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concern in this work

is

answering the question: does

parallel distributed processing (PDP) as a

model of the mind

genuine alternative to traditionalism?

There has been vigorous

debate within the

last eight

offer a

years on the subject of the relative

merits of the one model over the other; however, a detailed

examination of the nature of their respective differences has not

been attempted.

The mental realm

is

that realm in which causal interaction

governed by laws quantifying over representational
is

between mental

states are transitions

is

states.

the thesis that the law-governed transitions

Traditionalism

PDP

between computational

states.

the thesis that the transitions between mental states are

transitions

between distributed representational

states in a PDP-

type system. The representational content of a distributed state

determined by the causal history of the system
results

is

from the changing of system parameters

insert this state in the causal chain

external state-of-affairs

and

via learning so as to

between the perception of some

and behavior.
v

as a whole,

is

Traditionalism and

PDP are

best considered not as providing a

detailed picture of the causal processes involved in mental activity,

but rather as providing a general framework that sets broad
constraints on

how such law-governed

transitions proceed.

I

describe two aspects of qualitative distinctness that can be used

even when comparing such non-specific models. The

involves

first

examining the ontological commitment of each: assuming a
interpretation,

model
one

of the

may

what must

mind?

If

exist

if

traditionalism (or PDP)

the two models

make

the

is

realist

a true

same commitments,

ask the further question: do the constraints imposed on the

form that mental causal transitions take allow the

possibility of

an

isomorphism between causal sequences permitted by the one model
with those permitted by the other?
in

which representational content

shows that there

is

is

An examination

of the

manner

determined within PDP systems

no possible isomorphism. Therefore, the two

models are qualitatively

distinct.

vi
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION
1.1

Overview of the Issue

My main
views of

how

concern in
the

is

to

argue that two widely held

mind works present genuine

the model of the

another:

work

this

qualitatively distinct

mind

alternatives to one

associated with the one view

from the model associated with the

other.

is

The

two models being compared are traditionalism and parallel
distributed processing (PDP).

“Traditionalism”

is

name

the

I

have

chosen to designate that model of the mind commonly held within
post-behaviorist psychology and mainstream artificial intelligence.
It

is

known

also

“computationalism”.

proponent

is

as

“classicism”,

Among

philosophers,

is

governed by formalizable

processing (also

approach”)

its

most

and

oft-cited

Jerry Fodor. According to traditionalism, the causally

and the manipulation of

efficacious mental states are structured,

these states

“symbolism”,

is

known

rules.

as “connectionism”

a newer model of the

Parallel distributed

and “the neural networks

mind gaining

in popularity

within the cognitive science community. According to PDP, cognitive

processes are implemented in networks of

many

interconnected,

simple processing units.

The

title

of this dissertation, “Traditionalism

and

Parallel

Distributed Processing as Qualitatively Distinct Models of the Mind”,

provides a key into the structure of the remaining four chapters.

1

Obviously,

my argument

qualitatively distinct

is

that

two models are indeed

the

premised on a particular interpretation of

the four key phrases found within the

Each of Chapters 2-5

title.

includes an explication of one of the four phrases. Thus, Chapter 2

poses and then answers the question: what

Chapters

and 4 provide an analysis

3

what

it

means

for two

the task of explication

models

is

to

model of the mind?

a

of traditionalism

models of the mind, respectively. Chapter
of

is

5 begins

my

actual

as

with a discussion

be qualitatively

complete,

and PDP

Once

distinct.

argument

for the

qualitative distinctness of the two models follows rather easily.
In the rest of this section,

argument found

in the

body

I

provide an overview of the line of

of the dissertation.

should aid the reader in obtaining a
landscape of the work, so that
particular topics

my

feel for the philosophical

motivation for including the

and the particular arguments

becomes transparent. Stated

in

more

The

first

the mind”

and the examination of

2.

topic to consider involves the

when

in subsequent pages

poetic terms, the remainder of

this section describes the layout of the forest

individual trees begins in Chapter

This overview

meaning of “model of

applied to either traditionalism or PDP.

understanding of causation

is

A

clear

integral to the interpretation of one

system as a model of another, so

I

begin

my

examination of the

1
concept of modelhood with an analysis of causation.

I

assume a

greatest complaint against those who write in the field of cognitive
context
science is that they so often employ words understandable only in the
assumed \ie\\
of a particular interpretation of causation, yet fail to make their
s "On the
of causation explicit. A case in point is provided by Smolensky
read work by a
widely
most
the
is
which
Connectionism",
Proper Treatment of
he
Although
PDP.
on
literature
philosophical
PDP researcher within the
a
to
and
systems,
PDP
within
states
repeatedlv refers to representational

lMy

2

modified Lewisian view of causation:

determined by simplicity and strength

the

causal laws

These laws are

criteria.

analogous to axioms, which, in combination with the
conditions, yield the set of facts.
to Lewis

'

I

initial

must make several amendations

original proposal in order to

produce a theory that allows

for the existence of psychological laws. 2

causation,

are

I

prefer Lewis

approach

to

because, with the accompanying possible worlds

interpretation of counterfactuals,

I

am

able to explain

how

representational content can be causally efficacious within the

framework of a physicalist metaphysics.
feature, given that this

This

an important

is

whole work presupposes that there are

mental causal laws, and that these laws pick out the

states

based on

their representational content.
I

that
to

must here

differentiate

word appears within

it is

as

the phrase “model of the mind”. According

one sense, a model

framework:

between two senses of “model”,

is

the supplier of a general, abstract

not a concrete instantiation, hence,

it

cannot be said

relationship between the dynamics of PDP systems and cognitive processes, he
describes neither how representational states could possibly arise within such
systems nor how the relationship between PDP system states and cognitive
states is to be understood. As
shall argue in later chapters, the resolution of
both of these questions involves an explication of causation and its role in
determining meaning. The result of this failure to make the underlying
theory of causation explicit is sometimes arguments with ambiguous premises,
and a tendency for the potentially philosophically interesting exchanges
between proponents of traditionalism and proponents of PDP to degrade into
the two camps “talking past” one another, because they bring to the
discussion differing understandings of what causation (and, in particular,
causation as applied to the mental realm) is.
I

of several key assumptions to be found in this work is that there are
mental causal laws. I nowhere attempt to justify this claim against either of
the two groups opposed to the existence of mental causal laws. As a result,
convinced eliminativists and non-eliminativist philosophers and
psychologists who maintain that mental causal laws as such do not exist will
right from the start want to reject my analysis of mental modelhood.

^One

3

to itself instantiate causal laws.

model

Rather, a

in this sense

supplies a set of guidelines according to which a concrete
instantiation of the

model would be constructed.

other sense refers to the concrete instantiation

one

refers to a

laws,

one

is

model

as a

me

(i.e.,

Thus,

when

as a concrete physical object, subject to causal
Strictly speaking,

and PDP each are the supplier of a model

in the first sense.

system

itself.

using “model” in this second sense.

traditionalism

“Model” in the

However,

I

sometimes refer

to,

mind

of the

for example, a

PDP

a physical implementation of a network along PDP lines)

model of the mind. This ambiguity
to avoid use of the

in the

word “model”

more cumbersome, but

allows

technically

more

correct descriptor “concrete implementation of a system subject to

the constraints supplied by the PDP model of the mind”,
refering to such a
in

PDP system.

hope that

I

in each case the context

which “model of the mind” appears makes

“model”

is

when

its

clear

which sense of

meant.

When we

use one system to model another, we imply that the

modelling system reproduces certain relevant features of the

modelled system. Clearly, relevancy
our purpose in using the model

is

is

relative to our purposes.

to explain the behavior of the

modelled system, one relevant feature of the modelled system
set of causal laws operative in

If

producing the behavior

(or,

is

the

more

precisely, the set of causal laws operative in producing the subset of

behavior of the modelled system of interest to
explanatory model’s behavior

will

us).

Thus, an

not only mirror the behavior of

the
the modelled system, but will do so by virtue of instantiating

same causal laws responsible
4

for the behavior in the modelled

system.

If

our purpose in using one system as a model of another

merely prediction,

all

that

reproduce the sequence of

required

is

that the modelling system

states of the

modelled system, without

is

regard to whether or not that sequence

and PDP put

traditionalism

their respective

reproduced by

is

When

same causal processes.

instantiating the

is

proponents of

models forward, they do

so with the understanding that the models can be used not merely to

phenomena

predict, but also to explain mental

--

that the mental

causal laws operative in (biologically-based) entities are likewise

operative in bringing about the state transitions associated with
their respective models.
is

that mentation

is

(A related thesis endorsed by both camps

nothing above and beyond the instantiation of

mental causal laws. In particular, issues relating

and

its

role in mentation are not a concern.)

One
is

to consciousness

sees then, why, within the

so important to

make

domain

of cognitive science,

it

explicit the interpretation of causation being

presupposed. In order for a system to be an explanatory model of
the mind,

it

must

at a

minimum

be the sort of system that can

possibly instantiate mental causal laws.

over representational

states, the

supporting representational
traditionalism

is

Since these laws quantify

system must likewise be capable of

states.

a model of the mind

To say
is

(for

example) that

then to say that a system

structured according to the traditionalist guidelines can support

tokens of the very same state types mentioned by the mental causal
laws,

and that the

transitions

the mental causal laws.

5

between these

states are

governed by

What, then, distinguishes a traditionalist model:

what

constraints does traditionalism place on the hypothesized structure

of the

mind? (This

dissertation

is

the second of the four key phrases in the

According to

title.)

this view, the

mind

not in the concrete sense in which "computer"

is

is

a computer,

most often used

(namely, as a particular piece of hardware), but in the abstract sense
in

which the term appears

computer
which

is

whose

is

something with readily identifiable

transition function

How

are realized

A

computation.

defined as something that engages in computation,

in turn defined as

algorithm.

in the theory of

is

is

states

described by a formal, explicit

these states (usually called "computational states")

irrelevant:

they could equally well be "realized" in

the total states of an abstract Turing machine (the system state +

tape contents + position of the read/write head) or in the states of a

garden-variety silicon-based computer or in the states of a

human

nervous system. 3

The theory

of computation has

advanced

to the point

the border of the class of computable functions

is

where

well-known.

Traditionalism assumes not only that mental state transitions
constitute a computable function, but also that mental processing

is

computational processing, whereby the formalizable rules that force
This

the mental state transitions are the mental causal laws.

hypothesis places clear constraints on the nature of mental
processing.

work are

Two

that:

(1)

that bear directly to

my

main argument

in this

any possible transition sequence of mental

states

course glosses over the fact that all real computers are resourcebounded, whereas the standard Turing machine is not.

3 This of

6

consistent with traditionalism

must be computable, and

representational content of a particular mental state

is

inherited

from the representational content of the computational
which

it is

(2) the

state of

an instance.

A view

that goes hand-in-hand with traditionalism

language of thought (LOT) hypothesis.
computation,

it

is

the

is

Within the theory of

the total computational state that, strictly

speaking, must be rule-governed. According to the

LOT

hypothesis,

those monolithic computational states that are also mental states

have structure

to

which the mental causal laws are

sensitive:

in

particular, they have a combinatorial semantic structure that

mirrors a combinatorial syntactic structure. This structure explains
certain attributes of mental
implicit

phenomena

assumption of the argument for the LOT

structural parts of these mental states are the

very similar
language.

to)

An

that the semantic

is

same

as (or, at least,

Thus, a further feature of traditionalism (via

LOT argument)

represented by the mental states

A

.

the semantic structural parts of our natural

association with the

propositions

systematicity )

(e.g., its

(i.e.,

is

is

its

that the level of reality

that of word-concepts

and

entities easily representable in natural language).

final point to note

on traditionalism

love/hate) relationship with folk psychology

is

(i.e.,

its

(sometimes

the "folk" theory

explaining the behavior of mind-possessing beings by reference to
beliefs, desires, etc.

held by the entity and a set of generalizations

Unking the having of certain
behavior).

I

beliefs

and desires with certain types of

explicitly distinguish the two:

traditionalism

is

coherent on the view that mental states are something other than
7

beliefs, desires,

would be

whenever

and

in that case
I

want

concrete example,

the rest.

all

However, what traditionalism
As a

unclear.

is

result, within this text,

to illustrate a traditionalist principle with a
I

one from the domain of folk psychology.

pull

This does not, however, demonstrate an equation of the two.

Indeed, folk psychology
traditionalism:
folk

best viewed as a specification of

is

traditionalism provides the broad framework and

psychology provides the particular details

efficacious mental states

and mental causal

Parallel distributed processing,

widely familiar (and,
of the mind.

It

many

on the other hand,

as a rival to the continued

not so

dare to say, not so intuitive) as a model
last

decade or so

--

hegemony
initially

of traditionalism.

to

is

Its

earliest

PDP networks were constructed

models of neural processing within the brain.

relative youth, there

is

within the cognitive science community view

roots are in neuroscience
as

I

laws).

has gained in popularity over the

the point where
it

may

the set of

(i.e.,

Because of

not even a consensus within the

field of

its

PDP

researchers about what their current systems are modelling. In this

work,

I

explicitly

assume that PDP

mind. This means that

I

is

interpreted as a model of the

identify states within

PDP networks

that

are capable of supporting representational content,

and construe the

PDP model of the mind

way

as the view that the

meaningful states follow upon one another

which the mentally causally
agents follow

is

the very

that these

same way

in

efficacious states in biologically-based

upon one another. One consequence

of

my siding with

the mind-modelling (as opposed to the brain-modelling) contingent

8

among PDP

researchers

plausibility angle that

The most
of

many

that

is

downplay the physiological

I

one often meets

striking feature of

in the

PDP

literature.

PDP networks

is

that they consist

simple processing units that pass signals to one another.

The connections along which these

signals are passed have a

(perhaps alterable) number encoding the strength of connection

between the unit sending the signal and the unit receiving

number

is

unit to

which

sum

This

Each unit instantiates a simple

called the "weight".

function of the

it.

of the weight x output value (one product per

this unit is connected); this

output

turn serve as

will in

input for the other units with which this unit connects. The pattern
of connections for a network
architecture.

unit-a

is

is

one of the features determining

Some networks have

connected

bidirectional connections

to unit-b, then unit-b

Other networks are segmentable into

is

layers,

connected to

its

(i.e., if

unit-a).

such that information

passes (via the connections) in only one direction. (This net-type
called "feed forward".)

forward, but allow

Still

other networks are predominately feed

some connections

to go "in the other direction".

The network architecture determines the
that a
it

PDP system can

is

class of functions

instantiate, and, hence, the types of tasks that

can perform; some network architectures are extremely limited in

their task-solving capabilities, whereas others are powerful
to instantiate

any Turing-computable function.

the reader to keep in

same

as

computing

computation.

it.

mind

It is

important for

that instantiating a function

In particular,

(Many contributors

researchers and philosophers,
9

is

not the

PDP systems do not engage

to the

fail to

enough

PDP

literature,

note this point.

in

both PDP

However, as

even a cursory examination of PDP system dynamics shows, PDP
networks

fail

to satisfy the conditions for a computational process, as

understood within the theory of computation.)

how then

This said,
content,

if it is

does a PDP state possess representational

in theory disbarred

from inheriting

it

from the

corresponding computational state? This question leads naturally

how

into a discussion of

adopt Dretske'

s

approach

this case, a state in a

comes

representation

in general explained.

is

I

to the naturalization of content: a state (in

PDP system) comes

to play a causal role

to

mean

x

when

the state

mediating the presence-of-x and

behavior appropriate to the presence-of-x (for example, avoidance
behavior

when

x

s

are dangerous to the continued survival of the

system as a whole). Dretske's theory constitutes,

hope

for the naturalization of content,

artificial

is

it

any such agent,

applies just as well to

make learning

I

mentioned above

that,

each unit's connections has associated with
within PDP

is

it

on

within PDP systems,
a weight.

Learning

accomplished by the changes of these weights over

time, as the system adapts itself to

progresses, the system becomes

"correct"

a necessary feature

as the causal role that a particular state takes

a result of learning.

the

think, the best

mental agents as to biological ones.

His theory does, however,
for

and

I

behavior,

conditions. Various

environment:

more and more

given

methods

its

its

as learning

likely to

produce

immediate environmental

for achieving this directed changing of

weights have been developed for use with PDP networks; the most

popular

is

called "back-propagation" (or, usually, just "back-prop").

Using this technique, networks can be effectively (albeit slowly)
10

trained to correlate certain inputs

an

x)

with certain outputs

the presence of an
correlation meet

x).

all

(e.g.,

detection of the presence of

guidance of behavior appropriate

(e.g.,

to

In particular, the states mediating this

of Dretske's criteria for the attainment of

intentional state status.

There

is

a good deal of debate, even within the mind-

modelling contingent amongst PDP researchers, as to which states
within PDP systems are the bearers of content. This issue

more contentious because there
Is it

is all

are two dimensions to consider:

the
(

1

the unit level or the patterns over units level that provides the

correct level of analysis of a

PDP system

model of the mind?

as a

(Are the intentional states, the contents of which are quantified over
in

mental causal laws,

level?)

Is

(2)

it

found

to be

at the unit or at the pattern

the unit output state that

is

the sought after

representational state, or the weight state, or perhaps both together?
In

my

analysis of

PDP

as a

model of the mind,

I

identify the output 4

plus weight state over patterns of units as the states that, by virtue
of their content, participate in mental causal laws. This content, like

that

associated with the

traditionalism,

is at

causally efficacious

states

within

the level of word-concepts and propositions

again, as with traditionalism, those objects

(i.e.,

and statements that are

easily representable in natural language).

PDP

is

useful as a

between these

states

model of the mind because the

transitions

can be studied (both within the framework of

particular experiments

and

theoretically) in isolation

from much of

of the
^Technically speaking, adopt the activation value as one component
any
of
not
is
though,
difference,
meaning state, not the output. This
theoretical importance.
I

11

the psychologically irrelevant details that co-occur in humans. The

mathematical basis of the syntax of PDP systems

fairly well

is

understood, and can be tapped to provide information on the
constraints governing transitions amongst these states.

model of the mind holds

PDP

as

that these constraints are operative in any

mind-possessing being, and result from the causal governedness of

mental

state transitions.

The

"traditionalism

mind"

key phrases within the statement

final of the four

and PDP are

qualitatively distinct

What

relates to qualitative distinctness.

must be

satisfied

when two models

choice of words indicate that what

whether two

for deciding

I

models of the

is it?

What

criteria

are qualitatively distinct?

am

after

is

My

a general framework

scientific theories (irrespective of their

domain) are the same theory with a difference

in terminology,

distinct theories differing only in quantitative respects, or really two

theories with differences that allow neither an easy intertranslation

nor an easy shifting from one
of

need was

accomplish

to use

this task,

inappropriate.
distinctness,

I

first,

Kuhn's "incommensurability"

to try to

in

I

both theories.

quickly abandoned that concept as

therefore developed the notion of qualitative

which

perhaps, best explained by giving the

is,

it.

The algorithm

consists of two stages.

one asks whether the two theories

their ontological

commitments. This

realist interpretation to

each one:

My

in the value

reaction to

but

algorithm that tests for
the

by a change

initial

some constant appearing

this

to the other

what must

is

In

differ with respect to

accomplished by giving a

each of the two theories, and asking, for
exist

12

if

this

theory

is

true?

Among

the

ontological

commitments of a theory

are

its

very broad metaphysical

assumptions, plus a commitment to the existence of the objects and
their states quantified over in the causal laws forming that theory.
If

two theories differ with respect to their ontological

the

commitments, then they are qualitatively
continues to the second stage of the

distinct.

If

one

not,

test for qualitative distinctness.

This second stage involves sameness of posited causal
processes.

Given that both theories have the same ontological

commitments with respect
first

to the causally efficacious entities,

matches up the corresponding

The two theories are

entities across the

qualitatively distinct

within the one theory

is

when

one

two theories.

the causal relation

not isomorphic to the causal relation within

the other, using the correspondence mentioned above as mapping.

When

such an isomorphism

exists, the

two theories are qualitatively

indistinct. 5

Once
5,

I

this (extended) bit of stage-setting is

can give

distinct

my

answer:

traditionalism

complete in Chapter

and PDP are

qualitatively

models of the mind. .Although the two theories make the

same ontological commitments, the
of causal laws

constraints

on the possible

imposed by the two implies that there

will

sets

be no

possible isomorphism.

too simple, for this
differing only in quantitative ways.
5 Actually, this is

13

way

of putting

it

distinguishes theories

1.2 Relation of Issue to

Other Areas of Philosophy

Even the above sketch
dissertation

sufficient

is

to

show

that

this

not easily pigeon-holed into one of the traditional

is

areas of philosophy.

philosophy of mind,

I

While

my

top-level concern

also deal with issues

in

is

more properly

the

part of the

philosophy of science.

The most obvious

classic philosophical issue that

and PDP,

the nature of the mental. For both traditionalism

mind

is

to

engage in mentation;

to

address

I

engage in mentation

is

to

is

have a

to possess

representational states, the transitions between which are governed

by the mental causal

laws; the mental causal laws are those laws of

nature that advert to content.
traditionalism and

mental

states.

traditionalism

PDP

It is

'

s

The main difference between

relates to the transition function

just as important to note

and PDP'

s

whatsoever of an aspect of

what

We

account of the mind.

human mentation

that

between

is

omitted in

see

no mention

some philosophers

take as a defining characteristic; namely, consciousness.
In

both traditionalism and PDP, the overarching goal (so

overarching, that most researchers within both camps are probably

unaware of

room

it)

is

to explain mentation, and, in particular, to

make

for the causal efficacy of mental states within a broad

physicalist framework. In this regard, they find

philosophers

who

reject both eliminativism

company with

those

and dualistic-based

attempts to argue for the reality of mind. Even traditionalism, with
its

Cartesianesque rationalist assumptions with respect to the

14

innateness of the mental conceptual framework, thoroughly rejects
Cartesian metaphysics.
In addition to the

above

issues, this dissertation also deals in

depth with some topics most often associated with the philosophy of

The most prominent

science.

what

causation:

is it

of these surrounds the nature of

in general,

and how

is

the causal efficacy of

mental states in particular to be understood? As already mentioned,
I

adopt a Lewisian construal of causation, but modify

make

it

more

realist in general,

and more amenable

it

so as to

to the existence

of causal processes at levels other than that of basic physics.

The

appropriateness of the attribution of realism to this modified view

achieved by

(1)

assuming that a

and strength

simplicity
(2) giving

criteria

rationalist explication of the (true)

can

(at least, in

theory) be given, and

a realist interpretation to the closeness ordering on the

possible worlds.

(which are,

I

My

motivation for bringing in possible worlds

think, best to be avoided

metaphysical suspectness)
causally relevant.

I

is

if

at all possible, given their

to help explain

how

content can be

emphasize repeatedly (especially in Chapter

that philosophers have been too quick to discard content.

see

is

Stich's

"syntactic

theory

of

the

Thus we

and Fodor

mind"

2)

s

"methodological solipsism" as rather misguided attempts to justify
the continued use of terminology referring to the

mental

states.

my view,

mind and

to

Their respective attempts are counterproductive, in

for the theory of the "mind" that remains after

a causally relevant property has been removed

15

is

meaning

as

no theory of the

mind

at all 6
.

I

trace this misguided rejection of content back to a

misconstrual of the counterfactual testing for the causal relevance of
content.

The need

for a worked-out interpretation

analysis of counterfactual statements thus drives

A second

topic that

I

take

up

me

schema

to Lewis.

in this dissertation that

labelled as a part of the philosophy of science involves the

of scientific disciplines.

If

for the

is

also

autonomy

both models of the mind are through and

through physicalist, then there must be either reductive or

at least

supervenient relations linking mental states and physical

Doesn't the presumed existence of these relations make

states.

all

non-

physical states (in particular, mental states) causally inert? The
generally assumed ceteris paribus nature of

all

causal laws outside

of basic physics lends additional weight to the argument that causal

processes, properly understood, occur only at the level of basic
physics. In the course of arguing against this limitation of the scope
of "causation",

I

consider evidence both pro and con relevant to the

topic.

A

third area of concern (also a quintessential part of the

philosophy of science) within

this

work

is

the relationship between

two models attempting to explain the same level of
traditionalism

and PDP both

reality.

If

are models of the mind, must they

necessarily be understood as competing

(in

the sense that

consistency requires that the acceptance of one implies the rejection
of the other)?

to

be non-competing, what

for their relationship to

one another and for the

If it is

would that mean

possible for

them

than consistent in his rejection of meaning as causally relevant;
the less
isolate the "solipsistic" tendency within his writings as
thus,
me.
by
reconstructed
representative of his view as
6 Fodor is less
1

16

nature of the mind? While

and PDP

examine

I

as examples, the

this issue using traditionalism

same concerns and questions apply

to

other scientific domains.

There are a few other subtopics within the philosophy of
science that

I

touch on

(e.g.,

the sociology of scientific practice a la

Kuhn), but they are best viewed as side-issues, not directly relevant

argument that

to the line of

1.3 Relation of Issue to

The

I

develop in the following four chapters.

Other Disciplines

issues being considered in this dissertation span not only

multiple areas within philosophy, but also multiple disciplines. In
particular, the other disciplines with interests in cognitive science
(i.e.,

psychology,

suppliers of

artificial intelligence,

many

and neuroscience) are the

of the concepts and theories that appear

throughout the rest of the work.
Artificial intelligence 7 is the provider of the

compared.

Normal

scientific practice within AI

two models being
is

not concerned

with the implications, whether conceptual or psychological, of
Rather, the usual methodology

research.

interesting task

solve

it.

and

While AI

is

is

to isolate

is

irrelevant.

some

to then try to build a particular system that can

thoroughly empirical, the issue of whether the

constructed system solves the task in the same way as a

would

its

Perhaps a

human

human

task-solver can serve as a

include under this rubric all attempts at producing intelligence via nonnatural svstems. Thus, PDP is just as much a part of AI as traditionalism. When
mean to refer only to the traditionalist wing of AI, use the phrase

7

1

I

I

"mainstream

AI".
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source of ideas for strategies to use in the construction of the
artifical

the

system, but the question of whether the machine

same thing

remained

as the

is

doing

a non-issue. To this extent, AI has

faithful to Turing's original advice vis-a-vis testing for

intelligence: roughly,
intelligent,
AI,

human

is

then

it is . 8

if

a system

The

s

behavior leads you to think

traditionalist

and PDP models,

it is

as tools of

help to constrain the search for a system that can solve the task.

So, for

example, a PDP researcher identifies a target

about answering the question: can an

task,

and

sets

system with a PDP

artificial

architecture solve this task?
It is

only in the hands of the cognitive psychologist that the

two AI frameworks take on the role of genuine mental models. A
reconstruction of the process by which psychologists have come to

accept either of the two models might go something like

produced

artificial

systems that can solve some cognitively

within (either traditionalist or PDP) AI systems
in the mind. Let's

work on

theoretical advantage of the AI models over
is

is

the same as that

that assumption

the data from psychological experiments

candidate model

fits

and see

the model.

some other

if

The

potential

that the former are consonant with physicalism,

and the vast majority of psychologists assume a
metaphysics.

AI has

Perhaps the abstract architecture implemented

interesting tasks.

implemented

this.

my

As with

cognitive psychology

is

above portrayal of

also

physicalist

AI, this portrayal of

an oversimplification. Of course, some

a generalization of what goes
on in the process of research within AI labs. Many AI researchers are
interested in reproducing not only I/O behavior related to human tasksolving, but also the intermediate steps involved. In doing so, however, they
are entering the domain properly belonging to psychology.
8 Clearly, this portrayal of

"normal science"
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is

cognitive psychologists have research interests only tangentially
related to that above
relationship between

those psychologists interested in the

(e.g.,

mind and brain

are a case in point).

And, of

course, people outside of cognitive psychology are interested in

empirical support for one or the other model.

language of thought argument
to the

domain of psychology
It is

clear that

psychological, for

I

my

.

I

think, best

viewed as belonging

9

concern here

explicitly state

based arguments of any kind.

argument only

is,

Indeed, Fodor's

(I

is

philosophical rather than

my lack

expend

of interest in empirically-

effort in

examining the LOT

to help elucidate the traditionalist position vis-a-vis

the level of reality represented by mental states and to consider but

then reject the transcendentalist interpretation of

and
is

will

from time

it.)

to time reiterate this lack of interest.

the neglect of the question: which of the two models

I

state here

One
is

result

the best?

While the traditionalism versus PDP debate revolves around
question,

I

disregard

it

as outside of the proper

this

domain

of

philosophy.

The

last discipline to

consider within cognitive science

is

neuroscience; in particular, that area of neuroscience concerned with

phenomena. This

the relationship between neural

and mental

dissertation contains very

of interest to the neuroscientist.

fact,

I

little

level

In

only touch on neuroscientific issues in providing a brief

history of the development of PDP.

but as
interpret the LOT argument, not as a transcendental argument,
an inference to the best explanation.

91

s hall
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1.4 Personalities

Many

and Their Positions

writers have expressed their view on the issue of the

superiority of either traditionalism or

PDP

as a

model of the mind.

Within these writings, one can often tease out assumptions relating
directly to the topic of this dissertation: namely, are the two models

qualitatively distinct?

The philosopher most often
is

Jerry Fodor.

He

cited in the literature

on

this topic

clearly enunciates his view that the two

are qualitatively distinct.

His reasoning

is

models

that empirical evidence

supports the interpretation of traditionalism as a model of the mind

and PDP

as a

model of the implementation

level of the

mind.

Because the two models are models of different things, they must be
qualitatively distinct 10
.

Another author whose views are often

cited

is

Paul Smolensky

(an AI researcher and supporter of PDP as the correct model of the

mind).

He

is

likewise of the opinion that the two models are

qualitatively distinct, although, as

one might guess,

from those of Fodor and Pylyshyn. For him, PDP
description

is

his reasons differ

at the unit level of

the correct model of the mind, and traditionalism

approximation to the gross characteristics of pattern

Thus

PDP

he, like

is

level activity.

Fodor and Pylyshyn, understands traditionalism and

as modelling two distinct levels of reality.

relationship between traditionalism and

PDP

He describes the

as analogous to that

10 Recause Fodor co-wrote with Zenon Pylyshyn (a computer scientist and
mainstream AI researcher) the first work in which he explicitly mentions
use both names whenever refer to the LOT argument as applied
PDP,
specifically to the issue of the adequacy of PDP as a model of the mind.
I

an

I
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between Newtonian and quantum mechanics: the laws of quantum
physics are the true, counterfactual supporting laws governing

between physical

transitions

states.

The laws

all

Newtonian physics,

of

while offering accurate predictions over a limited range of physical

phenomena, are only an approximation
physical laws.

of the underlying, genuine

Thus, in a sense, quantum physics implements

Newtonian physics

(at least to the extent that the laws of the latter

can be derived from an averaging over a very large number of
individual

quantum mechanical

processes). Just so,

PDP provides the

and traditionalism approximates the mental

true mental causal laws,

microprocesses by averaging over a large number of these causally

determined microprocesses.
traditionalism

and PDP are

On

qualitatively distinct.

Some philosophers who have
traditionalism versus

involves interpretting
Patricia

of late contributed to the

PDP debate on the

the scope of this work, for their

is

view of their relationship,

this

.

main motivation

as eliminativist.

it

Churchland

side of the latter fall outside

11

in supporting

An example

in this

PDP

group

Stich can perhaps also be put into this

group, although he denies being an eliminativist

.

12

1.5 Outline of Rest of Dissertation

Before embarking on the body of this work,

I

would

like to

give the reader a general idea of where various topics are taken up,

and of which views and arguments are

original,

and which are

USee her Neurophilosophy.
12 See

Ramsey,

Stich,

and Garon's "Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the

Future of Folk Psychology".
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re-

hashes of the ideas of others. Each of the remaining four chapters
includes a detailed analysis of one of the four key phrases in the
thesis

title.

Chapter

In

2,

I

provide the description of mental causation

that will be presupposed in the other chapters. In the

how

describe

I

will

be understanding causation as a general

As already mentioned,

not at

Indeed,

To

my

I

all

clear that

would assume

I

relation.

use Lewis' theory as a starting point.

I

However, given the large number of amendations that
is

first section,

it is

I

make

to

it, it

correctly described as "Lewis' view".

that, if asked, Lewis

would openly

reject

it.

knowledge, no one else has written on how a Lewis-style

interpretation of causation would need to be changed to

make

it

applicable to the special sciences in general, and to psychology in
In the second section,

particular.

from the

phenomena
new,

them

as those

try to delimit the

mental realm

what properties do mental phenomena

rest of reality:

possess that set

I

off as mental?

While identifying mental

governed by laws adverting

to content

is

not

do produce several arguments working out some of the

I

ramifications of this equation, both in general and as relevant to
traditionalism
section

is

and PDP

as

models of the mind. Most of the third

taken up with an (original) argument that content

is

causally relevant, even supposing a physicalist metaphysics. The socalled

problem of mental causation

is

one among the several

problems in applying the notion of causation
this third section,

the others.

I

also consider

The fourth

scientific
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mental realm. In

and suggest solutions

section gives

between a model and the

to the

my

classic

for

some

of

view of the relationship

domain being modelled. Along

the way,

I

make

a distinction between two types of models

(explanatory versus merely predicting) that seems to

me

to be

important to understanding what role traditionalism and PDP are
playing within psychology. As far as

working out of

its

know,

I

this distinction

and the

implications are original. In the fourth section,

I

try to tie together the various views put forward in the first three

sections to produce a coherent picture of the relationship between a

model of the mind and mental causation.
Chapter

3 deals with

In the first section,

I

traditionalism.

the way,

I

I

have

tried to

make

have written

I

it

places

statehood as that concept

is

is

section,

I

its

domain. Along

of traditionalism

is

and

laws.

an analysis of computational

perhaps new to some readers,

used in Chapter

brief history of PDP,

is

model and

used within traditionalism. Again,

different treatment to the topic of

section

work through the

to

my

this is original.

Because PDP

literature

its

false picture of

on the form of the mental causal

in Section 2

I

I

commitments

Another subject taken up

the one

and

in the first section in the light of

relationship between a

the constraints that

implicit

this section as unoriginal

second section,

the

In

isolate the ontological

knowedge,

its

be accused of presenting a

I

implications of what

my view of the

traditionalist model.

describe traditionalism, both

explicit assumptions.

as possible, lest

an explication of the

3.

I

PDP

as a

I

give a slightly

model of the mind than

start off the fourth

chapter with a

and provide some sample quotations from

showing the diversity that

fits

under the PDP banner. This

mostly summary and direct quotation.
give a syntactic description of
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the

In the second

PDP systems,

again,

on the

assumption that

this is all

new

to the reader.

describe the building

I

blocks of PDP networks, and try to give a feel to the reader for the

dynamics of such systems. Sections

PDP

for

as

Chapter

3

and 4 cover the same ground

covered for traditionalism.

3

I

distinguish

between two differing views of the model of the mind being offered

by PDP (namely, the

and argue

and distributed interpretation schema),

local

for the superiority of the latter as offering the most

coherent model of the mind. Along the way,

PDP

come

states

have content.

to

I

The

naturalization of content for

PDP systems

theory of representation.

adopt Dretske

remainder of

this project is

for explaining
illustrate

it

how

the

I

is

wholly original.

PDP

states

need

I

come

Once

interpretting

PDP

how

of the

the enunciation of a

wholecloth.

s,

The

give general principles
to

have content and
'

s

coming

to

have a

of the pieces are in place for

all

model of the mind,

as a

stage

first

with an example of a particular state

particular content.

to explain

I

identify the ontological

commitments made and the constraints on the causal laws offered
by

it.

The

final

chapter begins by providing an explication of the

fourth key phrase: qualitative distinctness. The concept as such

new, but the parts out of which

it is

is

constructed are borrowed. The

idea of comparing ontological commitments comes from Kuhn, and
the idea of checking for an isomorphism between items originates

with Putnam (although, his functional isomorphism needed some

working to make

and make
examples.

clear

it fit

what

an inter-model comparison).
I

mean by

The second section
24

I

re-

try to illustrate

qualitative distinctness with several
is

not directly relevant to the main

line of

argument

included

it

in this work, but

anyway.

was fun

it

In this section,

scientific evolution (with particular

to think about, so

I

examine Kuhn's theory of

I

emphasis on the role played by

incommensurability within that theory) and apply

it

to the current

state of cognitive science with respect to the traditionalism versus

PDP debate.

I

include some criticisms of Kuhn's theory, and

distinguish his incommensurability from

The

title

my qualitative

distinctness.

of the third section ("Some answers given by others") might

lead one to mistakenly believe that the section

many

summarization. However,

of the writings in this area are so

ambiguous and require so much "reading between the
arguments found

in this section are

of approaching that topic

or another person

is

nothing but

is

more

original than not.

to isolate a clearly-stated

who wrote on

lines" that the

this topic,

My way

view from one

and, using that as a

premise, try to construct an argument either that the two models are
or are not qualitatively distinct. In the fourth section,

consider and

I

then discard several arguments within the traditionalism versus PDP

debate relating to computability.

then consider and reject the

I

interpretation of Fodor's

LOT argument

conditions for something

being a mind. The argument

form of

its

rejection

is

s

new.

The

as supplying necessary

final section gives

my

is

preferred

answer to the question: are the two models qualitatively

My

aim

in the first

stage, so that

my

200-odd pages of

this dissertation

is

old, this

distinct?

to set the

conclusion "yes, they are" would follow in a

straightforward manner.

I

hope that
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I

have succeeded.

CHAPTER

WHAT
The

MENTAL CAUSATION, ANYWAY?

IS

logical place to begin a

cognitive models

something

to

work dealing with a comparison

with a description of what

is

be a model. After

all,

model of a domain, so the question

make

it

maintain

2

for

not any old system counts as a

what features

arises:

of a system

a possible candidate as a model of another system?

minimum,

that, at a

level of description)

model our

(at

a suitable

and the modelling system. For example, were

solar system (say, with a desktop reproduction of

the relevant parts that

I

I

there must be a correspondence

between the constituent parts of the modelled system

to

means

it

of

would need

to include in

I

it),

order for the

desktop system to be a genuine model of the solar system would be
the sun and planets.

In order to be a genuine model, the desktop

version need not reproduce every detail of the actual solar system.

A

second necessary condition for modelhood

is

that the important

interrelationships between the parts of the modelled system are

reproduced in the modelling system. What

made

to the use to

be

explanatory

mode

--

of the model.

When

is

it is

important

is

relative

to function in a non-

merely keeping track of places

--

the causal

relationship amongst the parts of the modelled system need not be

When, however, the model

is

intended as providing an explanation of the modelled system,

it

reproduced

in the modelling system.

must reproduce the relevant causal
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relations.

A

simple thought experiment should convince the reader of

this assertion:

Imagine I set a pendulum in motion and a child
approaches me and asks: "Explain to me the motion
of the pendulum, especially its going from the one
extreme to the other." Suppose further that my
response is as follows:
"You see, there exists
(abstractly) this Turing Machine with the two states,
51 and S2, such that SI corresponds to the
pendulum's being at its left-most extreme position,
and S2 corresponds to the pendulum's right-most
extreme position. The look-up table of the Turing
Machine consists of two items:
(<S1

!

*

(don't care)><S2

(<S2

!

*

(don't care)><Sl

!

!

0 no move>)
!

0 no move>) 1
!

So you see that the Turing Machine goes from SI to
52 and back again forever, and that explains the
motion of the pendulum."

My

intuitions

tell

me

that the above usage

is

improper:

merely

displaying a correspondence between the states of an entity and the
states of

some

abstract

machine (being put forward

as a potential

model) does not explain the former. A more appropriate word
use in this context

"describe": the abstract

machine describes the

Explanation requires something more than just regular

behavior.

correspondence

my

--

in particular,

Were

causal laws.
replacing

is

to

I

it

to retell the

requires subsumption under

above thought experiment,

"explanation" with a description of the

pendulum

s

behavior as resulting from the effect of gravity and tension in the

iThe formalism adopt for the items in the look up table of the Turing
Machine is
(cnachine state at time Tlchar under read/ write head at T>
<machine state at T+l!write at current head positionlmove head>)
I

:
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pendulum'

s

string,

would submit

--

intuitions

would immediately change, and

that, in that case, "explain''

for this reason that

causation

my

must begin

was properly used.

I

It is

work with an explication

of

both in general and in the mental domain. Returning

to

I

this

our desktop solar system as place-holding example, the relevant
relations

and

would include

relative diameters.

relative distances
If

among

the desktop system

the sun
is

to

and planets

model not the

solar system at a particular time, but rather the solar system as a

dynamic system, then an additional interrelationship
desktop system must capture
the planets.

If,

is

the relative rotational velocities of

on the other hand, we wish

system as an explanatory model of the

somehow have

that the

to use the

desktop solar

real solar system,

to capture the causal relations

we

will

which underlie the

behavior of the real solar system in our desktop model. Because of
the difficulty of overcoming the interfering causal relations to which

the desktop (but not the real) solar system

is

subjected, this

is

nearly impossible on earth. Hence, such a desktop model could not
serve as an explanatory' model of the real solar system.
solar system

example

is

rather simple,

sorts of considerations that

it

While the

serves to illustrate the

go into construing one system as a model

of another.

Returning to the task at hand, what are the parts and their
relevant interrelationships in a cognitive system? Unlike the solar

system case, the "parts" are not physical parts

even

if

one believes that

states, for, as

mental

all

(this

must be the

mental states are reducible

a description of a cognitive system,

that are relevant, irrespective of

28

how

it

case,

to physical
is

states as

those states are

realized). Rather, the parts of a cognitive

A

states. 2

(for

cognitive system

may

system include intentional

also include non-intentional states

example, pain states and other qualia) as parts. The relevant

interrelationships

among

these states that any adequate model must

capture are the causal interrelationships.

It is

for this reason that

I

begin an explication of modelhood with a discussion of causation.

2.1

What

Causation in General?

seldom that a philosopher of mind begins a paper with an

It is

explicit

is

account of the theory of causation being assumed whenever

she uses terminology adverting to causal interaction.
general rule

what

is

is

to use causal terminology without

meant thereby. This can

Rather, the

making

it

clear

result in misunderstandings

when

the reader assumes one theory while the author assumes another.
Particularly prevalent are situations in
realist

which one party assumes a

understanding and the other party an

of causal terminology.
will lay

irrealist

understanding

To avoid such possible misunderstandings,

I

out in advance the underlying theory being assumed

whenever

I

use the word "cause" and

on where

I

am making

its

cognates, laying emphasis

ontological commitments.

In addition, this

has come to be the standard practice in the philosophy of mind to mention
Brentano' s assertion that the hallmark of mental systems - what sets them
apart from all other types of systems — is that they consist of states which are
essentially representational. I shall follow standard practice in this regard.
Some (notably eliminativists) may maintain that there are no mental states,
and that the totality of cognitive capabilites are explainable without recourse
am
to mental/intentional type talk; however, as stated in Chapter 1,
and
component,
mental
assuming the contrary. Cognition has an essential
what distinguishes mental states is their intentionally.
2

It

I
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section will aid in fleshing out the sorts of objects that are relevant
to a

model.
Stated broadly, the goal of a scientific discipline, whether

astronomy, biology, or psychology,

is

to identify the rules

it

be

which

capture the regularities of the state transitions of the objects of

concern to the discipline (that

is,

rules with the

form S1->S2, where

SI and S2 are state descriptions of an object or of objects (possibly

complex), and

is

not

logical,

but rather nomological implication).

For astronomy, the relevant objects are celestial bodies, and the
regularities to be captured involve repeated patterns of

The

those bodies.

mere

assumed

rules are, however,

to

motion of

be more than

generalizations, true of the observed state transitions, but

possibly not true of unobserved or yet-to-be-observed state
Rather, they are assumed to codify an underlying

transitions.

natural

(or,

in

accordance with philosophical terminology,

nomological) relationship, such that not only the observed

and the yet-to-be-observed

transitions

state

transitions, but also the

counterfactually observed transitions, proceed in accordance with
the rules. That
to

is,

the rules justify sentences of the form:

be the case that SI, then

that S2".

So, at a

it

would (shortly

minimum,

rules.

is

causally-produced

(My treatment

causation

-- ie,

were

thereafter) be the case

a theory of causation must support

counterfactual claims regarding state transitions.
transition

"if it

when

it is

A

particular state

an instance of one of these

of causation specifically discounts event

the analysis of causation at the level of particular

events, without the requirement of subsumption under a causal
law.) So, si

is

the cause of s2
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if

and only

if

si

is

an instance of

SI,

and

s2

an instance of

is

can be read in English as "SI

and

si

is

s

'

a causal law that S1->S2 (this

are nomologically sufficient for S2

'

s"),

The

potential difficulties arise regarding the interpretation of
first

involves statistical laws: what

with a probability less than 1.0
S2,

it is

followed by s2.

Two
this.

and

S2,

but of those that
laws in

statistical

(i.e.,

are, the S2

quantum

is

from the case of

prediction:

we cannot say

'

follow

upon Si's

followed by an

is

caused by the SI)?

We

see such

The interpretation of

physics.

statistical

laws

is

slightly

non-statistical laws with respect to

that

if

an instance of SI occurs, an

instance of S2 will immediately follow.
statistical

S2

not every SI

nomological sufficiency for the case of
different

if

However, the role that

laws play with respect to explanation remains the same as

with non-statistical laws:

after the fact,

when an S2 immediately

follows an SI, si was the cause of s2.

We

by extending the meaning of S1~>S2

to include statistical laws:

can easily cover

now, S1-->S2 means "Si's are nomologically
probability p".

While

it

is

this case

sufficient for S2

'

s

so

with

an empirical question whether

psychological laws are statistical in nature,

I

will (admittedly,

without any attempt at justification) assume that they are not. As

my

ultimate concern

is

an explication of mental causation,

I

shall

henceforth treat causation and causal laws as non-statistical: to say
that Si's cause S2's

is

to say that, given

an SI, an S2

will (with

probability=1.0) follow, subject to ceteris paribus constraints, as per

below.

The second potential

difficulty regarding

my

theory of

causation involves the status of non-strict (so called ceteris paribus
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)

laws.

It is

(universally?) accepted that

all

non-basic laws have a

suppressed ceteris paribus proviso: only for the most basic physical
laws do S2

s

always follow upon Si's, irrespective of

about the world. Does

this

mean then

that

all

all

other facts

non-basic laws are not

precisely-speaking genuine laws? The consequences of accepting

such a view are far-reaching.
the capitulation that

For the physicalist, this amounts to

"laws" other than those dealing with state

all

transitions in basic physics are not genuine laws, but merely

approximations.

In particular, psychological laws (and, hence,

mental causation) are impossibilities.

One way out

of this

dilemma

is

to reject physicalism: there are

basic laws quantifying over something other than physical states. In
particular, for the non-physicalist

who

is

keen on maintaining the

existence of psychological laws under this precise construal of

"lawhood", there are basic (hence, potentially

over intentional

states.

This

is

laws quantifying

strict)

not an option that

I

can take, for in

describing traditionalism and PDP as cognitive models,

remain

faithful to traditionalism

their proponents:

and PDP

in each case,

it is

I

must

as they are understood

assumed

by

that the causally-

interacting objects are ultimately instantiated in physical matter.

This leaves only two options:

either accept the claim that

there are no causal laws covering state transitions of objects that are

not the entities of basic physics, or relax the criteria for causal

lawhood

to include non-strict

(i.e.,

ceteris paribus) laws.

Fodor has persuasively argued in Chapter
choosing the

first

5 of

As Jerry

A Theory of Content

option means not only that

all

,

purported

psychological laws are not entitled to the claim to lawhood, but also
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that all purported laws in

non-laws.

If

a discipline

all

is

disciplines other than basic physics are

a science by virtue of locating the causal

laws relating state transitions of

relevant objects, then

its

called special sciences are not genuine sciences.

I,

all so-

along with Fodor,

take this as a reductio of the appropriateness of the equation of

Any adequate theory

"causal laws" with "strict laws".

must allow
Here

for non-strict laws.
I

would

in causal laws,

and

of causation

like to distinguish

two sources of non-strictness

roughly characterizable as countervailing tendencies

unsatisfied

implementation-level

"countervailing tendencies"

assumptions.

By

have in mind the existence and

I

instantiation of other causal processes that tend to produce the

opposite effect as that produced by the causal law in question.

example from Newtonian physics
strictness.

It is

illustrates this source of

a law that rigid bodies

move

in the

an applied force with an acceleration equal
force divided by the mass of the body.

even as applied to middle-sized

same direction

body

in the opposite direction.

to the strength of the

is

not exceptionless, for

handy notion

Newtonian physics has developed

of the vectorial

summation of forces (which,

Newton force

ball

in

not a particular force being applied to the body) to explain

the "exceptional cases" to this law. Thus, even though
1

of

be other forces exerted on the body that tend to move the

may

reality, is

non-

Strictly-speaking, this law,

rigid bodies,

there

the

An

to a rigid ball,

it is

I

may

apply a

nomologically possible that the

does not accelerate in the direction of the application of the

force,

because in addition

to this 1

N

force, there

force being applied along the same axis as the
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is

a second

first,

1

N

but in the

opposite direction. Consider an example of countervailing tendencies
closer to the

domain

law that

desire to eat

if

I

disposal rights to

x,

of this work. Suppose that

then

x,

and

I

believe that

will eat x.

I

it is

I

have unrestricted

Suppose further that

desire to be well-respected, and a belief that

respected
that

it is

see the

if

I

publicly give x to

also a law that

means

(via those

if

to achieve

my

have a

be well-

to achieve condition

y as readily available to me, then

means) achieve

y.

Even though

I

may

myself, the countervailing causal process explains

and

will

I

I

some needy person. Suppose further

have a desire

I

a psychological

giving of x to the

needy person.

countervailing (physical) forces,

we

y and
I

will

desire to eat x

my failing

to eat x

Just as in the case of

see that the

mere

satisfaction of

the nomologically sufficient conditions does not guarantee the
obtaining of the effect.

The second source of non-strictness
(summarized above as the lack of
level assumption)

is

what

is

in

causal

laws

satisfaction of implementation-

usually intended to be captured under

the rubric "ceteris paribus" (at least, as Fodor uses the term). The
"ceteris paribus"

physicalism)

all

is

intended to capture the fact that (assuming

objects are implemented in physical stuff,

all

causally-governed state transitions of the non-basic objects occur as
a function of the causally-governed state transitions of the objects

implementing constituents, and occasionally, the background
assumptions of a causal law (statable only

in the

vocabulary of the

3
science of the implementing constituents) are not satisfied.

3 One may argue that the need for ceteris parihus laws shows that the objects
postulated by the special sciences do not "carve nature at the joints", but that
the objects are merely "close approximations" to the true strict causally
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Returning to the formulation of cuusul luwhood,
"Si's are nomologically sufficient for S2
particular SI, si,
simpliciter:

is

'

followed by an S2,

the non-strictness

is

s,

ceteris paribus".

s2, si is the

When

cause of

It is

statement that psychological laws are non-strict

model of the mind

is

incompatible with

However, such an argument, while interesting as a counter
claim that Fodor

'

s

at

arguable that the

be discussed in Chapter

to

a

s2,

only at the level of lawhood, not

the level of particular causal interactions.

traditionalism (the

SI — >S2" meuns

3).

to the

various views relevant to the nature of the mind

are consistent, would not be directly relevant to the topic of this

work.

So

far,

I

have not specified what makes a

description a causal law.

One

state transition

aspect involves the "naturalness" of

the connection between the two states.

I

mentioned previously that

in order for a generalization relating two states to be a causal law,

must hold not only
Si's.

How

is

for

all

actual Si

this condition to

s,

but also for

all

it

counterfactual

be understood? 4 Most importantly,

interacting aggregates, and, rather than capitulating to the tendency to
accept the status quo in the special sciences, we should withhold the title of
"science" from those disciplines which have not yet located the true causally
interacting aggregates, on the assumption that, eventually, the special
sciences will be able to locate the "natural" objects and the strict causal laws
relating their states. While I find this line of argument somewhat compelling,
I take the universality of non-strictness of laws in the special sciences to
indicate that it is not that the scientists in those disciplines are sloppy, nor
that the disciplines are qualitatively less well-developed than basic physics,
but rather that the non-strictness (and, hence, the need to accept ceteris
paribus laws as laws) is a fact of nature: there are no non-basic objects whose
state transitions obey strict laws.
4 In what follows,
shall adopt a highly modified version of David Lewis'
explication of causation and counterfactual support. As my main concern in
must relax some ol his
this chapter is describing mental causation,
treatment of causal lawhood in
Lewis
constraints on lawhood. This is because
applicable
only to strict laws,
Coun terfactuals is most naturally viewed as
his assumption
Similarly,
which as argued above, exist only in basic physics.
states
higher-level
of tvpe-tvpe bridge laws between basic physical states and
I

1
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causation

is

a natural, rather than conventional relationship: there

is

a fact-of-the-matter about whether a particular succession of states
is

causally related

and there

is

generalization relating states

is

a fact-of-the-matter about whether a
a causal law. Specifically,

instrumentalistic construals of causation,

perceived regularities of succession

is

I

reject all

whereby the ground

left as

for

wholly mysterious.

Instances of a cause (both actual and counterfactual) necessitate
their effect because there

is

some property

of the cause that forces

the transition to the effect. For the case of special science laws, the
forcing property(ies) are grounded in the causal laws relating the
states of the

implementing constituents. For the case of the laws

basic physics, the forcing property(ies) are not analyzable:

in

the

regress stops here at the level where the forcing of the effect given

the cause

is

a brute fact of nature

A

5
.

description of the causal

structure of the world can be given in terms of possible worlds.

adopt

this

approach because of the ease with which

a framework for analysing counterfactuals

.

it

I

can be used as

6

an issue on which am trying in this work to remain agnostic. (His
reductionistic predilections are clearly expressed in the chapters on the
philosophy of mind in his Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1.) In making this
introduce difficulties not found in his original theory — this is the
change,
price that must be paid in converting a clean but generally inapplicable
theory of causation into one that can be used for disciplines other than basic
ph ysics. also diverge from his theory in my analysis of the similarity

is

I

I

I

relation, as described below.
5 Admittedly, this leaves the ground for causation as mysterious as that
resulting from instrumentalism: positing "brute facts of nature" is merely a
philosophical device for stopping what would otherwise be an infinite
regress. So be it.
6
am not clear that want thereby to commit myself to the existence of these
think is necessary is that am
possible worlds (a la Lewis). Rather, all that
committed to the non-conventionality of the closeness ordering of the
possible worlds. In particular, there is a matter-of-fact about which possible
1

I

1

worlds are close to the actual world, and which are not.
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I

The

set of causal laws

forms an approximate hierarchy, with

the laws of basic physics at the base.
"disciplinization" of science

is

Assuming that the current

complete and accurate

7
,

each level of

the approximate hierarchy corresponds to a scientific discipline.

Within each

whose

level, the causally-interacting objects

the objects

state transitions are quantified over in the causal laws), while

implemented

in lower level objects, really

causally-interacting objects

do

exist

A

8

However, the
deal,

distinct scientific level of analysis

both the state transitions of objects

if

.

and the causal laws form a package

determinable only a posteriori.
exists

(i.e.,

at that level are

describable by causal laws and the objects and their states

smoothly into the overall quasi-hierarchy of
This "smoothness of

fit"

criterion

is

fit

scientific disciplines.

the analog of the strength and

simplicity criteria for causal lawhood within a level, as described

below. Within a level, the causal laws are determined using Lewis'

and Ramsey's simplicity and strength

criteria for

whereby the laws are analogous

physics,

in basic

to axioms, which, in

combination with additional axioms describing the
world, yield the set of facts. Lewis describes

lawhood

it

initial state of

the

thus:

This assumption is being made at this point only for expository purposes: so
as to allow me to use simpler locutions such as "the laws of chemistry", rather
than the strictly more correct locution "the laws of chemistry, under the
assumption that chemistry is a proper discipline of completed science".
Nothing at this point hinges on this assumption, and shall in later chapters
explicitly disassume it when discussing the status of psychology as a scientific

7

I

discipline.
8

I

know

order to

way of putting the point sounds silly. However, must say it in
make clear my view that, even on the strong claim that the causallythis

1

interacting objects are reducible to their lower level constituents, causallyinteracting objects are never "mere artifacts" of a discipline, useful but
ontologically-speaking fictitious. If the states of an object are quantified over
are not
in a causal law, then that object and these states exist; they
epiphenomena of their respective constituents.
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Whatever we may or may not ever come to know,
there exist (as abstract objects) innumerable true
deductive systems:

deductively closed, axiomatizable
Of these deductive systems,
some can be axiomatized more simply than others.
Also, some of them have more strength or information
content, than others. The virtues of simplicity and
strength tend to conflict. Simplicity without strength
can be had from pure logic, strength without simplicity
from (the deductive closure of) an almanac. ... What
we value in a deductive system is a properly balanced
combination of simplicity and strength - as much of
both as truth and our way of balancing permit. We can
restate Ramsey' s 1928 theory of lawhood as follows: a
contingent generalization is a law of nature if and only
if it appears as a theorem (or axiom) in each of the true
deductive systems that achieves a best combination of
simplicity and strength. A generalization is a law at
world i, likewise, if and only if it appears as a theorem
in each of the best deductive systems true at i. 9
sets of true sentences.

,

This theory of causal lawhood has been widely discussed, and
of

its

weaknesses have been pointed out.

enumerate them, but

to focus

relevant in light of the uses

I

My

purpose here

is

many
not to

on two of them that are particularly

want

to

make

of the theory.

The

first

of these involves the apparent irrealism presupposed by this theory:

nowhere

in this definition of causal

as a natural (as

opposed

lawhood

mentioned causation

to conventional) relation.

the axioms/laws that form the "best
simplicity

is

and strength)

fail to

fit"

It is

possible that

to the data (in terms of

cut nature at the joints

--

either

because the "true" causal laws do not conform to our somewhat
aesthetically-based criteria of simplicity

and strength or because

there are no natural joints, hence no "true" (in the realist

causal laws to be determined.

9

Counterfactuals, page 73.
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My

s

sense)

response to this charge of

my adopted

irrealism against

theory of causation

is

as follows:

it is

brute assumption of mine that there (really) are causal laws

make

absolutely no claim to be able to justify

assumption, the second of the two possibilities

What

of the first possibility

determined
left

fail to

(i.e.,

is

Given

it.

-

a
I

this

not a problem.

that the axioms/laws thus

cut nature at her (true) joints)? This objection,

uncountered, would prove to be the undoing

thoroughly-realist account of causation.

to

my

if

otherwise

Lewis notes and in some

passages accepts this charge, as in the following, where he considers
the possibility that there will be no "best set" of generalizations:

We may
world

hope, or take as an item of faith, that our
one where certain true deductive systems

is

come out
as laws,

and

come out
by any remotely reasonable standards -- but
as best,

we might be unlucky
In order to

remove

another change

.

certain generalizations

10

this potential source of irrealism,

I

must make

to Lewis ' original formulation: let the laws

be those

generalizations that appear as axioms in the deductive systems of

the actual

and

all

nearby possible worlds.

As stated above,

my

realism extends to the existence of a similarity relation between the
actual

and

all

possible worlds.

Lewis waffles on this point.

example, there are realist-sounding passages such

as:

a fact about a town that it is situated near to one
city rather than another, and in the same way it is a
fact about our world that its character is such as to
make some antecedent worlds [that is, those worlds in
which the antecedent of a counterfactual conditional is
11
true] be similar to it, and others not
It is

.

10 Counterfactuals, page 74.
11 Counterfactuals,

page 69.
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For

However, the more often stated view

is

less realist

with respect to

the similarity relation (although he does presuppose that the
similarity relation

is

something more than mere whim) as

in:

[T]he relative importance of respects of
comparison, and thereby the comparative similarity
of worlds, are at least roughly fixed. Not anything
goes. It can happen that a counterfactual is true (at a
world) according to some permissible systems of
spheres but not according to others, so that its truth
value will be indeterminate by reason of vagueness.
But it can happen also, and often does, that a
counterfactual has the same truth value according to
all permissible systems of spheres, and so is
definitely true or defintely false 12
.

As

my

aim here

is

not exegesis of Counterfactuals, but rather the

description of the causal theory
reject the latter (admittedly,

I

more

shall

be assuming,

This said, there

be a matter-of-fact about which worlds are nearby

world.

feel free to

representative) view in favor of

the former, realist, view of the similarity relation.
will

I

to the actual

This matter-of-factness grounds a matter-of-factness with

respect to the truth value of counterfactuals (or, at least the truth

value of counterfactuals whose antecedent does not stand in
contradiction to the causal laws in the actual world).
that

I

am

a realist with regard to causal laws, this

Let us

and

its

nearest neighbors (using Lewis
i,

and the

immediately surrounding
i is

a nearest neighbor of

set of

i) is

j,

what

I

say

I

mean.

similarity relation as regards a world

assume that the

centered world,

is

When
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worlds constituting the sphere

symmetrical and transitive. That

then

12 Counterfactuals, page 93.

spheres terminology, the

j is

a nearest neighbor of

i,

is, if

and,

if i

is

a nearest neighbor of

nearest neighbor of

have the

A

.

13

;,

and

j is

a nearest neighbor of k then
,

Then, a world and

set of causal laws in

its

i

a

is

nearest neighbors will

common. Stepping back and viewing

the ordering that the nearest neighbor relation imposes on the set of

possible worlds,
class

we

having the

see that they

form equivalence

set of causal laws in

common.

classes,

The

each

similarity

relation for a world as relates to the possible worlds other than

nearest neighbors

A second

may be

its

non-symmetrical and non-transitive.

criticism of the counterfactuals via possible worlds

formalization of causation involves the possibility that there are

multiple but mutually-orthogonal sets of best
given Lewis'

initial criterion 14

,

that there are

fit

axioms, hence,

no causal

laws. This

is

particularly relevant to the topic of mental causation in two respects.
First,

ontological space must be

made

for mental states to be

presuming a physicalist metaphysics.

causally-efficacious, even

If

psychological generalizations are redundant in the sense of

producing the same predictions

at a macro-level as those

made by

the laws of basic physics at the micro-level, then the simplicity
criterion will rule
this as

them out

as possible laws of nature.

Lewis views

being not a flaw, but a feature, as he maintains that the only

yet another divergence from Lewis, who explicitly denied the
general symmetricity of the similarity relation, as noted on page 51 of
Counterfactuals "This assumption of symmetry for the similarity measure
implies a constraint on similarity ordering derived from that measure. ... But
that constraint would be unjustified if we suppose that the facts about a world
and dissimilarity are
i help to determine which respects of similarity
similarity to the world i."
of
respect
in
worlds
other
comparing
important in
transitivity (holding only
and
symmetry
limited
of
assumption
However, the
more well-founded, since,
much
is
neighbors)
nearest
between a world and its
world that influence what
centered
the
of
features
as Lewis himself notes, it is
13 This

is

worlds are similar to

it

— and

features.
14 That to be a law of nature

those similar worlds should have similar

is

to be a
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member

in all of the best sets.

laws of nature are to be found at the level of basic physics anyway.
(This

is,

think, his view in the

I

most consistent reading of

Counterfactuals. He does in other works

explicitly

laws other than those of basic physics, however.)
issue of the

I

mention causal

shall discuss the

supposed causal inertness of mental objects

section. Suffice

it

for

now

to say that this result,

makes the traditionalism versus PDP debate

if

in a later

allowed to stand,

irrelevant, since neither

are in that case potential candidates as mental models. Therefore,

need make yet another change
involves only one word, yet

from one wherein

all

to Lewis

its

'

original theory.

I

The change

acceptance transforms the theory^

the so-called special sciences are not genuine

sciences to one where sciences other than basic physics can truly

speak of causal laws in terms of their own special vocabularies. This

change

is

as follows:

replace Lewis' definition of "law of nature"

with "a contingent generalization

is

a law of nature

appears as a theorem (or axiom) in

ANY

if

and only

if it

of the true deductive

systems that achieves a best combination of strength and simplicity."
Lewis' reasoning behind not using this definition

leaves

open the

determined.

is

that

possibility that events can be causally over-

This

not the cornerstore variety of over-

is

determination, the classic example of which

is

the shattering of a

glass after being simultaneously subjected to being struck

hammer and

by a

being exposed to the soprano's high-C, both of which

are alone nomologically-sufficient for the glass' breaking.
the over-determination
to diverging

it

is

deeper, in that

it

involves something akin

ways of conceptualizing the world

describable system.

It

was
42

this

Rather,

as a causally-

deeper over-determination that

troubled Lewis.

determination
sciences

--

For me, on the other hand, this form of overis

hence,

a necessary feature of a layered view of the
it is

to

be sought out rather than avoided. This

acceptance of over-determination

not inconsistent with a realist

is

understanding of causation, for realism does not imply that only one
causal process can be operative in a dynamic system.

Consider a

The events taking place (broadly

particular chemical reaction.

construed) can be causally explained at either of two levels of
description:

the chemical and the atomic (physical).

The former

recognizes whole molecules and their states as the causally relevant
objects

and properties. The

same event (broadly construed),
nor of molecular

on the other hand, explains the

latter,

yet

makes no mention of molecules

Both explanations, however, truly describe

states.

the causal processes taking place during that event. Realism alone

does not exclude

There

is

this as

a possibility.

a related point (the second

manner

in

which

it

could

turn out, on Lewis' original definition of "law of nature", that there
are no laws because there are multiple best sets).
level

event

(i.e.,

is

within a scientific discipline),

might be the case that an

over-determined, 15 perhaps because two theories have laws

which quantify over the
is

it

Even within a

perhaps

less

states of different objects.

This possibility

obviously compatible with realism than over-

determination by virtue of the existence of causal processes at
distinct levels.

realism:

15
in

Even here, though,

perhaps the world

just

is

I

see

no basic antagonism with

so constructed that there

is

out
use the term "event" broadly, such that the same event can be picked
states.
their
and
objects
two different ways of carving the world into
I
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a

basic indeterminacy in the natural joints that carve

causally efficacious objects.

The picture

it

into

of such a possibility

is

dynamic world

in a superposition of causal descriptions.

superposition

different

quantum

is

from that

as

its

of a

This

normally understood within

physics, in that the totality of facts (stated in a causation-

neutral way) for the particular

moments

of time are the

same across

the superposed causal worlds. With this as a possibility, one needn'

t

be forced into an exclusive either/or position, whereby one model

s

being true implies the other
level of description of

'

'

being either false or true at a distinct

s

phenomena.

If

seems

this

like

a non-sensical

feature for a theory of causation to have, like something a

phlogiston-theory based researcher would say against mounting

evidence in favor of the opposing view ("maybe we can both be
right"),

I

beg to

differ.

For one thing,

whether the phlogiston theory was

an empirical matter

it is

true.

It

turned out not to be.

But more importantly, as the recent developments in physics have

shown, our

common

changeable.

notions of what sort of theories "make sense"

Even though the acceptance of over-determination

within a level as a genuine possibility consistent with realism
absolutely necessary (indeed,
a possibility),

is

it

I

nowhere make

more approachable:

if

I

not

explicit use of this as

does make the overall question that

in this dissertation

is

I

am

addressing

can isolate the question

"are the two models qualitatively distinct?" from the need to choose

between the two,
answer

A

it

it

will

make

the conceptual analysis required to

easier.

final set of

remarks concerning

my

understanding

the reductionistic versus supervenience versus strict
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vis-a-vis

autonomy

of

levels views of science

As stated previously,

in order.

is

view that the sciences form a quasi-hierarchy.
inserted for two reasons:

the

word "hierarchy"

which

do not wish

I

1

)

it

seems

to

me

hold the

(The "quasi"

is

that a failure to qualify

gives the impression of strict reductionism,
to imply,

and

(2)

it

may

turn out that some

good candidate being biochemistry), while circumscribed

sciences (a

enough

(

I

to constitute a science, nevertheless cut across the levels

defined by other disciplines.)

There are then several

possibilities

with respect to the relationship between the objects whose states
are quantified over at the various levels.

consider

is

assumption,

The

first possibility to

that the objects are strictly autonomous.
it

Under

this

could happen that two objects in the same world are

identical in every physical respect, yet disparate with respect to

some or

all

chemical, biological, or psychological respects:

the

chemical, biological and psychological levels are wholly autonomous

am

assuming a physicalistic metaphysics,

not a serious option.

Supervenience and reductionism are

from the physical. As
this is

I

both consistent with physicalism.
supervenience hypothesis

is

The source of the general

Donald Davidson'

s

"Mental Events":

Mental characteristics are in some sense dependent,
or supervenient, on physical characteristics. Such
supervenience might be taken to mean that there
cannot be two events alike in all physical respects
but differing in some mental respect, or that an
object cannot alter in some mental respect without
altering in

The

some physical

literature sparked

by

this

respect. 16

hypothesis has been immense, and

has produced several distinct flavors (strong versus weak, global
16 "Mental Events", in Essay s on Action
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and

Events, page 214.

versus local) of supervenience. Of most concern to me, however,

is

the relation of supervenience to reductionism, and the appearance of

incompatibility of a non-reductive (but supervenient) layering of the
sciences with the existence of causal laws at levels other than basic
physics. (For a sample expression of this view, see Loar'

Meaning pages
,

s

Mind and

15-25.)

Supervenience was put forward as a way to make the
existence of mental objects compatible with physicalism. Previously,
it

was believed that physicalism implied reductionism

--

the view

that object state types outside the purview of basic physics were not

only implemented in basic physical

stuff,

but also identical with

basic physical stuff. In particular, non-basic object state types were
identical with

some

(likely

state types.

Were

basic objects

would be

my

very complicated) complex of basic object

this the case, causal laws relating states of

non-

strictly-speaking superfluous. Relating this to

theory of causation, the simplicity criterion for lawhood would

rule

out as potential laws of nature any such redundant

generalizations.

The

fear

among philosophers

in general,

and

philosophers of mind in particular, was that reductionism implied
the epiphenomenalism of

non-basic object states.

all

(Of special

concern to philosophers of mind was the feared epiphenomenalism
of mental states, although, as

sciences are in the

remarked previously,

same boat with respect

of their object states.) Supervenience

to the

was seen

all

of the special

epiphenomenalism
as a

way out

--

it

allows a connection of implementation of non-basic states in basic
state complexes, yet avoids the strict reducibility of the
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former

to

tiie latter.

1

'

One advantage

of reductionism over supervenience

is

the philosophical cleanness with which one can explain regularities
of state transitions

more

among non-basic

correctly, object-types) are

objects,

and the causal laws

regularity of state transitions, then

room

is

made

those objects

If

(or,

complex aggregations of basic

at the level of basic physics

be such that the non-basic objects

pragmatic)

objects.

persist, giving the

some

for causal laws

(if

happen

appearance of

not ontological,

among non-basic

With supervenience, however, the lack of

to

at least

objects.

strict basic-object-state-

type/non-basic-object-state-type equations seems to rule out the
possibility of non-basic causal interaction, the desire for

which was

the very thing that led philosophers to embrace

is

This

it.

because

causal interaction presupposes a causal law, and, without a law-like

equation relating non-basic-object-state- types to their implementing
basic-object-state-types, there

basic causal laws.

is

implemented

no mechanism

(Loar argues this point in

pages 16-17.) Given

argument

is

my

to

undergird non-

Mind and Meaning

,

previous assumption, however, this line of

Granted that non-basic objects are

unsound.

in basic objects (note here that

tokens, not object types),

it

can

still

I

am

speaking of object

be consistently maintained that

there are causal laws relating state transitions of non-basic objects
types.

For example, suppose

I

have a certain desire

water) and a certain belief (that there
front of me),

and suppose

it is

is

(to

drink some

a glass containing water in

a psychological law that such beliefs

and desires cause water-drinking behavior, then

(ceteris paribus, of

theory what supervenience accomplishes, yet there is not
unamimity on this point. See, for example, John Heil' s The Nature of True
Minds, Chapter 3 for an overview of the debate.
17 This

is

in
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course)

I

will

drink the water (that

my water-drinking
my belief and desire

is,

and

that desire

belief will

cause

behavior).

that

are implemented physically (either in the

current state of

my

Now, supervenience requires

nervous system or

in the current state of

my

nervous system plus certain physical relations with the external
world ). 18

It is

not a requirement of

logic,

however, that in order for

a law to relate the belief/desire state with the behavior, there must

be a law-like equation of the belief/desire state type with a basic
physical state type and the behavior state type with another basic

physical state type.

In this sense, supervenience represents a

middle ground between the complete autonomy of
complete reducibility of the less-basic

any event,

I

do not wish

to

level to the

commit myself

more

to either

and the

levels

basic.

In

supervenience

or reductionism as the correct understanding of the relationship

between the sciences:

I

take

it

as

an empirical question, well outside

the purview of philosophy.

Given the large number of amendations to Lewis

have been made

summarize

my

in the last several pages,

may

I

have been trying

out a theory, not argue for

it.

to

do

be useful to

My occasional

in this section

my own view,

particularly in respects in

from one more commonly

held.)

My

(I

is

use of motivating

arguments has been intended more than anything
clarifying

theory that

theory of causation without reference to Lewis.

should reiterate that what
to lay

it

'

as a

which

theory of causation

means
it

of

diverges

is realistic:

there are as a matter-of-fact laws of nature, and the objects whose
To use Davidson's terminology, the mental event described and the physical
event that implements it are one and the same event, under different
18

descriptions.
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state transitions are quantified over in those laws really

There

is

do

exist.

a matter-of-fact about whether a particular counterfactual

conditional

is

This matter-of-factness

true.

is

grounded

in the

existence of a real similarity relation which orders possible worlds

how

as a function of

causal law

is

to be a

close they are to the actual world.

member

as axioms in

any of the

world and

all

of

To be a

of the set of generalizations that serve

"best sets" of axioms that describe the actual

its

where

closest possible worlds,

"best"

is

understood as involving strength and simplicity considerations.
Thus, the actual world and

same

all

of

its

nearest neighbors share the

Causal laws quantify not only over the transitions

set of laws.

of objects in basic physics, but also those of objects in the special
sciences.

Given

my

supervenience,

agnosticism in choosing between reductionism and
I

must separate

my

description of

how

I

square the

strength/simplicity requirement for sets of causal laws, with the
existence of causal laws at levels other than that of basic physics.
(1)

(Assuming reductionism) In

one considers

this case, non-basic laws are,

just the actual world, redundant.

The

when

state type

transitions quantified over in non-basic laws are equivalent to

complex

state types at the basic level.

However, as the

(both actual and those at the actual world

need

to

nearest neighbors) that

be deducible from the set of axioms, given the

conditions in each of those worlds,

reductions
differ

s

set of "facts"

(i.e.,

may involve

differing

initial

manners of

the reduction equations at the actual world

from those

basic causal laws.

in the
I

am

nearby worlds), the door
assuming that
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is left

open

to

may
non-

this is the case, for otherwise

my

analysis does not allow non-basic laws (because any non-basic

generalizations would be excluded from the "best set" by the
simplicity criterion).

Admittedly,

may be

it

that the reduction

equations in the actual and nearby worlds are identical:

it is

merely

another asumption of mine that they are not. As an example, on
analysis

it

may

be the case that chemical objects are reducible to

physical objects in

way they
(2)

my

some nearby world

in a

manner other than

the

are reducible in this world.

(Assuming supervenience) The

difficulty here arises not out of a

fear that the simplicity requirement will rule out redundant non-

basic laws, as per above, but out of a concern that the existence of
ceteris paribus laws

simplicity
strict laws,

is

and strength

threatened:
criteria

would prefer

leaving the latter again

answer here

is

one might imagine that the

non-members

that the notions of simplicity

undeveloped that

I

strict

cannot say for sure that

laws over non-

of the best

set.

and strength are

My
so

ceteris paribus laws are

obviously ruled-out. The fact that the current state in the special
sciences

is

such that ceteris paribus laws are universally used lends

credence to their usefulness. Whether
being in the best set
I

is

this translates into

yet another assumption on

such laws'

my part

for

which

have no argument.

2.2

What

First

is

the Mental?

and foremost -

eliminativism

is false:

I

there

am
is

working on the assumption that

such a thing as the mental realm,

populated by causally-interacting mental
50

states.

In the final

analysis, the truth or falsity of eliminativism

an empirical

issue,

determined by whether generalizations quantifying over

state

transitions of mental objects

manage

to

is

make

into the best set;

it

hence, an attempt at an a priori argument against eliminativism
certain to

from the

right

fail

that an a priori

the same fate.)

get-go.

argument against the

The

(This

is,

however, not

relative success of mental-based explanations of

time

I

shall

mention eliminativism

As the section

my

title

theory of the mental:

states

of support to

hardly constitutes an argument. This

it

to say

belief in eliminativism suffers

some human and animal behavior lends a modicum
assumption, but

is

from non-mental

my

the last

is

as a hypothesis.

indicates,

I

attempt here to describe

shall

in particular,

what distinguishes mental

states? Stated glibly, the

mental

is

the level

(or levels) of description corresponding to the true psychology. This

needs quite a

unpacking.

lot of

I

do not hold the view that science

complete, hence, that psychology as

it is

currently practiced must

correspond to the true psychology. However,

I

accept what

be the two underlying assumptions of psychology. The
is

that psychology

psychology

is

fits

is

first

into the quasi-hierarchy of science.

I

take to

of these

That

is,

compatible with physicalism (either via reduction or

supervenience of

its

objects

on more basic physical

psychology, like other scientific disciplines,

is

stuff).

Also,

concerned with the

discovery of the causal laws grounding the regularity of succession

among

the states of

its

objects.

The second underlying assumption of psychology
vast majority of the states over which
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its

is

that the

causal laws quantify are

contentful

.

19

Hence, psychology

is

the science concerned with

discovering the causal laws pertaining to being an intentional agent,

such that those laws are expressed using intentional terms.
Although

I

want

states get their

considered,

I

to

postpone a detailed explanation of how mental

meanings according

feel

compelled

two mental models being

to the

some

at this juncture to at least suggest

possible approaches one might take to answering this question.
this in

order to avoid the appearance of assuming something

existence of meaningful states) which

according to physicalism.

is

do

I

(i.e.,

the

an utter impossibility

Two approaches

that have been widely

discussed in the literature are the evolutionary role explanation and
the causal pathways explanation. Briefly, the

first (teleological)

view

contends that our physical states can come to have meaning by
virtue of being correlated with a condition in the external

environment.

In particular, a physical state

comes

external condition because those ancestors of ours

(by the evolutionary standard of success:

to refer to

an

who succeeded

reproduction) did so at

least partly in virtue of the correlation of this internal physical state

with the survival-relevant environmental condition.
familiar proponent of such a view of

summarizes her basic approach

come

to

meaning

to explaining

is

The most

Ruth Millikan

how

.

20

She

physical states can

be meaningful in terms of the proper functions

(also called

the "teleo-functions") of those states:

19 Recall,
am allowing that some non-intentional states (eg, pain states)
cannot make the blanket
also play a role in psychological laws; hence,
meaningful.
are
states
statement that all
20 See particularly Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories.
I

I
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may

To describe the

biological function of an item is ... to
describe the role that its ancestors played in a
particular historical process, a concrete cyclical
process of birth, development, and reproduction
extended over a number of generations. It is to tell
how earlier items involved in this historical process
that are homologous to this functional item
characteristically contributed to continuation of the
cycle (thus helping, of course, to account for this

item'

s

existence ). 21

She continues:

The position

that psychological classification is
biological classification: hence proceeds by reference
to teleo-function. This means that categories such as
belief, desire, memory, percept and purposive
behavior are biological function categories 22
is

.

This theory,

if

successful,

grounds the contentfulness of certain

physical states naturalistically:

it

does so without having to deny

physicalism (although, more than the complete current physical
description of an intentional agent

is

needed

in order to determine

what, in particular, a specific physical state means).

remarks on

this feature of

Millikan

her theory:

that intentionality is grounded in
external natural relations, Normal and/or proper
relations, between representations and representeds,

The position

is

the notions "Normal" and "proper" being defined in
terms of evolutionary history ... [T]his means that
there is not a way of looking just at a presentmoment, eg, ... at his neural network patterns, that
will reveal even the intentional nature of his ... inner

representations,
represent 23

let

alone

reveal

what

these

.

Mental Causation, pages 211-212.
22 "Explanation in Biopsychology", pages 212-213.
23 Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories, page 93.
21 "Explanation in Biopsychology" in
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A
what

I

second candidate theory for the naturalization of content
shall call

"the causal pathways approach".

As a

is

first

approximation, a certain physical (brain) state of mine has a
particular

meaning by virtue of being caused by the

represents.

In naive terms, a brain state of

brain state that occurs while
virtue of being caused
that

my

am

I

by the

mine

looking at a cat)

cat

--

entity that

(for

it

example, a

means

this cat

by

counterfactually, had the cat

brain state represents not been there, that brain state

would not have occurred. For cases

of a meaningful physical state

instantiation not directly caused by

its

referent

(i.e.,

perceptually-based production of a meaningful physical

the nonstate), the

content of the state needs to be explained in other terms than by

immediate

distal cause.

its

In fleshing out this general framework,

Jerry Fodor develops and refines what

it is

for a physical state (or,

using his terminolgy, a "tokening") to refer to something. He does
this in

terms of the counterfactually-based asymmetric dependence

of the causal relation in false tokenings (between the distal cause of

the tokening

and the tokening) on the causal

relation in true

tokenings. Formally, his criteria for a tokening, "X" meaning X are:
1.

2.

Xs cause "X'V

Some

is

"X"s are actually caused

For all Y not = X,
then Ys causing "X"s
Xs causing "X"s. 24
3.

24

A Theory

a law.

by

Xs.

if

Ys qua Ys actually cause "X"s,

is

asymmetrically dependent on

of Meaning, page 121.
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As stated above,

do not want

I

theories of meaning; rather,

to argue for or against either of these

include them to head off a criticism

I

that the very idea of meaningful physical states
I

now

return to

my

is

absurd.

description of the true psychology.

general approach to circumscribing a scientific discipline

This
is

not

unique to psychology. One could similarly describe biology as the
science concerned with discovering the causal laws underlying a

subset of processes

(i.e.,

those pertaining to

laws are expressed in the vocabulary of biology.
in order.

First,

psychology

cannot explain

-- ie,

for such behavior

is

that

it is

no

not intentional per

all

caveats are

behavior of

criticism of psychology that

laws do not include

its

Some

not about explaining

is

intentional agents. (For example,
it

such that those

life),

se.)

--

reflex reactions,

Rather, psychology

is

the

science that seeks the causal laws underlying the behavior of
intentional agents

A

qua intentional

second caveat relates

While

psychological states.
that psychology

must

to a general character of the
I

(like all

deal with external behavior:

observable.

This

is

agents.

am

not a behaviorist,

I

domain

of

do maintain

other scientific disciplines) ultimately
its

ultimate experimental

domain

not to say that there will not be

is

many

intermediate, non-observable states posited as parts of causal
chains; however,

the initial cause and final effect must be

observable. All of the
states are the

causal laws

initial causes, final effects,

and intermediate

purview of psychology, so long as they play a role

and are expressed

for tying psychology
sciences, there

is

down

in intentional terms.

to

behavior

is

A

in

second reason

that, unlike in other

a tendency within psychology to populate the
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realm of non-observables with
post-introspective reports.

untrustworthy.

(This

is

states

based only upon the subjects'

Introspection, however,

is

notoriously

not a problem for other sciences:

even an option for a physicist

to ask

it is

an electron "How do you

not
feel,

spin-wise?") True psychology, properly practiced, cannot assume
that certain non-observable states obtain, merely because subjects

say that those states obtain (however, subjects

behavior

is

hence, in the purview of psychology). This requirement

--

also keeps

thus saying so

an

illegitimate

argument relevant

to

my

topic here

from

gaining acceptance. The argument goes:

Subjects describe their mental states in the

(PI):

language of traditionalism.
Subjects always introspect and (when
attempting to be sincere) describe their mental
(P2):

states accurately.
(P3):

The language of traditionalism

is

not the same

as the language of PDP.
(C):

Thus,

PDP cannot be the

my way

true

model of the mental.

of describing true psychology does not

assume

that

introspection gives an accurate "snapshot" of the subject's mental
state.

on

Whatever mental

states take part in causal laws will fall out

their own.

A

third question which often arises in the context of

discussions of alternative systems as mental models
of beings have minds?

I

hope

that

my

is:

what types

(biologically-neutral)

way

describing psychology will save a lot of quibbling on this topic.
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of
If

dogs

(or computers'

,

or martians') behavior

is

non-trivially2 5

explainable by reference to causal laws quantifying over intentional
objects, then

such beings have minds. Similarly, the fear that clearly

non-intentional-state-possessing objects

(e.g.,

lecterns) will also be

included in the set of things possessing minds, because their
behavior

is

"explainable" in terms of causal laws quantifying over

their "mental" states (e.g., their "desire" to

can be likewise allayed within
behavior

is

only

my

remain where they

framework, for such

trivially "explained"

by reference

are)

entities'

to causal laws

quantifying over intentional objects.

mean here by inserting the modifier "non-trivially" is something
one can assume that the causes and effects in causal laws
quantifying over intentional objects will form a network of relations (ie, the
objects will be mentioned as causes or effects in many causal laws). To cite a
particular example using the traditionalist model: my belief that p may be a
cause (or one of several collectively nomologically-sufficient conjuncts) in
several causal laws, and the effect (or one of several nomologicallynecessitated effects) in other causal laws. In order for an entity's behavior to
be non-trivially explained by reference to laws quantifying over intentional
objects, the entity must be such that at least counterfactually, it can
participate in a large subset of these causal laws, where the accessibility
--"’What

I

like this:

relation for the resolution of counterfactuals is limited only to the actual
world and its nearest neighbors. (Recall that on my construal, causal laws -both mental and non-mental -- are shared by the actual world and all of its
nearest possible worlds.) Lecterns and the like fail to satisfy this "nontriviality" constraint -- the number of causal laws quantifying over
intentional objects in which they can actually and counterfactually
participate is very limited. This condition of non-triviality also rules out the
existence of so-called "punctate minds": "minds" only capable of having one
or a very few intentional items. That such a non-triviality condition is not
unique to the discipline of psychology can be seen from the following:
certain non-living entities may be seen as exemplifying a biological law. For

has been argued by some that the earth's biosphere+atmosphere as
subject to many of the homeostatic laws regulating the behavior of
(and,
think, most biologists) would not therefore
biological entities, yet
maintain that such a system constitutes a living entity, because the number of
biological laws that such a system could participate in is so very limited.
Similar considerations can be seen in the debate as to whether viruses are
living. Previously, it was believed that the number of biological laws in which
viruses could potentially participate was very small (in particular, a subset ot
the laws dealing with reproduction). The consensus has now shifted in favor
of viewing viruses as living entities, as their capacity for participation in a
much larger subset of biological laws as come to light.

example,
a system

it

is

I

I
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A

final clarification:

I

take the proper role of psychology to be

the discovery of all of the intentionally-based laws, not just that

subset which, for lack of a better

way

of describing

it,

I

call

subset corresponding to the activities of our 'reason'."

"the
is

It

an

empirical issue whether there are intentional laws covering "non-

reasonable" or "sub-reasonable" aspects of mentation.

This

is

particularly relevant to the traditionalism/connectionism debate, as

one part of Fodor's language of thought argument against
proponents of PDP
the belief that

if

is

that their

p then q and the belief that p

sufficient for the belief that q.

an empirical
that

if

model cannot explain the

issue, just as

it is

Whether

.

I

nomologically

this rule is a causal

an empirical issue whether the

p then q and the belief that not-p

for the belief that not-q 26

is

"fact" that

hope

is

law

is

belief

nomologically sufficient

to describe

to prejudice either in favor of or against a

psychology so as not

model that

is

closely

connected with the existence of only rationally-defensible inferences
as existent.
it

clear that

into

my

These caveats have been
I

am

explicitly given so as to

make

not building a pro-traditionalism or pro-PDP bias

construal of psychology

—

and, hence, into

my

construal of

mental causation.

2.3

Problems of Applying Notion of Causation to the
Mental Realm
There are in general two major potential problems

in applying

the notion of causation to state transitions in the mental realm. The

have found equal empirical support
20 in my dealings with UMass freshman,
former.
the
for
as
inference
for the latter (fallacious)
I
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first

of these has already been briefly mentioned;

the supposed

epiphenomenalism of psychological

states

dependence on more basic physical

The second (and,

more threatening

to the status of

states.

assuming

their

psychology as a science) involves

the causal efficacy of psychological states qua intentional.
section

I

shall describe

solution.

think,

I

In this

each potential problem in detail and offer a

Following this

I

enumerate some

lesser considerations in

applying the notion of causation to the mental realm.

many

While

philosophers over the centuries have argued that

physicalism (whether reductive or supervenient) implies the
inefficacy of psychological entities, the locus classicus for this view

the first half of

mechanism".

Norman Malcolm's "The

In this paper,

potentially realizable)

adequate

to explain

is

conceivability of

Malcolm describes a hypothetical (but

completed neurophysiology "which

and predict

all

movements

of

human

is

bodies

except those caused by outside forces ". 27 This completed theory

makes no mention
even

if

of intentional states in

any of

its

laws

28
.

Thus,

one could identify generalizations describing psychological

state transitions, the states quantified over

would be

27 Page 45.
28 I should

inefficacious.

note that Malcolm's portrayal of the intention/purpose-based
think, most other
(or,
rival to this neurophysiological theory is not what
laws to be
underlying
philosophers) have in mind when speaking of the
tautologous
the
discovered by psychology. Indeed, Malcolm himself notes
nature of the straw-man psychology that he puts forward, as in: "Premises of
the other sort fused in psychological laws adverting to intentional states]
express a priori connections between intentions (purposes, desires, goals) and
behavior." (Page 50.) And a paragraph previously: "Thus the universal
premise of a purposive explanation is an a priori principle, not a contingent
law." (Page 49.) As stated previously, my construal of the role of psychology is
as the discoverer of the contingent causal laws relating psychological states.
think the questions Malcolm raises concerning the efficacy of
Nevertheless,
psychological states given the hypothesized completed neurophysiological
theory are equally applicable to a more robust picture of psychology.
I

I
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I

Malcolm describes the

rivalry

between the neurophysiological and

psychological explanations of a

man's behavior

as

he climbs up a

ladder to fetch his hat:

Given the antecedent neurological states of his bodily
system together with general laws correlating those
states with the contractions of muscles and
movements of limbs, he would have moved as he did
regardless of his desire or intention.
If every
movement of his was completely accounted for by
his antecedent neurophysiological states, ... then it
was not true that those movements occurred because
he wanted or intended to get his hat 29
.

Malcolm

is

assuming here that allowing determination of the same

(broadly-described) event via two causal chains at distinct levels of

analysis

is

a

overdetermination.

philosophically-unacceptable

form

of

However, as Fodor (and others) have pointed

out, this overdetermination of causal transitions

of psychological laws, but of

all

is

a feature not only

laws in the special sciences.

One

could just as easily construct an argument against chemistry by
substituting the phrase "chemical law" for "psychological law" and

the phrase "underlying physical explanation" for "underlying
neurophysiological explanation".
I

see two reasons for rejecting Malcolm's conclusion that,

assuming such a completed neurophysiology, psychological
are inefficacious.

The

first is

consistency would thus

the reductio ad

demand

that

all

entities

absurdum

that

non-basic entities

(interestingly, including neurophysiological entities) are causally
29 Page 53.
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inert.

Thus,

all

the laws put forward by

We

physics are not really laws.

demand

are

more

for non-overdetermination than

sciences as sciences; hence, psychology
In contrast to this negative

argument

is

name

is

up on the

willing to give

on the

status of the special

saved.

argument, there

for the salvation of psychology.

originated with Putnam, his

Were one

sciences apart from basic

all

(While

is

a positive

do not think

I

most closely associated with

it

it.)

to insist that only those generalizations stated in the

vocabulary of basic physics can count as genuine causal laws, one

would miss out on a

number

large

of counterfactual-supporting

generalizations relating state transitions of objects, where the
properties describing the states are not in theory expressible in the

vocabulary of basic physics. Indeed, the objects whose states would
partake in such regular transitions would not be mentioned by the
causal laws. (This

take

is, I

it,

true even

assumes that the reduction relations

if

one

is

a reductionist and

in the actual

valid in the nearest neighbor possible worlds.)

world are also

The description

of

such counterfactual-supporting, but non-basic, generalizations in the

vocabulary of basic physics would constitute a very ungainly
generalization indeed. Imagine a generalization encoding

some non-

basic counterfactual-supporting rule (for example, the rule in

biology that, without energy input, a gradient of some substance
across a permeable

membrane tends

to equalize itself) in the

vocabulary of basic physics. Such a generalization would most

be a huge disjunction, in order to account for

membranes,

all

the ways those

the types of gradients,

etc.

(I

the types of

membranes could be permeable,

doubt that there
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all

likely

is

some

all

basic physical

property that, for example,
the

number

membranes

have, that might rein in

of disjuncts constituting the generalization.)

generalization

this

all

there any mention of

is

which are necessary

permeability,

entities

generalization as a true generalization.

Nowhere

membranes
seeing

in

in

or
this

Here the strength and

simplicity criteria for the inclusion of a generalization in the set of

causal laws argues in favor of the inclusion of such generalizations,
for a very large

number

of counterfactual-supporting regularities

would otherwise be missed.

And, as per above, the vocabulary

specifying the relevant objects

and

their states participating in such

regular transitions must be that of the corresponding level (rather

than that of basic physics) in order for the "generalization"
generalization at

all.

room can be made
There

is

So,

qua

be a

even assuming a reductionist physicalism,

for causal laws outside of basic physics.

a second potential problem in applying the notion of

causation to state transitions in the mental realm.
issue of

to

how to understand

intentional.

More

It

concerns the

the causal efficacy of psychological states

specifically, the

problem runs

as follows.

The

intentional content of a mental state does not in general supervene

upon

the intrinsic physical properties of the object possessing that

state.

Twin-earth thought experiments illustrate the essential

extrinsicness of content, in that they describe a situation in which

two people with physically-identical bodies

same intentional

more

states;

fail to

share

all

of the

hence, intentional states require something

for their discrimination.

In particular, they require the

consideration of certain relational properties between the person

and the world (usually understood
62

in terms of the causal histories

leading
rely

up

to the tokening of a particular

upon such

mental

exotica as molecular duplicates

that this rather

homely point

is

true.

state).

One needn'

on twin-earth

What

t

to see

distinguishes the

reference of a visual experience of a desert oasis in the veridical
case from that of a mirage has nothing to do with the experienced

physical state:

we can

s

stipulate sameness of physical state in both

Rather, what distinguishes the fact that in the one case the

cases.

reference of the physical state token that implements the percept

is

the nearby oasis whereas the reference of the other

is

else 30 are the extrinsic properties of the experiencer.

Granted then

that contentful states supervene

physical properties of a subject,

— how can

causal interactions

on both

intrinsic

how can such

among

extrinsic

a subject's extrinsic properties be
first

potential

beginning of this section, this problem

is,

the special sciences, particular to psychology; hence, a Fodor-

style reductio
I

at the

and

states participate in

causally relevant? (Note that, unlike the case with the

problem described

something

won' t

help.)

see here two

ways of answering

route basically acquiesces

(i.e.,

this question.

answers "they can

t"):

The

first

while meaning

does indeed supervene on both extrinsic and intrinsic properties, the

former are causally

inert.

This "methodological solipsism" has the

advantage of side-stepping

enormous
it

this

potential problem, but at an

cost for psychology as the science of intentional states, for

puts psychology in the untenable position of simultaneously

maintaining that there are causal laws relating contentful state
not sure what the reference of an illusion should be. In any event,
cannot be the real nearby oasis, because, per supposition, there is no such
thing.

30

I

am
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it

types, yet each (tokened) causal state transition

virtue of being

subsumed under

this

is

not causal by

law (for the law makes

reference to states in terms of their contents, which, on such a view,
are inert), but by virtue of

would

set causation as

some implementing mechanism. This

understood

in

psychology totally apart from

causation in the rest of science, where

mentioned
efficacy.

in the causal

To make a

it

is

the very properties

law that are causally responsible for

its

parallel with the previously-mentioned causal

law of biology dealing with equalization of a gradient across a

membrane,

it

even though

would be
it is

as

being a

if

by virtue

membrane were

of being a

membrane

causally inert,

that something

is

subject to this law. Thus, taking this tack with respect to the second

problem leaves one no protection from
first:
is

the reason that the reductio

is

criticism with respect to the

so intuitively effective

based upon the assumption that psychology

on

special sciences; however,
distinct
I

from the other

this view,

is

that

just like the other

psychology

is

qualitatively

find the advantage of the methodological solipsistic stance

disadvantages (which,

its

their extreme, render psychology a non-science). Yet,

second problem of mental causation as serious
a response.

So,

it

special sciences.

more than outweighed by

states

is

how do

I

--

when taken
I

is

to

also take the

hence, as requiring

explain the causal relevance of mental

qua intentional? Here

is

an instance in which the

my assumed

theory of causation

specificity

will

pay

off,

with which

I

because,

allows a rather straight-forward explanation of mental

it

causation.

described

(I

am

also of the opinion that

this subject consists of

much

of the literature

on

philosophers talking at cross purposes,
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because they are each making differing assumptions with respect

to

the nature of causal interaction.)

Before giving

what

take to be

I

some physical
is still

a long

my response

its

I

would

like to state the

most compelling form. Even

state tokens

if

problem

we grant

can have the property of meaning

way from demonstrating

that that property

is

that are not relevant to

its

a famous example

the soprano

property

is

s

31

causally

one of

these. So, to

meaning

causally irrelevant to the glass' shattering.

A, that

Maybe

solipsism

is

is

likewise causally irrelevant.

the best that

we can

get.

solution to this problem would consist in identifying a

A

causally relevant difference between the property of meaning
the soprano case
state

--

and the property

of

meaning A

in

for a psychological

a difference that can in principle leave the door open for the

causal relevance of meaning 32
.

meaning of the soprano'
to

the

physical states (including the states of

all

Maybe methodological

many,

while the physical state corresponding to

,

cognitive agents' nervous systems)

A

is

singing a high-C has the property of

meaningfulness of

that

forcing the transition to

the effect. Perhaps the property of meaning x
cite

that

x,

relevant, for a physical state that constitutes a cause has

many properties

in

s

My

words

is

causal intuitions

tell

causally irrelevant

be interpreted within the framework of

me

that the

— how

is

that

my theory of causation?

I

understand that as the counterfactual "had the soprano sung
something with a different (or with no) meaning, while

31 Dretske, Explaining Behavior, page 79.
32
should re-emphasize, whether meanings are causally relevant

all

is,

1

other

take

it,

I

an
not

about here is demonstrating that such a thing
theory of causation.
out
by
my
ruled
principle

empirical issue.
in

What

I

am
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is

properties of the physical state corresponding to the singing

remained either unchanged or changed
change in meaning, the

glass

would

as

still

as necessary given a

little

have shattered". Hence,

in

the nearest possible world in which she sang something with a
different meaning, the glass shattered.

possible world in which this

the case

is

actual world.) Therefore, there
of the

words with the

What about

is

(I

is

assume that the nearest

a nearest neighbor of the

no causal law

relating the

meaning

glass' shattering.

the cases in which

it is

presumed

that the

meaning

of a physical state token is causally relevant? Let's return to

Malcolm'

s

case of the

man

climbing a ladder because he wanted to

mentioned

fetch his hat. As

earlier,

Malcolm holds that ”[g]iven the

antecedent neurological state of his bodily system together with
general laws correlating these states with the contractions of

muscles and the movement of limbs, he would have moved as he did
regardless of his desire or intention".
counterfactual to use
relevant?

the

I

when

assessing whether

think not. Furthermore,

problem

of

Is

mental

I

the correct

meaning

believe this

causation

this

leads

way

is

causally

of construing

unavoidably

methodological solipsism. Compare the two counterfactuals, where
is

the agent,

N

is

the physical state possessed by

A

A

in the actual

world that produced behavior B (broadly construed), and

N means

in the actual world:

Cl: If it were to be the case that A was in state N,
but N did not mean M, then B would not have been
produced.
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to

M

C2:
state

were to be the case that A was not in a
with meaning M, then B would not have been

If it

produced.

Malcolm (and many other philosophers) chose Cl

as the correct

counterfactual to use in considering whether meaning
relevant, whereas

maintain C2

is

causally

obvious

how

the adoption of Cl as the correct construal leads to difficulties:

if it

is

I

is

the correct one.

a law that N's produce B's, then in

which A was

in state N, B

all

It is

the nearest neighbors in

would be produced. The question then

becomes: are any of these N-worlds also worlds in which N does not

mean M? The answer here

is

not so clear.

If

we

are convinced by

the twin-earth thought experiments that meaning resolution
involves consideration of the causal history of a physical state

tokening (so

N

includes not just an "at-this-moment" snapshot of A'

neurological state, but also some of A's relational properties), one

could attempt to argue that there are no nearby possible worlds in

which N does not mean M; however,

must be the
for

I

am

case. Therefore, the construal

someone

like

Malcolm

not convinced that

this

Cl leaves open the door

to argue for the causal irrelevance of

meaning.

On
C2

is

construal C2, this argument

analysed.

We

is

blocked. Let's consider

examine the nearest possible world

possessing the meaning

in

M is not a property had by any of A'

s

how

which
states.

not in state

N

(in

other things being equal, B would not be produced

—

therefore, C2

is

mean

M

This could be so either because

true) or because, a la Cl,

A was

A was

in state N, but

N

which

did not

case,

(which leaves us back in the ambiguous case noted above).
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I

maintain that the

first of

these two possibilities

is

closer to the

actual world than the second, because the

number

of important

changes needed to get from the actual world

to the first

that to get to the second.
state

depends not

just

intrinsic state, but also

move from

possible world in which the

same

the actual world to the nearest
intrinsic state

comparison with the relatively smaller change

failed to

needed

have that

had a

other changes (in particular, the

which the agent

minimum number

necessary to accommodate the change in intrinsic

this

agent, in

This change would also require

intrinsic state.

amount

different

in the intrinsic state

in the nearest possible world in

the overall quantitive

than

on the causal

meaning would require changing the causal history of the

of the agent

less

Because the meaning of an intentional

on the

history of the agent, the

is

of change

is

of changes

state);

however,

While

less is this case.

does not prove that there are in fact causal laws quantifying

over intentional

entities,

it

at least

demonstrates that such a thing

not ruled out; one might rephrase
causation

is

this as:

is

the problem of mental

not a conceptual problem (hence, not a problem for

philosophers) but rather an empirical issue.

There are a few other

lesser difficulties that relate specifically

to the application of causation to the

mental realm.

The

first

of

these involves the possible difference between ceteris paribus

conditions in psychological laws and in the laws of other special
sciences.

meant

to

As mentioned previously, the

ceteris paribus condition

encode the background assumptions that must be

for the cause to be enabled to force the effect,

assumptions pertain

to conditions at the

68

is

satisfied

where these

implementation

level;

hence,

if

made

explicit, the ceteris

paribus conditions would be

stated in the vocabulary of the implementing mechanism.

case of psychological laws, however,
least

some conjuncts

extreme difficulty of enumerating

of the background beliefs, desires,
.

33

I

think, though, that this

is

etc.

relevant to a psychological

an inappropriate use of the

paribus condition: those "background"

beliefs, desires, etc.

constitute a background to psychological laws in the

beliefs, desires, etc.

psychological law.

If

ceteris

do not

same sense

properly functioning brain constitutes a background.

such background

at

For example, one often reads in the

traditionalistic AI literature of the

law

sometimes assumed that

it is

in the ceteris paribus clause are themselves

also at the psychological level.

all

In the

On my

as a

view,

belong in the body of the

philosophers like Dreyfus are correct in

maintaining that the totality of background

beliefs, desires, etc. are

not enumerable, then the enterprise of traditionalist psychology
called into question.

I

is

don't have any particular counter against

33 Sometimes this difficulty is viewed as merely pragmatic: it is hard to
enumerate them all, but not in theory impossible. Sometimes, though, the
"difficulty" is portrayed more as a theoretically insurmountable hurdle,
founded on an essential differentness of psychological laws. A proponent of
this view is Hubert Dreyfus. He states in his paper "From Micro-worlds to
Knowledge Representation: AI at an Impasse":
thesis ... is that whenever human behavior is analyzed in
terms of rules, these rules must always contain a ceteris

My

paribus condition, i.e., they apply "everything else being
equal," and what "everything else" and "equal" mean in any
specific situation can never be fully spelled out without a
regress. Moreover, this ceteris paribus condition is not
merely an annoyance which shows that the analysis is not
yet complete. ... Rather the ceteris paribus condition points to
a background of practices which are the condition of the
possibility of all rulelike activity. In explaining our actions
we must always sooner or later fall back on our everyday
practices and simply say "this is what we do" or "that s what it
is to be a human being." (Page 92).
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Dreyfus

attack. In

any event, the burden

of proof

(rather than merely assume) that this background
infinite or necessarily regressive.

of

PDP leads me

to believe that

decisive against psychology per

cognitive psychology as

As stated

traditionalist form.

present psychology
true psychology

laws explaining

am

is

it

is

(i.e.,

more recent

His

he doesn
se,

t

on him

is

is

to

show

indeed either

writings in praise

take his concerns as

but rather as directed against

currently embodied in
earler,

I

am

its

strong

not presuming that

the true psychology; rather, that there

is

a

a science that aims at discovering the causal

human

behavior in terms of intentional

states).

I

not concerned in this paper with arguing for or against one or

the other models.

Another consideration

in applying causation to the

mental

realm involves the possibility of there being more than one distinct
level of organization of intentional entities that are causally related.

One

sees a similar

phenomenon within

the (widely-construed)

qua

discipline of biology as the science of entities

living systems.

This discipline encompasses causal laws at the organellular
pertaining to parts of

cells), cellular, organ-level,

ecological levels. Perhaps psychology

sees such a hypothesis in the

describing

PDP

as

metapsychological

a

organism-level, and

similarly laminar.

One

more ecumenically-minded

cognitive

thesis,

is

there

model
are

.

34

(i.e.,

According

often

articles

to

this

two distinct levels of

organization of entities qua intentional agents, each of which
possesses

its

own

causal laws stated in the vocabulary appropriate

34 An example is Paul Smolensky's "On the Proper Treatment
Connectionism".
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of

to that level,

PDP

level.

such that the traditionalist level

is

implemented

This view allows that some PDP-modellable behavior

not describable in traditionalist terms, but

all

modellable behavior

level.

are in the

make

implemented

is

at the

am

PDP

is

traditionalist-

Both levels

domain of psychology because the laws within each model

reference to meaningful states 33 While this possibility
.

interesting empirically-decidable issue,
I

in the

to

distinct levels.

an

relevant to the question

it is

posing in this present work in so far as

models correspond

is

it

requires that the two

Hence, the models are

themselves distinct.

The

possibility of

problems for

my

two psychological levels

may appear

to

pose

theory of causation. Wouldn't the strength and

simplicity criteria rule out the adoption of the generalizations as

causal laws at both levels?

dependence

(better

known

A

related concern involves the mutual

as circularity) of the entities

and

their

states quantified over in generalizations,

on the one hand, and the

generalizations made, on the other.

Which

object-states are

considered potentially causally efficacious determines which
generalizations will be made. This

but also within the same

level,

is

true not only at distinct levels,

when

there are two or

competing ways of consistently "carving up"
produces a causal web relating the
another.

We

can assume that there

is

reality,

each of which

states within that

no

more

way

to

one

theoretical reason to prefer

35 There are also philosophers (noteably Fodor and Pylyshyn) who argue that
while it is possible that the model proposed by PDP is a true model describing
human behavior, and that it corresponds to the implementation level of
traditionalism, it is not itself a model of the mind, because the states related by
shall have much more to say in
its causal laws are not intentional states.
viewed
as a model of the mind.
Chapter 4 on if and how PDP can be
1
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one of the competing conceptualizations

and generalizations "cover" the

entities

to another:

both

sets of

facts (broadly construed);

although, again, the "facts" (narrowly construed) to be explained

from one conceptualization

differ

traditionalism

to another.

PDP debate,

versus

ecumenical possibility.

Applied

constitutes

this

to the

another

Unlike in the case mentioned previously,

however, one would not be an implementation of the other. Does
pose a problem within the framework of

this possibility

my

theory

of causation?
I

think that in each case

my

theory not only handles these

potential problems, but also leaves the door

analysis

open

to a philosophical

and comparison of traditionalism and PDP

to

an extent not

possible within the framework of a causal theory that allows only

one of several competing descriptions of the causally interacting
world

to

be true.

(That

irrelevant, question of

how the models

is,

I

can isolate the, for present purposes

which model

differ.) Recall that

virtue of being a

member

equivalent explanatory power)

is

(if,

make

obtained

when
it

is

a causal law by

per supposition, they provide

it

into distinct best sets; hence,

A

similar result

the theories are at least partly at distinct levels

not the case that one completely reduces to or

supervenes upon the other).

my

is

sets of generalizations.

sets of generalizations constitute causal laws.

(but where

of

a generalization

any 36 of the best

of

The competing conceptualizations

both

correct from the question of

is

I

view

this

not as a problematic aspect

theory of causation, but as a feature, both for providing a

a departure from Lewis original theory, in which a
generalization was a causal law by virtue of being a member of all of the best

36

A

reminder: This

is

sets.
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framework

comparing traditionalism and PDP

for

as well as for

elucidating the relationship between competing paradigms within a

when both paradigms

discipline

yield equally

good strong-yet-

simple generalizations.

While the above considerations show that

my

theory of

causation has no theoretical difficulties in dealing with psychological
laws, yet,

still

the doubt remains that

it

In particular, the fact that

difficulties.

relate non-directly-observable states,

my

generosity of

does have certain practical

most psychological laws

combined with the

and

relative

theory of causation in granting lawhood to

generalizations (with a concomitant ontological
entities

will

their causally-interacting states),

commitment

to the

produces the fear that

there will not be enough restraint placed on which generalizations
are causal laws.

This fear of a population explosion of causal laws

and

ungrounded,

entities

is

as

the criteria for lawhood will

immediately exclude from any best

do not contribute

way

to the explanatory

set those generalizations

power of the

set as

which

a whole. By

of illustration, consider the two sets of generalizations below:

Set

1:

Gn

As cause Bs

Gn+1

Bs cause Cs
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Set 2:

Gn

Assume

As cause Cs

mentioned only

that Bs are

within Set

1.

If

both

in generalizations

sets are equally strong

(i.e.,

Gn and Gn+1

postulating the

causal efficacy of Bs does not produce any increase in explanatory

power) then Set

and there
entities

is

1 is

not a best

no requirement

mentioned

Thus, each best

set;

set will

Gn and Gn+1

are not laws,

an ontological commitment

for

in B, unless

hence,

it is

mentioned elsewhere

be minimal relative

to

any

in Set 2.

to a host of sets within a

particular paradigm. While this example considers only the simple

case of a superfluous intermediate state, rather than a superfluous

web

of states,

I

see

no reason

will likewise eliminate

to

doubt that the simplicity criterion

superfluous states that appear as conjuncts in

complex causes and/or

effects.

2.4 Analysis of Mental Causation as Providing
of the Mental

I

began

this

chapter with a brief overview of what

model of a domain

is,

in order to motivate

wanderings through the topics of causation
causation in particular.

modelhood

Model

Now

it is

in general

think a

subsequent

and mental

time to re-examine the notion of

in light of the previous three sections.
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my

I

The

first

science, the

point to note

word "model"

merely predicting

is

is

that, within

common

used ambiguously

to include

(or, less pejoratively, simulating)

as explanatory models. 3

practice in

both

models as well

The former grouping includes those models

that are constructed to mirror the state changes of the modelled

system, without regard to whether the causal laws producing the

changes

state

producing the

in the
state

modelled system are the same

as those

My

changes in the modelling system.

previous

example of the desk-top reproduction of the solar system
such a simulating model. This remains true, even supposing

means

of gears with carefully chosen ratios,

I

is

just

that,

by

produce a dynamic

desk-top reproduction that mirrors not only the relative positions of
the real planets and sun at a particular time, but also the relative
velocities

and

positions of the real planets

and sun through

time. In

that case the toy solar system, while accurately reflecting the
location-state transitions of the real system, does not

of being subjected to the

do so by virtue

same causal laws underlying the

state transitions of the real solar system.

models of physical systems

(i.e.,

simulations by

Likewise, computer

means

of a

of the state transitions of the modelled system)
predicting, even

when

upon an encoding

location-

computer

are merely

the state transition predictions are based

of the relevant causal laws underlying the state

transitions in the modelled system.

No one would say

in either the

desk-top reproduction case or the computer simulation case that the

of referring to this sort oi model would be to use
However, this usage may lead to confusions
model".
the phrase "implementing
have closen to use
of a model. Hence,
level
when discuss the implementing
model".
"explanatory
phrase
the less apt, but also less confusing
3,

A more appropriate way

I

I
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models implement the systems
understood in terms of the

in question,

where "implement"

state transitions of the modelling

is

system

being produced by the same causal laws as those governing the state
transitions of the modelled system. Hence,

no one would argue

such models are explanatory models. In contrast,
in the sciences (the clearest

that

many models used

example being animal models within

medical research) are based on the assumption that the causal laws
forcing state transitions in the modelled system

are reproduced in the modelling system

(i.e.,

(i.e.,

in the

human)

in the animal).

Unlike the typical computer simulation of the state transitions of
a physical system (for example, the simulation of the progression

over time of a thunderstorm)

it is

not a forgone conclusion that a

computer model of the mind can be
model. This

is

at

most a merely predicting

because the causal laws that must be captured in a

concrete implementation of a mental model are not laws relating
physical state types but intentional state types and behavior.
is

And

it

not clear whether or not the intentional state types and behavior

that are quantified over in psychological laws are reproducible

computer.

committed

shall argue in

I

Chapter

3

on a

that traditionalism

to the theoretical reproducibility in a

is

computer of both

the intentional states quantified over in psychological laws as well as

the psychological causal laws themselves; hence, that traditionalism
is

committed

to the possibility of

an explanatory model of mind

implementable in any computational device with certain
In

Chapter

4,

will constitute

this will

I

capabilities.

argue that PDP likewise assumes that their systems

an explanatory model of the mind. The relevance of

become apparent

in

76

Chapter

5,

when

I

compare the two

models. Traditionalism

is

committed

mental causal laws — hence,

computational nature of

to their computability.

argued 38 that the PDP model proposes

non-computable psychological
models are

to the

laws.

(or, at least,
If

Some have

does not rule out)

this is true,

then the two

distinct.

Both traditionalism and PDP offer a general summary of how

mental processing works. From these summaries, one can tease out
a theory of mental causation for each which describes the gross
characteristics of object states that take part in causal interaction

and the gross
the

body

characteristics of the causal relationship. These

of the respective mental models.

model of the mental realm

as

form

One can thus view

a

an abstract web whose interior "nodes"

are the causally efficacious state types and

whose "directed

connections" are laws relating the partial cause and the partial
effect.

I

have in mind something

like the following (this

small section of a folk psychological causal

might be a

web representing a model

of the mind)

Figure

1 --

Portion of folk psychological

web

38 See for example Cummins and Schwartz' "Connectionism, Computation, and
Cognition" in Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind.
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In

order to avoid misunderstandings

I

should reiterate that

concerned here with what particular intentional
laws are mentioned in the causal

web

(that

is

I

am

and causal

states

an empirical matter)

but with the gross characteristics of the states and laws.

example, what level of reality

is

not

For

represented by the causally

efficacious intentional states by each of the two models? By

considering the above question, one can determine the ontological

commitments made by
traditionalism

particular

a

model.

and PDP place constraints on what

addition,

In

sorts of causal laws

are allowed and/or obligatory.

One
detail in

concern that

final

Chapter

4) involves

shall only

I

mention here (but

an ambiguity within the PDP

treat in

literature

regarding which level of analysis of a PDP system to equate with the

model of the mind being
unit-level state changes

offered.

Obviously, the laws regulating

and the intentional content

of unit-level

activation differ from the laws regulating pattern-level state

changes and the intentional content of pattern-level activation;
hence, the unit-level description of PDP systems produces a distinct

model of the mental from the

pattern-level description of

PDP

systems.
I

would

this chapter.

like
I

now

to

summarize the most important points

of

take causation, whether involving object states in

basic physics or in

any of the

as a real relation.

A

special sciences (including psychology)

particular state transition

being subsumed under a causal law.

is

causal

by virtue of

Psychological laws are

distinguished by quantifying over intentional state types. To be a

psychological law

is

to

be a generalization that, relative
78

to a

consistent paradigm, best encapsulates the regularities of the

behavior of humans

any other

(in addition to the other

entities capable of being

higher animals, and

governed by intentionally-

described states) qua intentional agents.

It is

possible that multiple

self-consistent but mutually-incompatible paradigms describing the

intentional level exist. That intentional states either supervene

upon

or are reducible to physical states in no

mere

way shows

the

epiphenomenalism of the former.

A model

of the

mind

causation. This theory

is

is first

and foremost a theory

brought to

light

of mental

by abstracting away from

the particular vocabulary used to describe mental causal interaction

and focussing on the characteristics

(in

terms of possible

representational content) of the causally efficacious states and on
the constraints placed on the possible causal laws relating these
states.

This abstract

way

of viewing a theory of mental causation

permits formalization of causation in terms of a relation and relata,
thus allowing a formal comparison of two presumably competing
theories of the mind.
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CHAPTER

3

TRADITIONALISM AS A MODEL OF THE MENTAL

Traditionalism has most often been described in

its

folk

psychological version. As will become apparent later in this chapter,
I

believe that there

psychology.

is

sense to be

made

of traditionalism sans folk

However, the ubiquity of the examples

illustrating

traditionalism using folk psychological constructs, and more

importantly, the dearth of non-folk psychological examples of
traditionalist causal laws, lead

way

me

to introduce traditionalism

by

of folk psychology.
In this

recently,

chapter

I

what has been,

shall describe

until quite

the predominant view of the mental realm within

psychology and philosophy in the

latter half of this century.

This

view (variously called "classicism", "computationalism", and
"traditionalism"

-- I

adopt the

latter

term for the remainder of

this

work) offers a model of the mind which, among other things, was the
first to

how our

explain

folk psychological theory of intelligent

agenthood may be realized, without contradicting an underlying
physicalist metaphysics.

This fact

traditionalism's popularity.

The

is, I

believe, the

first

way

I

make

it

some

is

has emerged with the

(artificial intelligence) in the

explicit

for

section of the chapter

devoted to a description of traditionalism as
beginnings of AI

main reason

1940's.

Along the

of the (oft-unmentioned) assumptions

inherent in traditionalism, and enumerate some of the various
flavors in

which traditionalism comes

--

this as

an aid in identifying

the absolute minimal commitments of traditionalism.
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The second

section of this chapter takes

up the

providing a model of the mind.

What

questions:

ontological

topic of traditionalism as

In particular,

I

consider the

commitments are made? What form

would causal laws posited by traditionalism take? Given

that

traditionalism proposes that representational states are causally

what

efficacious,

3.1

What

level of reality

do such

states represent?

Traditionalism?

is

Folk psychology as a theory of intelligent agenthood has been

around
is

for a long time. While

clear that

it

I

dare not hazard to guess

how long,

it

pre-dates the advent of traditionalism. According to

folk psychology, the behavior of certain entities (including

and the other higher animals)

is

humans

explainable by reference to the

beliefs, desires, etc. of those entities:

ie,

those beliefs, desires,

etc.

are causally relevant to the behavior. Thus, one encounters in folk

psychology such putative causal laws

as:

A
A

If

then

desires to drink some water, and
believes that there is a glass of water in front of A,
(ceteris paribus)

A

engages in water-drinking behavior.

There are several problems with folk psychology that led
philosophers and psychologists to doubt that
a serious

(i.e.,

scientific)

(philosophical) problem

mental

how

states posited

by

is

it

theory of mind.

how

could ever constitute

The most obvious

to square the causally efficacious

folk psychology with physicalism; hence,

to find a place for the folk psychological ontology within the
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scientific quasi-hierarchy.

(It is

an assumption made by virtually

mainstream philosophers that any respectable

presuppose physicalism
immediately branded
belief

--

to

"fringe".)

buck

How

this

theory must

assumption

to

is

could something mental

how

be causally efficacious? Also,

scientific

all

be

like a

could something as patently

non-physical as meaning play a role in a causal interaction?

A

third

concern (one whose consequences can be seen in the particular
psychological theory put forward in contraposition to folk

psychology in the

latter

how folk psychology

19th and earlier 20th centuries) involves

could ever be transformed into a science, given

that the causally efficacious states
--

it

posits

-

ie, beliefs,

desires, etc.

are non-observable.

One found

in associationism

and behaviorism an attempt

to

formulate a theory that can explain the behavior of intelligent
agents without recourse to their hypothesized mental
this

movement

lay the

Were

Behind

hope that purely physical causal pathways

would be discovered (most
response.

states.

likely, via

the brain) linking stimuli and

this the case, philosophical

concerns about making

the existence of mental states consonant with physicalism would be

avoided

--

there would be no mental states in the usual sense

(i.e.,

as identifiable using a non-physicalist vocabulary).

Two

events

(or,

more

precisely expressed, two

movements)

in

the mid-twentieth century turned the tide of favor within

psychology and philosophy against the associationistic/behavioristic

approach

to explaining intelligent behavior

82

and (back) towards a

belief/desire-based psychology.! The
(identified

first

of these was the feeling

most strongly with Chomsky's attack on behaviorism)

that the associations approach could not explain the facts of

behavior.- For later purposes in

and PDP

it

is

my

human

comparison of traditionalism

important to note that a working hypothesis of

behaviorism was the learned nature of concepts; the attacks against

behaviorism were more often than not attacks against
hypothesis.

Indeed, Chomsky's attack against behaviorism related

to the inability of the latter to explain

how

children could learn the

concepts expressed within the language, not
the language

itself.

how

they could learn

Thus, in psychology in the post-behaviorist era,

there has been a return to a Cartesian view of concepts:

atomic

this

entities that are built into the

mind.

they are

(When speaking

of

concepts entertained by natural creatures, this corresponds to the
thesis that concepts are innate.)

The second movement leading
was the progress

in AI in

to the decline of

behaviorism

making the very idea of causally

want to reiterate that traditionalism need not be identified with folk
psychology. (Indeed, traditionalism is silent on whether the causally
efficacious mental states are beliefs, desires, and/or something else.) If
anything, folk psychology is best viewed as one among many specifications of
traditionalism. In its pure form, traditionalism is silent on which particular
generalizations are causal laws. Folk psychology, on the other hand, includes
(perhaps even consists solely in) the set of commonsense generalizations
purportedly providing explanations and predictions of the behavior of mindpossessing entities. Many of these commonsense generalizations have been
called into question by various schools within traditionalist psychology, and
many additional generalizations not a part of the folk psychological
repertoire have been advanced. A clear example of the latter category is
Freud's psychological theory, which, while belief/desire-based (hence,
consonant with traditionalism) is not typically considered a part of folk
psychology.
2 The identified short-comings of behaviorism were based on a posteriori
considerations: it was not that behaviorism was in principle incorrect as a
theory of intelligent behavior, but rather that it failed to explain certain
aspects of human behavior -- in particular, human language acquisition.
!

I
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efficacious mental states conceivable within the framework of

physicalism. The importance of the computer metaphor in bringing

about the hegemony of traditionalism within cognitive psychology

cannot be overstated.

Philosophers saw in the computer an

existence proof that one aspect of the mind-body problem

(i.e.,

how

a meaningful state could be causally efficacious) was readily
the meaningful states were also (token identical with)

solvable:

physical states whose physical/syntactic properties were sufficiently
related to their meaning, so that the transition
state to the next mirrors the transition

the next.

derived
exact.

—

In the case of the

it

all

points out one of

3.)

its

human was

at least part of the

not

mind-body

that remained was the naturalization of

original intentionality. (This

Section

state to

computer, the meaningfulness was

was believed that

problem was solved;

2,

from one meaningful

the analogy between computer and

so,

However,

Chapter

from one physical

is

a project that

is still

ongoing. See

my

Giving the historical roots of traditionalism

underlying assumptions: any mental

state, in

order to be genuinely efficacious, must be explicitly represented in a
physical state. This holds true both for systems (like the computer)

with derived intentionality as well as for systems with original
intentionality.

Even the most abstract

(i.e.,

remote from

details of

physical implementation) cognitive psychological diagram of the

mind, with

its

information,

is

belief boxes

based on

this

and arrows showing the flow
assumption:

of

there must be a set of

physical states and physical pathways that instantiate the depicted

mental

states.

Jerry Fodor, perhaps the most unambiguous

proponent of traditionalism, makes clear
84

this

underlying assumption:

then, what exactly is RTM [his version of
traditionalism] minimally committed to by way of
explicit representation? ... According to RTM, mental

So,

processes

are

transformations of mental
representations. The rules which determine the
course of such transitions may, but needn't, be
themselves explicitly represented. But the mental
contents (the
thoughts', as it were) that get
transformed must be explicitly represented or the
theory is simply false. To put it another way: if the
occurrence of a thought is an episode in a mental
process, then RTM is committed to the explicit
representation of the content of the thought 3
.

With

this

assumption as background, the psychologist,

like

any

researcher in the other natural sciences, need not concern herself
further with the particulars of implementation, but can remain

conceptually isolated within the vocabulary of beliefs and desires.

The

historical relationship

between traditionalism and AI

points out another of traditionalism'

s

groundlying assumptions: the

computability of the function governing mental state transitions
For present purposes,

it is

most

.

4

fruitful to define computability in

terms of rule-governedness of manipulation. Using the vocabulary
transferred over from the computer metaphor, the representational

3 A Theory of Content, pp. 23-24.
4 Computability theory as a subdiscipline of computer science pre-dates by
several decades the construction of the first electronic computing devices in
the 1940' s; hence, the definition of what constitutes a computable function is
given, not in terms of the modern von Neumann-style computer (with its CPU,
instruction registers, and addressable memory), but in terms of the luring

machine. A function is computable if and only if it is Turing-computable (ie,
in the
if and only if there is a Turing machine that can, for each element
It just
element).
that
for
output
function's
the
return
function,
domain of the
machine
uring
universal
the
power
of
computational
so happens that the
and the (non-resource bounded) von Neumann-style computer are the same:
anv Turing-computable function is von Neumann-computable and vice versa.
I
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states being

refers to

manipulated are

explicitly stored,

and transforms these

states

and the program

that

corresponds to formal rules

governing the manner of manipulation. (The computability thesis
carries with

it

laws can take.

We

a set of restrictions on the form that mental causal
I

shall discuss this topic later.)

see in traditionalism an even stronger interpretation of the

computer metaphor than

as a

mere analogy

to aid in clarifying

mental vocabulary. From the beginnings of AI
that,

it

has been a thesis

once the rules governing mentally-describable

state transitions

were discovered and encoded, a computer program implementing
these mentally-describable states and their corresponding rules

would not only simulate a mind, but implement a mind.
vocabulary introduced in Chapter

2,

the thesis

is

In the

that an explanatory

model of the mind (rather than a merely predicting model)
theory achievable. Even the
in the

1950

s

name

in

mentioned by John McCarthy

first

for the fledgling field reflects this assumption: notice

the distinction between the import of the phrases
intelligence"

is

and

"

fake intelligence"

--

"

artificial

the former implies that

genuine intelligence, albeit via human-manufactured

entities, is the

goal, not a simulation of intelligence. This, along with the often tacit

assumption that only things with minds can have genuine
intelligence, implies that part of the goal of AI

mind.

is

the production of a

Perhaps the most well-developed espousal of

computational theory of mind view

Computation and Cognition

.

A

is

to

this strong

be found in Pylyshyn's

typical passage

is:

As we see below, in the case of cognitive psychology,
explanatory adequacy depends on a stronger sense of
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equivalence [than mere correspondence of I/O
behavior], particularly on knowing the details of the
process at a suitable level of abstraction. What, then,
recommends computation as the appropriate vehicle
for that task? To provide a framework for discussing
this question, let us first look at computation from a
more abstract point of view. That will help bring out
further similarities in the relationship of
computational devices and computational processes,
on the one hand, and brains and cognitive processes,

on the other.

It

is

the failure to distinguish

computation as a type of process from the particular
physical form it takes in current computing machines
that has prevented many people from taking
computation as a literal account of mental process. If
we understand computation at a fairly general level
(as, in fact, it is understood in theoretical computer
science), we can see that the idea that mental
processing is computation is indeed a serious
empirical hypothesis rather than a metaphor 5
.

A

similar statement equating mental processes with computational

processes can be found in the writings of other traditionalists, such
as Fodor. For example:

happens, some reasonably persuasive
theories about the nature of such mechanisms
[dealing with mental phenomena]. The one I like
best says that the mechanisms that implement
intentional laws are computational 6

There

are, as

it

.

One can

see

now

the truly pivotal role that the emergence of

AI has played with regard to saving a place for causally efficacious

mental states within the framework of physicalism. Computers

(like

brains) are physical devices, subject to physical (and chemical

and

5 Page 55.

6A

Theory of Content, page 145.
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thermodynamic,

etc.) laws.

While embodying a computation process,

a computer has, in addition to

its

thermodynamic,

certain

etc.)

states,

physical (and chemical and

computational

states.

Computational states possess some interesting properties, three of

which are particularly relevant
that, while

implemented

computational

is

in a physical

medium, such

first is

a state

not physical. Rather, the property that makes

computational state that

it is is its

the relation between this state and
states.

A

qua

it

the

functional role within the context

of an abstract process. This functional role

computational

The

for present purposes.

is

understood in terms of

preceding and following

its

particular physical state implements a

particular computational state by virtue of being a token of a

member

of an equivalence class of physical state types that are

related to other equivalence classes of physical state types in the

same way

as the corresponding computational states are related to

one another. A second relevant property of computational
the rule-governedness of their succession

can identify, by means of an algorithm

program

more concrete

(at a

states

is

upon one another. One

(at the abstract level) or a

level), the rules that

govern the

manipulation of data structures.
Finally,

and perhaps most importantly

contribution of the computational theory of
solution of the

mind

derived

seeing

the

to the partial

mind/body problem, computational

intentional states.
strictly

in

states are

As already mentioned, their intentionality

from

the

original

intentionality

observer/creator of the computational process.

of

When embodied

is

the
in a

concrete computational device, the physical characteristics of the
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physical state that implements a particular computational state bear
a relation to the meaning of that state, such that the physical laws
that force the transition

physical state that
class constituting

from the current physical

a token of a

is

is

of a distinct equivalence

another computational state are isomorphic to the

rules governing transitions

correspondence

member

state to the next

between the computational

"built in" to the computer:

This

states.

the designer designs

it

so that this correspondence between the computer's physical
properties and

its

computational properties (when

computational process) obtains.
express

this

in

English

—

see

(I

am
the

finding

it

it is

engaged in a

very

difficult to

diagram for a

pictorial

representation of this relationship between physical states and

computational

states.)

Corn p - state -hype
* •

A

conn p-s tat e-hype

•

Figure 2

--

Relationship between physical and

computational states
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-

2

We

see one single computational state transition depicted in the

diagram

(i.e.,

type-2).

At the computational level of description, the transition

the transition from comp-state- type- 1 to comp-stateis

governed by one of the rules that constitute the (abstract)
computational system.

It is

possible to implement a computational

system in a physical system
computer).

(e.g.,

in

a

von Neumann-style

Each computational state type corresponds

to

an

equivalence class of physical state types, as shown. Computers, as
artificial

devices, are designed to take advantage of relevant

physical causal laws to allow relatively easy implementation of

computational systems: one can guarantee

computer

type-m+1
system

s

physical state transits from one of the states in phys-

s

state-type-1

(ceteris paribus) that the

...

...

phys-state-type-m to one of the states in phys-statephys-state-type-n

if

and only

if

the computational

computational state transits from comp-state-type- 1

comp-state-type-2.

A

particular physical state of a

token of phys-state-type-1)

is

computer

to

(e.g.,

a

meaningful by virtue of instantiating a

computational state type (for

this case,

it

inherits the intentional

content of comp-state-type-1). For the case of a computer, we can

guarantee a correspondence between computational states and
equivalence classes of physical states only because the (human)
designer of the computer has built in the correspondence.

What

guarantees such a correspondence between computational/mental
states

and equivalence

classes of physical states in the

any other natural being? How a

traditionalist

human, or

responds

to this

question depends upon which method for the naturalization of
original intentionality

is

assumed.
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A

traditionalist leaning towards

the evolutionary approach to naturalization will answer that, in the

history of a species,

body

(or,

follow

it

has offered selectional advantage to have a

more narrowly, a nervous system) whose physical

upon one another

manner

in the

of Figure

2.

states

Whether or not

such a correspondence between classes of physical states of the

nervous system and computational
issue

which

is

states obtains

is

an empirical

not yet decided.

While the computational-nature-of-mind thesis

phenomena

liberating to the study of mental

in

is

(in that

it

one sense
frees the

psychologist from a concern for the implementational details of the

computational/mental
This

is

because

mental realm
however,
(i.e.,

is

it

computable functions.

functions which are

known

to

There

are,

be non-computable

no computational system that computes these

Perhaps the mind

functions).

can also be seen as constraining.

limits the candidate functions describing the

to the set of

many

there

it

states),

is

a system that implements a non-

computable function. The ramifications of

this possibility are

only

recently becoming understood within psychology. Although rarely

mentioned

explicitly in traditionalist writings, the computability

assumption

is

so

integral

that

it

cannot be removed from

traditionalism without destroying the integrity of the entire model.

This

is

because the intentional content of the physical state

implementing a mental
state type that

among
with

it

it is

state

a token

is

of.

determined by the computational
(I

am

taking as the received view

traditionalists the thesis that computational statehood carries

wide content.

psychological

As mentioned in Chapter

phenomena

2,

I

assume that

are identified by their subsumption under

91

causal laws that advert to (wide) representational content.) But

something

s

being an instance of a computational state type makes

sense only within the context of a computational process

--

a process

which, at a minimum, can be described by formal rules.
This restriction to the set of computable functions constrains
the sorts of learning in which a traditionalist system
particular, learning

must be confined

structures, for changes to the

of computation.

program

is

to

may

engage. In

changes in the manipulated

program take us outside of the realm

This restriction makes sense, given

how

the

interpreted within tradtiionalism: the program encodes

the mental causal laws, which themselves remain unaffected by
learning.

In

order to stay within the guidelines

computationalist assumption, the program

is

set

unalterable.

by the

Some may

object that computers running self-altering programs are not only

conceivable but also actual, and this

is

certainly true.

implementing such a function, the computer

is

However, in

not implementing a

computational process. (In general, a physical computer
of performing

many

tasks other than

drop

it

this function (namely, its

implementation of

its

location of release) are non-computational.
in

t**2

For

when

out a window; however, the computer's states relevant to

its

keep

capable

computing functions.

example, a computer can implement the function d = 0.5 a
I

is

mind

accompanying

that

displacement from
It is

important to

what the computationalist assumption (and

restriction)

buys for traditionalism

is

its

representational

content.

As we shall see in Chapter

4,

PDP systems, while most often

in

practice limited to the implementation of computable functions, are
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not in theory thus limited.

Whether PDP researchers

believe that

the possibility of implementing non-computable functions

important feature of PDP systems

an issue on which there
discuss this topic in

is

more

any consensus

detail in

Chapter

the last several pages

In

mental modelling

vis-a-vis

I

in the literature.
5,

are

states

have described the

computational

mental/computational states must be

would

like

now

states

its

A major assumption

not

shall

I

of

set

AI roots:

and

(2)

(1)

these

explicitly represented.

examine more closely the features of these

to

is

Section 4.

hypotheses within traditionalism stemming from

mental

an

is

within traditionalism

is

I

states.

that mental states are

often structured: 7 they are composed of parts, each of which, in

combination with

something
is

its

"semantic" position within the state, contributes

meaning of the mental

to the overall

state.

The meaning

nothing over and beyond the synthesized meaning of

meaning fully-relevant

addition, the

state.

reflected

by some physical

that this specific order

is

would constitute a

state that

implements the

Additionally, any meaning-relevant position
relationship. So,

of three parts (mental-parti, mental-part2,

parts

parts. In

parts correspond to physically-

isolable structural parts of the physical state that

mental

its

implements

it

important

(i.e.,

if

is

also

a mental state consists

and mental-part3) such

a different ordering of the

different mental state), then the physical
will also

have three parts (phys-partl,

phys-part2, and phys-part3), such that phys-partl implements
mental-parti, phys-part2 implements mental-part2, and phys-part3

7 On this view,

not

all

mental states need be structured, but the vast majority

will be.
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implements mental-part3 and

When

encoded.

this

ordering of the parts

is

somehow

asked to give a reason for insisting on structured

representations, traditionalists most often cite Fodor's language of

thought argument. As

I

discuss this argument in Section 2 of this

chapter (in the context of an examination of the level of reality

represented by mental

mention

it

states),

shall not

I

do more than merely

here.

Traditionalism

is

the theory of

mind most

often assumed in

mainstream (non-PDP) AI and cognitive psychology.
advised, therefore, to sample
in

these fields,

traditionalism

is

if

for

some

It

is

well

from researchers

of the writings

no other reason than

to

prove that

not just a theory of interest to philosophers.

Perhaps the earliest sign of an inclination toward traditionalism
within the field that would later develop into AI

is

to

be found in

Alan Turing's "Computing Machinery and Intelligence",

first

published in 1950, in which he refers to the "human computer" and

compares processing

in the digital

computer with processing

(human) mind. 8 Another important

in the

figure in the early history of AI,

Allen Newell, describes the close relationship between psychology

and computer

science:

[My purpose] is to
symbolic models

call

your attention

in

many

experimental psychology.

...

to the use of

places through out
I maintain that a shift

paper originally appeared in Mind LIX, in October 1950, pp. 433-460.
reprinted in The Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence, edited by M. Roden.
8 This
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It

is

in the Zeitgeist in

a view of

man

And, a few pages

psychology has taken place toward
as an information processor 9
.

same

later in the

article:

In the discussion of the possible relationship of
information processing models to psychology we
opted for the use of such models as detailed theories

of behavior, rather than, say, metaphors or exercises
in the discipline of operationalism 10
.

In a later work, Newell gives his

own theory

of

human

cognition.

He

writes:

wish to be explicit that humans are
symbol systems. ... They might be other kinds of
systems [eg, biological systems] as well, but at least
they are symbol systems 11

At this point

I

.

He defines "symbol system"

computational

system ." 12

representative of those

by Haugeland,

in terms of being a

among

I

am

taking

"form of universal

Newell's views as

researchers in AI, as

is

corroborated

in:

computational systems] can be
interpreted: their tokens ["token" here is being used
in a slightly restricted sense. A token is not any old
instance of a type, but refers specifically to the

Formal systems

[ie,

on the Relationship between Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive
Psychology" in Theoretical Approaches to Non-Numerical lYoblem Solving,
page 376.
111 "Rem arks on the Relationship between Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive
Psychology", page 378.
1
Unified Theories of Cognition, page 113.
1
Unified Theories of Cognition, page 76.
9 " Remarks

95

physically

instantiated objects (i.e., concrete
realizations of computational states) manipulated by a
system] can be assigned meanings and taken as
symbols about the outside world. ... [I] f artificial
intelligence is right, the mind itself is a (special)
interpreted formal system 13
.

Traditionalism
psychologists.

I

is

also

the model of choice

among

cognitive

take John Anderson as typical of that group.

Production systems are particularly general in that
they claim to be computationally universal -- capable
of modelling all cognitive activity 14
.

One point

of contention amongst traditionalists relates to the

issue of the requirement for the explicit representation of the

rules/program governing the transition from one computational
state

demonstrates
Thus,

As the above-quoted passage from Fodor

to another.

it

may

15
,

he

is

willing to allow that the rules

may

be built

in.

be that mental processing corresponds to computational

processing on a dedicated, rather than on a general purpose

computer.

Newell and Simon, on the other hand, understand the

computational nature of mind thesis as requiring a separation into
universal computational device and particular program running on
thus, the rules, along with the

that general purpose device

--

manipulated symbols, must be

explicitly represented.

this difference as crucial to the

understanding of traditionalism, for

I

do not take

13 Artificial Intelligence, pp. 99-100.
14 The Architecture of Cognition, page 13.

which determine the course of such transitions may, but needn't,
be themselves explicitly represented." A Theory of Content, page 24.
15 "The rules
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all

three agree on the computational nature of mind, and on
the

thesis that a special

purpose device

a special purpose Turing

(e.g.,

machine) can implement a computational system. Hence,

I

side with

Fodor in allowing non-explicit rules within traditionalism. The issue
is

often brought up in the context of comparisons between

traditionalism and PDP, in that the latter not only permits nonexplicit rules, but requires
shall

for

have more

now

of rules
to

to say

on

to note that, as
is

I

by the very nature of PDP systems.

it

this topic in

Chapters 4 and

do not believe the

this line of

argument

it

explicit representation

a necesary condition for a traditionalist model,

be dismissive of

Suffice

5.

I

I

will

tend

in distinguishing the

two

models.

am

I

able at this point to state what

marks of traditionalism: a

realist

I

take to be the defining

understanding of mental causation,

the equation of mental processes with computational processes, and

the structured nature of the mental/computational representations

being manipulated. Tienson has

summed up

this

view quite nicely

as follows:

The "twin minimal commitments"

of [traditionalism]:
representations
and structure
syntactically structured
sensitive, rule-governed computational processes. 16

It

may be

criticisms of

make

it

useful to examine traditionalism in light of various

raised

crystal clear

by dissenting philosophers;

some

of

opponent of traditionalism

its

is

ramifications.

John

16 From the introduction to Connectionism
23.
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Searle.

and

I

do

this in

order to

The most famous

In his oft-cited article

the Philosophy of Mind, page

Minds, Brains, and Programs "
be

summed up by

17

his rejection of traditionalism can

his rejection of the computational theory of mind:

he states that "no reason has been given

to

suppose that when

understand English [he uses understanding English here
archetype representing

any formal program
to

all

mental processing]

at all ." 18 Rather,

I

am

as

I

an

operating with

he claims, causal laws relevant

mental goings-on (including those relevant for establishing a

mental token as meaningful) reach down
hence,
of the

it is

mind

in theory impossible to

to the biological level;

implement an explanatory model

in a computer.

Steven Stich, on the other hand, accepts the computational

theory of mind (in a slightly modified form), but rejects the
traditionalist hypothesis that the

are representations

(i.e.,

mental tokens thus manipulated

are intentional).

He summarizes the

conclusion of his arguments against the strong representational
theory of mind
to

con ten tful

(i.e.,

a theory according to which mental laws advert

states )

The question at hand is whether the notion of belief
and related folk psychological notions will find a
comfortable home in cognitive science. One view that
urges an affirmative answer is the Strong
Representational Theory of Mind, which sees a mature
cognitive science postulating representational states
and adverting to content in its generalizations. ... [T]he
cognitive scientist is ill advised to adopt the Strong

RTM paradigm

.

19

The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1980), pp. 417The Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence, edited by M.

17 Originally published in

424. Reproduced in
Boden.
18 The Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence, page 71.
1
From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science, page 160.
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He puts forward an alternative theory
Syntactic

Theory of Mind) which

of the

mind (dubbed

the

computational, yet "[avoids] any

is

appeal to content in cognitive generalizations." 20

A

third route to the rejection of traditionalism

to

is

adopt an

instrumentalist construal of mental state tokens. Under the rubric

"instrumentalism"

Dennett)

and

I

include both the standard interpretation (a

(for

representationalists.

— they

traditionalism

lack

of

a

better label)

the

reject the thesis that there corresponds, for

group of cognitive

final

scientists

experimental psychologists working in the

state token.

whom

(most of

field of

are

mental imagery--

Kosslyn and Shepard) argue against traditionalism on the

eg,

grounds that

it

gets

the nature of the structure of mental

They base

representations wrong.

least

some)

mental

manipulation of

processing

pictorial, rather

on a

their opposition

famous psychological experiments, 21 which purport

is,

non-explicit

Both groups reject the realist assumption of

each mental state token, an implementing physical

A

la

consists

of

to

show

set of

that (at

rule-governed

than quasi-linguistic, tokens. (That

they maintain that the manner in which the part/whole relation

of

some mental tokens

is

to

be understood

is

in terms of the

part/whole relation typical of pictures or images, rather than that of

complex sentences.)
argument

(to

I

believe that Fodor's language of thought

be discussed in Section 2 of

this chapter)

presupposes

that the structure of causally efficacious mental tokens

is

20 From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science, page 160.
21 See, for example, Mental Images and their Transformations, by

Shepard

and

L.

Cooper.

99

R.

quasi-

linguistic.

While

I

traditionalism solely

argument

would not want

my

to base

on the views of Fodor, the

in the traditionalism versus

interpretation of

centrality of the

PDP debate

inclines

LOT

me

to

exclude, at least in the context of this work, pictorialists from the
traditionalist

camp.

3.2 Traditionalism as a

In this section,

I

Model of the Mental

convert traditionalism (as defined by a

commitment

to a realist theory of

processes

are

mental causation, in which mental

computational

such

processes,

that

the

mental/computational representations manipulated are structured)
into a

model of the mind. Before

that a

model of the mind

is

I

would

I

explicitly distinguish traditionalism

laws.

and

is

even

In particular,

laws.

silent

efficacious mental tokens are beliefs, desires,

one typically finds

unclear; however, traditionalism in

if

its

a particular theory of the

2,

mind

want

to

on whether causally
and/or any other type
exactly

not beliefs, desires,

etc., is

purest form allows that they

Section 4, a
is

I

What

might be some other sort of representational
As described in Chapter

makes no

Indeed, the above

in folk psychology.

the true mental tokens would be,

it

folk psychology, because the

presumed causal

description of traditionalism

of attitude that

like to reiterate

an abstract model, in that

mention of concrete mental causal

latter includes a set of

begin,

states.

model corresponding

to

intimately related to the form that

the causal laws take within that theory.

Hence,

I

begin this section

with an analysis of mental causation according to traditionalism.

100

While traditionalism

mental

states,

intentional

—

ie,

is

committed

to the physical instantiation of all

mental causal laws quantify over

a state takes part in a mental causally-determined

transition in part because

it

bears a particular meaning.

may

(It

be that some other aspects of the state are causally relevant

example, that

it

belief that p. This

may

for

instantiate a

a distinct mental state type from a desire that

is

even though the representational content of the two

and

--

Using the belief/desire-based

specification of traditionalism, the physical state

identical.

also

instantiates a certain attitude of the agent towards

the representational content.

p,

qua

states

states

is

Presumably, mental causal laws advert to both content

attitude.)

The

from one

rules that specify the transition

computational state to another are the mental causal laws.

One important

aspect of causal lawhood (both on

construal given in Chapter

2,

Section

How

analysis of counterfactuals.

1

and

my particular

in general) involves the

are they to be understood a la

traditionalism? Consider a particular hypothesized mental causal
law:

C

where C and E are mental

s

cause E's

state types,

each of which

complex conjunction composed of more basic mental
Suppose that a particular instance

(i.e.,

occurred in the actual world, and that
instance of E (call
states

it

and physical

"e").

it

may

be a

state types.

a token) of C (call

it

"c")

was followed by a particular

Given the relationship between mental

states according to traditionalism, this

101

means

that

there was a token of

implemented

c,

in that

it

some physical

type which

state

was a member of the equivalence

class of

physical state types that form the computational/mental state C.
similar relationship holds between e

implements
implements

c "Phys-C",

and

call

physical state type and phys-e
e.

state that

Call the state type of the physical state that

it.

the physical state token that, on this

particular occasion, implements

implements

and the physical

A

is

c,

"phys-c". Similarly, Phys-E

the

is

the token of the physical state that

As mentioned, we are assuming that "C'

a law, and that c (an actual token) caused

e.

s

cause E

How

are

s" is

we

to

understand the following counterfactual?
a C hadn t occurred,
then an E would not have occurred.

If

We

first

'

consider the nearest possible world in which this instance of

C did not occur (presumably,

this

world

is

one of the nearest

neighbors of the actual world). Now, there are three

possibilities to

consider with respect to the properties at this possible world. Either:

(a)

(b)

(c)

phys-c occurred, but phys-c in this world is not a
token of C, or
phys-c did not occur, but some other state (call
it phys-o) did occur, and phys-o is an instance of
Phys-O, which is a member of the equivalence
class constituting C in the actual world, but
not a member of the equivalence class forming
C in this possible world, or
phys-c did not occur, and no other token of a state
that is a member of the equivalence class constituting
C in the actual world occurred.
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Recall in

general,

Chapter
I

2, in

the discussion of analysis of counterfactuals in

argued that the possibility represented by

(a)

above

is

not

the possible world to consider in analysing the corresponding
counterfactual, for

or

We

(c).

Chapter

it is

can see the similarity of

by considering the

2

mental state type C gives
So, possibility (a)

the

away from the

farther

man was

is

in the

actual world than (b)

with the one used in

this case

following: phys-c

s

to phys-c in the actual

instantiation of the

world

its

analogous to the case from Chapter

same physical

meaning.

which

2 in

state, yet that physical state

did

not correspond to the belief and desire that led him to climb the

ladder in the actual world.

But the difference between the actual

world and

to effect the

this

world needed

identical physical state

actual

is

change

because the physical state

in

which the meaningful

altered.

is

consider possibility
is

satisfied only

(b).

when

state

is

altered

Thus, whether a token of E

occurs in the possible world corresponding to

counterfactual

meaning for the

greater than the difference between the

and some other world

Now

in

(a) is irrelevant.

The antecedent of the

Phys-O, while a

equivalence class forming C in the actual world,

is

member

of the

not a member of

the equivalence class forming C in this possible world.

Thus, we

have the same situation as that described for the above

case:

equivalence class forming the computational/mental state
constant across the possible worlds

-- ie,

is

the

not

from the actual world

to

the possible world described by (b). And, as above, the quantity of

change needed

needed

to

to effect this

is

greater than the quantity of change

go from the actual world to the possible world
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corresponding

As above, therefore, whether a token of E

to (c).

occurs in this possible world

irrelevant.

is

So, this leaves us with (c) as the

world

to consider

when

analyzing the counterfactual: neither phys-c nor any other physical
state

token that

is

an instance of a physical

constitutes the equivalence class C occurs.
in the actual

physical

world was caused by the C

mechanism implementing

causing phys-e.
phys-c

s

(This

produce a physical

member

as hypothesized, the E

in the actual world, then the

conditioned upon

is

of the equivalence class that constitutes

no reason

nomic

its

state (in this case, phys-e) that

to possibility (c), there is

was phys-c 's

this interaction

because, according to traditionalism,

is so,

being a token of C

If,

state type that

is

ability to

an instance of a

E).

But, according

to believe that

an E would be

caused, unless E was overdetermined in the actual world. (That
is

also a causal law that, for example, C*'s cause E's,

instance of C as well as an instance of C*

and both were nomologically
In this case,

(call it

sufficient for the

and both an

"phys-c*") occurred,

production of phys-e).

however, we would not say that the C caused the

rather that both the C and the C* caused the

consider this possibility. So, in

this,

is, it

E,

but

Hence, we needn't

E.

the closest possible world, the

counterfactual turns out true, as expected.

Up

until this point,

I

have been somewhat sloppy

characterization of computational/mental states.

think that

my

sloppiness

is

I

would

in

like to

merely a reflection of the sloppiness

be found in traditionalist writings on

this topic

--

given that

I

often been engaged in summarizing the views of others in the

part of this chapter,

it

is

my

reasonable that
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I

to

have
first

should adopt the

vocabulary' used in the literature. Now, however,

I

must of necessity

adopt a more precise and standardized vocabulary. According
classical

computer science

to the

definition, a computational state of a

computing device consists of the complete computational

state of the

device at a time step. Using the Turing machine as archetype of a

computing device, a computational
<current-machine-state

state

is

the triple:

22
,

tape-contents,
position of read/ write head> 23

Thus, the Turing machine progresses from one computational state
to

to

another at each time step
construct

components

it , 25

.

24

A

concrete Turing machine, were one

would be a physical device with physical

(a tape, a

R/W

head, and some sort of controller that

could store the current machine state and perform the physical
actions corresponding to the formal actions specified in the machine
state tansition table).

Corresponding to each computational

state

is

a

(very large) equivalence class of physical states that can instantiate
it.

One can think

of this physical diversity as the consequence of

implementing a quantized device

in a

world whose ultimate

level of

of states accessed by the state transition table. The
machine state makes no mention of head position or items stored on the tape.
23 An equivalent formalism for describing the computational state of a luring
machine is: ccurrent-machine-state, contents of tape to left of R/W head,
contents of tape from R/W head to the right (inciusive)>.

22 0ne of a finite

number

24 Turing machines, like digital computers, are assumed to have a clock that
synchronizes all the changes necessary in going from one computational
state to the next. Thus, computational states are quantized: it makes no sense to
ask, for example, "What state is the machine in as the R/W head moves from
square 201 to square 200?".
2 ^Technically-speaking, this is not possible, because a Turing machine has
access to an unbounded amount of tape. As no one believes the (non-resource
bounded) Turing machine is true in all respects in depicting the attributes of
the mind, this short-coming can be glossed over.
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quantization
So, there

(if

there

might be

is

one)

many

Some

0010000..., 3>.

is

much

distinct

lower than that of the device.

ways of being

in the state <S24,

of the diversity results from the various

precise physical configurations corresponding to the

scanning the 3rd square of the tape. There are
of diversity.

many

R/W head

other sources

(As mentioned, in general, the equivalence class of

physical state types will be very large.)

A von Neumann-style

computer, while differing in some of the above

details,

analogous picture. The traditionalist thesis

that so too does the

human nervous system

more

(or,

is

produces an

generally, the nervous system of

any creature possessing a mind).
There

is,

however, a

this (monolithic)

slight

problem of terminology

view of a computational

state with the

in squaring

more

finely-

grained usage outside of the theory of computation literature.

Namely, psychologists and philosophers

talk as

though

it is

a proper

part of the complete computational/mental state of an entity that

causally responsible for

some change

of mental state or

behavior. Returning to the folk psychological example,

and

desire for water

of

me

my

my water-drinking

that causes

other beliefs, desires,

etc.,

sequence. In particular,
to

my

drinking.

computer
caused
Is

belief that there

behavior.

belief that

only

my

a glass of water in front

that play absolutely

my

some

2+2=4

have many, many

I

no
is

role in this causal

causally irrelevant

However, on the monolithic view imported from

science,

it is

my

my water-drinking
there a

is

it is

is

way

to

whole computational/mental

state that

behavior.

make

psychological and philosophical usage

of the computational theory of
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mind

consistent with computational

theory simpliciter? What traditionalism-cum-folk-psychology needs
is

a

way

of subdividing this monolithic computational/mental state

into substates that correspond to beliefs, desires,

etc.,

while

preserving the individuation of these substates along computational
lines.

that

There

is, I

think,

one avenue open

to the traditionalist. Recall

one of the commitments of traditionalism

the parts of the mental state

to structured parts:

is

the individual conjuncts

(i.e.,

constituting the monolithic computational/mental state) correspond
to physically-isolable parts of the physical state

mental

state.

(While usually intended

implementing the
Fodor's argument

--eg, in

from systematicity of mental representation 26 —

to cover the

part/whole relation between single propositions and their
constituents, the structured nature of mental states
also applies to conjunctive mental states. 27 ) So,

conjunct
that
state

is

a

is

is itself

on

is

a thesis that

this theory,

each

physically-isolable: within each physical state type

member

of the equivalence class that constitutes a mental

a physically-isolable "sub"-state type, tokens of which

implement the corresponding mental

state parts.

types are themselves physical state types.

We

The

"

sub" -state

have the following

picture:

26 See, for example, the section on the systematicity of cognitive
representation in Fodor and Pylyshyn s "Connectionism and Cognitixe
Architecture: A Critical Analysis", pp. 37-41.
27 See, for example, the section of the systematicity of inference trom the

same work, pp. 46-48.
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To say that
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my

9'CkSS

Of

v^ter

/»
physical state types

moool.'fb.c

Relationship of monolithic and sub-state types

belief that there

desire for water caused

is

me

a glass of water in front of

my

water-drinking behavior

say that, for each of the monolithic physical state types that

is

to

is

a

of the mental state type, only a subset of that monolithic

physical state

is,

strictly-speaking, necessary for the production of

water-drinking behavior.
is

*.

rr\y

^^-des'ire

(mono -p^yS-s+A'ktype-c)

member

f0

belief
+Hat +her£ 'i«>
glass of wafer
in -front of me

(
(.rwono-pb^S-^fak-

type-b)

my

Corresponding

^

©

(mooo-ph ys -stotC-

and

5u.b-stafe types

instantiated

(In particular,

when

mental-state-type-

by a token of monohthic-phys-state-type-b, only the

subset of b identified by the two circles within b are necessary to

cause the circle in monolithic-phys-state-type-w. 28

)

Clearly,

how

28 The subset need not be limited to spatial parts of the monolithic physical
state; rather, it is a subpart that is isolable using physical vocabulary.
Spatially-isolable parts are only one among many parts thus isolable.
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structured and causally-isolable the monolithic-phys-state-type
parts are

is

an empirical

issue.

In the idealized case

where such parts are perfectly

causally-

isolable, a picture

emerges of multiple computational processes

running in

implemented

parallel,

physical state tokens.

It

is

in a single

sequence of monolithic

analogous to a parallel-processing

computer executing several programs simultaneously. There are
two computational levels: one corresponding to the overall
computational process encompassing

second level corresponding

to

processes, one for each individual

think

all

of the subprocesses,

many

separate computational

program running

this picture that best fits the

it is

mainstream

traditionalists.

(It

and a

in parallel.

I

terminology adopted by

should be noted that parallelism as

described above does not increase the computational power to a
level

above that of a

serial

von Neumann-style computer:

both

(non-resource bounded) serial and parallel computers can compute
exactly the

same

this picture, in

set of functions as a

Turing machine.) An aside:

conjunction with the further thesis that the various

processes running in parallel are relatively compartmentalized,
results in faculty psychology, a la Fodor'
It is

and

s

Modularity of Mind.

interesting to note the relationship between this picture

my comments in

in the context of

Chapter 2 on

how

to interpret "ceteris paribus"

mental causal laws. Recall

that, in that discussion,

I

distinguished two interpretations assigned to ceteris paribus clauses.

The

first

supposes that ceteris paribus clauses,

if

cashed out, would

be seen to encapsulate a bunch of background beliefs and desires
that, while strictly-speaking necessary, are
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omitted because

this

background has proven recalcitrant
explication of
beliefs
effect,

and

ceteris paribus

to

enumeration.

as insufficient!

if

I

rejected that

the background

desires are nomologically necessary to produce the

then they belong in the body of the causal law. The second

interpretation of the role of ceteris paribus clauses also has

it

that

they stand for the background assumptions causally necessary for
the effect. However, on this interpretation, these assumptions are at
the level of the

mechanism implementing

the causal law (hence,

if

cashed out, they would be stated in the vocabulary of the discipline

implementing the causally-related
that a desire for water

and a

states).

For example, suppose

belief that there

is

a glass of water

cause water-drinking behavior, ceteris paribus. Most traditionalists
take neural hardware as either the implementing level, or perhaps,
the implementing level of the implementing level of mental states.
(In

any event, not too

hierarchy.)

The

far

below mental

states in the scientific quasi-

ceteris paribus clause

neurological hardware

is

is

not satisfied

not functioning as assumed.

have particular tokens of the above-mentioned
yet, just as

my

belief

when
Were

and

the
I

to

desire,

water-drinking behavior was about to commence,

I

suffered a serious stroke, or was shot in the head, the ceteris paribus

conditions would not be satisfied, and water-drinking behavior

would not be caused.

Similarly,

were the motor end of

my

central

nervous system to sudddenly become damaged, the expected waterdrinking behavior would not commence. This

is,

I

think, the only

interpretation that can be consistently maintained.

context of traditionalism,

it

means something

monolithic physical state type that
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is

a

member

Within the

like this:

each

of mental-state-

type-1 shares the "sub’’-state types that implement the belief and

shown.

desire, as

Strictly-speaking, these "sub"-states are not

nomologically sufficient for the production of the "sub" -state-type

corresponding to the water-drinking behavior.

one of the monolithic-phys-state

types, there

is

Rather, in at least

an additional part of

the physical state that, in conjunction with the instantiation of the
belief

and

desire, cause the effect.

However,

by each of the monolithic physical

this part is not

shared

state types constituting the

equivalence class in such a way that

it

could either form a new

computational subpart or be consistently encompassed within the
belief or desire.

boundaries of the belief and desire,

So, the

if

interpretted as surrounding the parts of the monolithic physical
state types causally sufficient for
bit.

Looking back to

my

production of the

example of

failing to

drinking behavior because of damage to
the current state of

my
my

is

engage in water-

motor control system,

motor control system

relevant belief or desire, yet
state type describing

my

effect, "leak" a

is

not a part of the

included in the monolithic physical

current physical state. This aspect of

physical state prevents the water-drinking behavior:
sense that

I

in this

say that the boundaries of the belief and desire "leak" in

order to accommodate
monolithic physical
Is

it is

my

all

of the causally relevant parts of

my

state.

this fatal for traditionalism?

Does

it

show

that those

sneaking suspicions about belief/desire psychology in particular, and
the computational nature of
after all?

One

mind

thesis in general,

were

justified

possible line of argument against traditionalism, based

on these considerations,

is

that the computational states which play
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such a central role within traditionalism could not be
isolated
"leak"; hence, there

bearers of meaning.

would be no
I

really

pull a Fodor-style reductio:

from the same "causal

much concerned

they

physically-isolable units to be the

don

could show that traditionalism

if

t

know whether such an argument

My

incoherent.

is

inclination

is

to

but the other special sciences suffer

leakiness".

In

any event,

I

am

not here so

with attacking or defending traditionalism, so

further discussion of this topic will have to be postponed until

another occasion.
I

Fodor

cannot, however, postpone any longer an examination of
s

language of thought argument and

traditionalism. In particular,

I

shall focus

has to say about the level of reality that
efficacious mental states.

Fodor'

s

its

consequences for

on what the LOT argument
is

represented in causally

argument 29

is

supposed

that certain features of the cognitive capabilities of

to

show

humans and

other mind-possessing entities are best explained by postulating a

language of thought, whereby mental representations possess
combinatorial syntax and semantics, and the processes that

manipulate those representations are sensitive to their structure.
His

argument can be summarized

as follows:

model of the mind that best explains

traditionalism

(1) the systematicity of

inference, (2) the systematicity of mental representation,

29 Actually, the

LOT argument did not

the

certain empirical features of

cognition. These features of cognition are:

productivity of mental representation.

is

I

shall focus

and

on the

(3) the

first

two

originate with Fodor, but rather, with
particularly in the context of the
because,
with
Fodor
Chomsky. associate it
traditionalism versus PDP debate, he has been the most vocal promulgator of
I

it.
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on the way

of these

arguing that the level of reality represented

to

by causally efficacious mental
parts are propositions

natural

(i.e.,

states

Fodor makes

on the

basis of the systematicity

quite clear that the causally relevant

it

some complex mental representations are

say that inference
logically similar

and Pylyshyn

is

systematic

forms are

cite

that thoughts that
all

in our

public) language.

of inference,

that Q,

their causally efficacious

and the concepts expressed by words

In arguing for traditionalism

parts of

and

all

is

To

to say that representations with

processed in the same manner. Fodor

a particular example:

P&Q_tend

propositions.

"it's a psychological

to cause thoughts that P

law

and thoughts

else being equal ." 30 In order for this to be true, the parts

that this rule

must be

sensitive to are the conjuncts that constitute

the overall mental representation that P&Q. So, one level of reality

represented by causally efficacious mental states corresponds

to

propositions.

The argument

for traditionalism based

on the systematicity

mental representation presupposes that some mental

states

of

have

parts which correspond to concepts expressed by words in our

public language. There are,
First,

think, four reasons for asserting this.

I

the overall structure of the argument from systematicity of

mental representation

is

basically an

argument from analogy with

public language: you never find someone

a language

who can understand

but cannot understand "The

phenomenon

is

girl

(for

who

is

a native speaker of

example) "John loves the

loves John".

The ubiquity

girl"

of this

explained by the fact that the well-formed sentences

30 "Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture:
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A

Critical Analysis",

page 46.

of a public language are not primitive, but rather are

elements

(i.e.,

words) according to certain rules

you never find someone who can think "John

Just so,

but cannot think "The
of this

(i.e.,

phenomenon

girl

loves John".

If

composed

the grammar).
loves the girl"

an analogous explanation

of mental representation

is

to work,

one must

assume that the parts of the mental representation correspond
the words used to express the proposition that John loves the

Secondly,

I

of

to

girl.

one version of the argument from the

cite

systematicity of mental representation:

A

argument

that cognitive capacities must be
at least as systematic as linguistic [public language]
capacities, since the function of language is to
fast

is

express thought. ... You can't have it that language
expresses thought and that language is systematic
unless you also have it that thought is as systematic
as language is 31
.

By closely tying the systematicity of mental representation with the
systematicity of public language, Fodor commits himself to the view
that the parts that are necessary to explain the systematicity in the

language of thought form a one-to-one correspondence with the
parts

(i.e.,

the words) that are necessary to explain the systematicity

in public language.

A

third

reason

for

identifying

the

parts

representations with the concepts expressed by words

each case, when Fodor

illustrates

of
is

mental
that, in

what he means by systematicity of

mental representations with a particular example, the parts of the

3

Psychosematics, page 151.
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mental representation correspond

words which

to the concepts expressed

by the

collectively express the proposition.

Finally,

Fodor and Pylyshyn

cite the

example of

existential

introduction as an aspect of the systematicity of inference that must

be explained. They write:

We

can reconstruct such truth preserving inferences
as if Rover bites then something bites on the
assumption that (a) the sentence Rover bites' is of the
syntactic type Fa, (b) the sentence something bites' is
of the syntactic type Ex(Fx) and (c) every formula of
the first type entails a corresponding formula of the
second type (where the notion
corresponding
formula' is cashed syntactically; roughly the two
formulas must differ only in that the one has an
'

that

is

bound

variable at the syntactic position
occupied by a constant in the other). 32

existentially

In order to explain this systematicity of inference, the syntactic

parts of the proposition

must be 'Rover' and

'

Rover bites

bites'

--

'

that

is

represented in the mind

otherwise, the systematicity remains a

mystery.

These considerations make

it

Fodor and Pylyshyn, traditionalism

(1)

many mental

clear that, at least in the view of
is

committed

representations

to the theses that:

complex
syntax and

are

structures, with a combinatorial
semantics,
(2) those mental representations that are conjunctive
have causally relevant parts that correspond to the
individual propositions that make up the conjunction,

and

3 2 "Connectionism

and Cognitive Architecture: A
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Critical Analysis

,

page

1

).

(^) those mental representations that
individual propositions themselves
relevant parts that correspond to
expressed by the words that form
expressing the proposition.

correspond to
have causally
the concepts
the sentence

Thus, the level of reality represented by the causally efficacious

mental representations are propositions 33 and the concepts
expressed by words in the public language.
traditionalism per se

is

As noted previously,

not committed to this close linkage between

the language of thought and the public language.

the

endorsement of the LOT argument by most

general

and given the

traditionalists,

traditionalists

as

representations,

I

LOT argument

to

the

lack of an alternative thesis

nature

of

the

shall henceforth accept these

parts

of

among
mental

assumptions of the

as descriptive of traditionalism in general.

One point

of comparison

I

distinguish traditionalism and
ontological

However, given

shall use in

PDP

commitments inherent

as
is

Chapter

5 in trying to

models of the mind

each.

Therefore,

I

is

end

the
this

chapter with an enumeration of the ontological commitments made
within traditionalism.

First

and foremost, traditionalism, while

based on a physicalist metaphysics, assumes that there are causally
efficacious mental states.

These mental states are explicitly

instantiated in physical states, presumably in the physical states of

the brain. Each meaningful physical state has

by virtue of

its

functional role.

its

particular

meaning

Mental causal laws advert to the

content of these states, whereby the "units" of content are the
33 Conjunctive sentences express (complex) propositions, on
word "proposition".
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my

use of the

concepts expressed by words in public language and propositions;
thus,

mental causal laws quantify over

reality

at

the

level

propositions.

states

of word-concepts

which can represent

and/or the

level

of

The computability assumption inherent

in

traditionalism places restrictions on the form that mental causal

laws can take.

In particular, they

must be formally

specifiable.

In

order not to transgress the underlying physicalism, the physical
states

implementing the mental

states

must have a structure

mirrors the structure of the meaningful units of the mental

that

state.

For example, the mental state that represents "John loves the

girl"

has causally relevant parts corresponding to "John" and "loves" and
"the"

and

"girl".

The physical

state that

implements

this

must

likewise have causally relevant parts, one of which represents

"John", another "loves", another "the", and another "girl ". 34

Furthermore,

this physical state

sentence "John loves the

must encode the structure of the

girl" (i.e., it

causally relevant that John

is

the actor

must capture
and the

girl is

in a

way

that

is

the recipient of

the loving relation).

consistent with the views stated by Fodor and Pylyshyn that some
groups of words function as a unit, for example, "the girl" may function as a
state
unit, such that there is no causally relevant part of the physical
that is
All
alone.
"the"
to
corresponds
that
state
implementing this mental
there is a
large,
and
by
that,
is
through
to
go
analysis
necessarv for my above
the
expressing
sentence
the
in
words
correspondence between the
instantiating
proposition and the causally relevant parts of the physical state

34 It

is

it.
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CHAPTER 4
PDP AS A MODEL OF THE MENTAL
In this chapter,

model of the mind.
of

PDP

more

I

present parallel distributed processing as a

In doing so,

I

must

restrict

precisely,

one version of PDP

because researchers within

this field display a

(or,

myself to one version
s

self-image). This

is

wide variety of views

about such basic issues as what PDP systems are understood as
modelling.

Perhaps because of PDP'

s

youth as a research

relative

endeavour, or perhaps because the researchers who have of

late

flocked to PDP represent by-and-large two distinct ways of
describing intelligent activity
its

(i.e.,

from the

field of psychology, with

"mind-centered" approach to explaining intelligent behavior and

from the

field of neuroscience,

with

its

"brain-centered" approach),

the literature shows no consensus on even this fundamental
question. 1 Similarly, a myriad of less-basic but

still

important issues

regarding the "correct" understanding of PDP have yet to be resolved
(or,

quoting one of the more useful analogies from PDP research, the

field is still in the process of settling into its stable state).

way,

My

I

shall hint at the variety of opinion within

PDP

Along the

(particularly in

name

"parallel distributed processing" over the
partisan names "neural networks" or "neural
network processing" is quite intentional — the latter gives, think, the strong
impression that the entity being modelled is the brain. If the mind is
simultaneously modelled, it is only coincidentally so. Also, this name gives
more information on the nature of such systems than does the name
1

choice of the neutral

more common, but

also

more

1

connectionism.
As an historical aside, the name "PDP" derives from the title of perhaps the
most influential work in the recent past of this paradigm (ie, Parallel
Distributed Processing, Volumes 1 and 2), which, in turn, repeats the
the research group responsible for its publication.
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name

of

the

first

mode

and second

sections); however,

I

will often lapse into that

of speech which presumes a unified view.

warn the reader

mode

that this

merely want

I

to

does not reflect true unity of

opinion.

The chapter

is

divided into four sections.

briefly describe the history of

purpose of doing
traditionalism

is

PDP from

the 1940's onwards.

model of the mind

section provides an introduction to

perspective

(i.e.,

1,

I

The

shake the reader out of the mindset that

this is to

the only

In Section

at present.

The second

PDP from a

"syntactic"

one that describes PDP networks qua

arepresentational systems).

isolated,

This section will serve to bring the

reader up-to-speed with regard to PDP, so that a non-superficial
analysis of
4.

PDP

as a

Any reader who

model of the mind can proceed
is

already knowledgeable about PDP

skip the first

and second

later use

the literature standard.

is

I

may

sections, as the terminology that

(A disclaimer:

purposes in describing PDP in so far as
of the mind,

in Sections 3

it

I

and

wish to

adopt for

Given

my

provides a general model

consider myself justified in overlooking

many

of the

technical details of such systems. As even the most cursory’ perusal
of a

work dealing with the mathematical

basis of

PDP systems

will

show, a considerable amount of background knowledge - in linear
algebra, multivariate calculus

and

differential equations

—

is

necessary to understand in detail the dynamics of PDP systems.

While

I

have dutifully read the proofs

comprehension:

my academic

mentioned prerequisites -

--

with greater or lesser

background includes

my

general feeling

is

all

of the above-

that such detail

is

unnecessary for gaining an understanding of the philosophically
119

interesting features of

PDP systems, and would,

included here,

if

only confuse any reader without such a background.) The
sections correspond to Sections

1

and

2 in

Chapter

3.

latter

two

In Section 3,

I

present one version of PDP qua representational system which,

among
best

the alternative versions being circulated, offers

hope of providing a coherent model

of the mind.

think the

I

Section 4

is

occupied with the actual description of PDP as a model of the mind
in light of

means

to

my comments

2,

Section 4 vis-a-vis what

it

be a model of the mind.

4.1 History of

I,

Chapter

in

PDP

along with most commentators, begin the history of PDP in

the early 1940's with the work of McCulloch and

They

Pitts.

demonstrated that networks consisting of many simple processing
units were capable of non-trivial computation.
like that of the

other early researchers in the field that would

become PDP, was
the mind.

Their motivation,

in

understanding

In order to

how

the brain could implement

understand the import of their work, one

must imagine oneself back

in the 1940's.

It

had been

clear for

centuries that, for humans, the possession of an intact brain was a

necessary condition for the possession of a mind. Neuroscience at
that time

was

far

enough advanced

brain (as consisting of a huge

that the gross features of the

number

of highly-interconnected cells

which passed signals amongst themselves) were well known.
However, the huge conceptual gulf separating the
brain from those of the

activities of the

mind seemed unbridgeable.
120

(As

I

shall

report in Section
traditionalism,

3 of this

PDP

chapter,

as a

model of the mind,

like

downplays or ignores altogether those features and

capabilities of the

mind not

processing.) McCulloch

and

directly relevant to information

Pitts'

work showed

that the sort of

input/output processing that single neurons were capable of could,
within the context of a system of

many

interconnected neurons,

support computation. In particular, there

exists, for

every Turing-

computable function, a system of interconnected simple processing
units

which can instantiate that function. Non- trivial processing,

indeed.

There was, however,

still

spanning of the brain/mind

a crucial piece missing in the

gulf:

McCulloch and

Pitts

never

developed a method by which their systems could learn. 2 For each
separate computable function to be instantiated, the system had to

be designed with the correct interconnections of processing
For

all

but the most

Neurons
to

units.

trivial tasks, this is practically impossible.

in functioning brains,

on the other hand, display the

change their patterns of connectivity and

ability

to learn thereby.

Presumably, this brain-learning went hand-in-hand with the
learning that one could discern at the level of mind. The researcher

Donald Hebb published an
a theory of

how

influential

work

in

1949 which provided

systems of interconnected neurons (and, not

coincidentally, systems of artificial simple processing units) could

not suggesting that a solution to the learning problem would mean that
all philosophical issues on this score would also be solved. Far from it. Rather,
the presumed centrality of learning in the acquisition of representational
content for natural creatures requires that the mere ability to instantiate
computable functions is not sufficient for the possession of intrinsic
2

1

am

intentionality.
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learn.

With

this piece of the

puzzle in place, work could begin on

developing new learning rules, 3 and running
experiments on
systems of interconnected simple processing units. While

there

were many researchers engaged

most often given

in this project, the

as representative of the

the ensuing decade or so

is

name

that

is

work within PDP during

Frank Rosenblatt. He was responsible for

developing a learning rule for changing the pattern of connectivity

between units in a restricted

class of networks.

It

was proven that

the system employing this learning rule was guaranteed to converge

(with appropriate exposure to training instances) to a pattern of

connectivity which solved the given problem

desired function)

if

(i.e.,

instantiated the

such a solution pattern of connectivity existed.

Along the way, he published results showing that the type of
network he used

in his research

was capable of instantiating (hence,

capable of learning) functions corresponding to non-trivial
classification tasks.

(At this stage in

its

development,

it

would

certainly be premature to say that Rosenblatt's systems displayed

full-blown intelligence.)

Unfortunately for Rosenblatt, the type of network that he used
in his research

functions.

was too simple

to instantiate

what seemed very basic

As mentioned above, the perceptron convergence

theorem 4 showed that convergence was guaranteed
was, in fact, capable of instantiating that function.

3Hebb's contribution consisted, not

if

the network

However, the

in the discovery of a particular learning
but rather in the illucidation of a framework for learning in which
particular learning rules could be developed.
4" Perceptron" was the name chosen by Rosenblatt to identify his networktype. These networks consist of a single layer of units, where each unit
computes an output based on the inputs to the system.

rule,
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class

functions

of

perceptrons

that

could

was

instantiate

considerably less than the set of Turing computable functions. This
is

because Rosenblatt

subset of

known

all

s

learning rule was only applicable to a limited

the possible types of networks.

For example,

was

it

that the sorts of networks used by Rosenblatt were capable

of instantiating (hence, learning) only those functions describeable
as classification of vectors into linearly separable sets. 5

The publication of Minsky’s and

marks the end of the
included
that a

it

first

epoch

Papert’s Perceptrons in 1969

in the history of PDP.

here for several reasons.

major motivation

in the

First, it

I

have

emphasizes the

fact

development of PDP has been the

prospect of bridging the mind/brain gap. Traditionalism, by being
so remote

from neurophysiology, threatens

not only isolated from

its

implementing

goes) irreconcilable with them.

to

produce a psychology

levels,

but also (so the fear

Second, the above history sets the

stage for understanding the central thesis of PDP:
"intelligence

namely, that

emerges from the interaction of large numbers of

simple processing units." 6

The recent history of PDP begins
development of a learning rule that
class of
(still

is

in the

1980's with the

applicable to a

more general

networks than that studied by Rosenblatt. In particular, a

circumscribed) class of multi-layered networks can

effectively trained.
finally

However,

it is

now be

not guaranteed that the net

converge to a connectivity pattern that solves the problem,

not so important that the reader understand
tor
exactly what this entails. It is sufficient to note that many functions,
example, XOR (exclusive-or) fall outside of this domain.
5

will

For present purposes,

it is

6 Parallel Distributed Processing, Vol.
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1,

page

ix.

even

if

one

is

possible. Rather, convergence

depends on a variety of

factors, including the initial state (prior to training) of the

connectivity and
consideration.

the

network

nature of the problem space under

Current PDP research

is

directed at refining the

learning procedure to increase the probability of converging on a
solution, at fine-tuning learning parameters to speed convergence,

and

at

new

developing a

class of learning rule that

more

is

neurophysiologically plausible. (More on this below.)

As mentioned in the introduction

agreement

at present

to this chapter, there

on some of the most basic

PDP research. The most troublesome source
most
(or,

is little

issues regarding

of contention

is

also the

what are PDP systems modelling, the brain or the mind

basic:

perhaps, some as yet

this issue is clear,

a model of the

given

mind

unnamed

level in between)?

my present purposes: PDP

(i.e.,

a model of the

domain

is

I

also

want

view on

assumed

to

However, as

to recognize the diversity within

the field with regard to this question.

It is

often the case that, even

within the context of the writings of one and the same author,

ambivalence

is

to

Rumelhart and McClelland

s

Parallel Distributed

:

cognitive psychologists and we hope,
primarily, to present PDP models to the community
of cognitive psychologists as alternatives to the

We

this

easily discernible. Consider, for example, the passage

from the Preface
Processing

be

that encapsulates

the causal laws that quantify over contentful states).

previously promised,

My

are

models that have dominated cognitive
psychology for the past decade or so. We also,
however, see ourselves as studying architectures for
computation and methods for artificial intelligence.
[traditionalist]
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...

Also, the

PDP approach provides a

set of tools for

developing models of the neurophysiological basis of
human information processing ... 7

There are unequivocal passages from

same

this

set of

authors which

clearly enunciate a mind-modelling understanding of PDP,
as in:

[T]he operations in our models can be characterized
"neurally inspired".
We wish to replace the
"computer metaphor" as a model of mind with the
"brain metaphor" as model of mind 8
...

as

.

and:

We

have not, by and large, focused on the kinds of
constraints which arise from detailed analyses of

particular circuitry and organs of the brain. Rather
we have found that information concerning brainstyle processing has itself been very provocative in
our model building efforts. Thus, we have, by and

on neural modeling (i.e., the
modeling of neurons), but rather we have focused on
neurally inspired modeling of cognitive processing 9
large, not focused

.

On

the other hand, there are also copious passages from the same

work which describe PDP

mind (presumably
mind), such

as modelling

either the brain or a level between the brain

as:

Parallel

processing models offer
models of the microstructure of

distributed

alternatives to serial

~

something other than the

Parallel Distributed Processing, page

8 Parallel Distributed Processing,
9 Parallel Distributed Processing,

xi.

page 75.
page 130
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and

cognition. ... What PDP models do is describe the
internal structure of the larger units, just as subatomic
physics describes the internal structure of the atoms
that form the constituents of larger units of chemical
structure 10
.

and:

would be wrong
as an alternative

view distributed representations
to representational schemes like
semantic networks or production systems that have
been found useful in cognitive psychology and
artificial intelligence. It is more fruitful to view them
as one way of implementing these more abstract
schemes in parallel networks, but with one proviso:

It

to

Distributed representations give rise to some powerful
and unexpected emergent properties. The properties
can therefore be taken as primitives when working in
a more abstract formalism 11
.

With such diversity of views espoused within the same
small

wonder

that the field as a whole

is

also not of

text,

it

one mind on

is

this

issue.

A

further

PDP systems

muddying

of the waters results

as currently structured are,

neurophysiological plausibility

12
.

In

many

some

model neural mechanisms or properties

from the

fact that

from

claim, very far

cases,

PDP systems

of neurons

known

fail to

to exist.

For example, an analog of non-synaptic communication between

neurons

is

wholly lacking, whereas

it

is

known

such

that

communication (implemented by the dispersal of chemicals

into

10 Parallel Distributed Processing, page 12.

page 78.
12 For a catalogue of such discrepancies, see pages 136-138 ol Rumelhart
McClelland's Parallel Distributed Processing, Vol. I.
11 Parallel Distributed Processing,
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and

diffuse regions of the brain) plays an important role in learning.
Also, the finer details of neural spikes are omitted.

been conjectured that such

what allow

"details" are

of the patterns of excitation

It

has lately

for the binding

stemming from sensory stimulation

from multiple modalities into a

single object.

PDP systems,

construed as models of the brain, are also guilty of postulating

mechanisms which are known not

among

these

the hypothesized need for interneural connections

is

which can propagate an error
that of the

The most important

to exist.

signal

back

in the direction opposite to

normal flow of information.

All of these considerations

taken together underscore the difficulty in assigning a unified
objective to

PDP

as a field of research.

As already mentioned, the

approach

to cognition

mind. The

means

was

initial

to this

implemented

gap between the brain and

to bridge the

line of reasoning suggesting

motivation for a PDP

PDP

as a

end has already been hinted
in a physical

medium

(this

is

physicalist thesis that everything that exists

physical in nature).

system of a creature
investigations of a

model providing a
the

at:

mind

is

just the familiar

must ultimately be

Empirical evidence suggests that the nervous
is

a key component of

domain

its

mind

.

13

In scientific

in general,

it

often helps in refining the

domain

if

one understands the causal

causal laws at the level of that

laws of the implementing domain.

For example, the laws of

chemistry constrain the set of possible laws dealing with transport

of putting it leaves open the possibility that the extracorporeal
environment of a creature may also be a part of the physical implementation
of the mind. Thus, it is not ruled out that relational states of a creature play a
role in mental causal laws.
13 This

way
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of a substance across a

membrane. Thus, a

the causal laws concerning

mitochondrial

membrane can

transport of glucose across the

phenomena when considered

neuroscience

laws.

may

may

Just

possible

be consistent with the

in isolation, but

which contradict

knowledge of the laws of

so,

help constrain the set of psychological laws

consistent with the psychological data.
dualistic nature of

many

automatically discount

candidates for laws of biology which

known chemical

biologist investigating

much

Perhaps because of the

mind

of the theorizing about the

in

which

philosophers have engaged in the past (back before psychology

broke off as an independent

on the

discipline),

many physicalists
mind

reconcilibility of the existence of a

efficacious states)

and the

rest of science.

cast

doubt

(with causally

In addition, the failure of

folk psychological states (such as beliefs) to dovetail nicely with

modern neurophysiological
scepticism on the part of

theories has only increased the

many

that traditionalism (at least in

(both philosophers and scientists)

its

most familiar

guise) could ever be vindicated as a science.

acknowledge psychology as a science when
least

supervene on neurophysiological

realized relational states.

The recent

folk psychological

Such sceptics

its

states are

rise in

PDP

one

listens to the

researchers, this

it is

we

hope seems

shall see in Section
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to at

is, I

a more likely

scientific quasi-

"mind-modelling" contingent among
justified.

The

states quantified

over in PDP system laws are representational
14 Although, as

shown

popularity of PDP

candidate than traditionalism to find a place in the
If

only

states plus certain physically-

think, attributable to the widespread view that

hierarchy.

will

4 of

this chapter, the

14
;

hence,

it

most commonly

is

legitimate to say
at least

on the

PDP systems are modelling the mind. Furthermore,

surface,

PDP promises

to tie into neuroscience.

In

responding to the charge that PDP systems lack neural realism,

Rumelhart and McClelland enunciate

just

such a construal of the aim

of their research:

[There are] two different ways in which PDP models
can be related to actual neurophysiological processes,
apart from the possibility that they might actually be
intended to model what is known about the behavior
of real neural circuitry. ... First, they might be

intended as idealizations. An alternative [the one
that they espouse] is that they might be intended to
provide a higher level of description, but one that
could be mapped on to a real neurophysiological
implementation. ... Specifically with regard to the
word recognition model [described previously, but
not reproduced here], we do not claim that there are
individual neurons that stand for visual feature,
letter, and word units, or that they are connected
together just as we proposed in that model. Rather,
we really suppose that the various abstract
informational states — such as, for example, the state
in which the perceptual system is entertaining the
hypothesis that the second letter in a word is either
an H or an A — can give rise to other informational
states that are contigent

upon them

15
.

used interpretation scheme among PDP researchers has it that units alone do
units
not represent, but rather take part in patterns of activ ation over many
which collectively have representational content.
15 Parallel Distributed Processing, page 138.
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4.2

A

Syntactic Description of

In this section,

I

PDP

shall describe

PDP on the assumption

reader knows nothing about such systems.
the unit:

what

sorts

if

typically connected (via

Following this

is

functions can
its

it

I

that the

begin at the level of

instantiate?

How

is

it

inputs and output) with other units?

a description of network behavior, including a

discussion of various learning rules and their convergence
characteristics,

basis of

and a very cursory examination of the mathematical

PDP systems.

how such

I

then run through a simple example showing

a network behaves, and end with a "syn tactic" description

of the sorts of tasks that

account of PDP

is

PDP systems can perform. A "semantic"

the topic of Section

The building block
(depicted in Figure 4)

of

is,

3.

PDP systems

is

the unit. 16

A

single unit

abstractly considered, a function over

numbers.

Figure 4

--

The unit

16 Because of PDP's history as emerging from neuroscience, one often sees
discussed shortly)
units referred to as "neurons". Similarly, connections (to be
neutral name
more
the
of
choice
are sometime called "synapses". As with my

have continued, whenever possible, to choose
"PDP",
reinforce the "PDP as neural model" view.
I
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names

least likely to

In particular,

it

maps

the

sum

of the (input x weight) products to

another number. While the notion of an input
the meaning of "weight"

may

not be. In

its

intuitively clear,

is

neuron-modelling guise,

the weight corresponds to a measure of the synaptic efficacy:

how

easily a particular pre-synaptically

onto

this post-synaptic unit.

produced signal

ie,

passed

is

Using neural-neutral terminology, the

weight, wj, corresponds to the strength of the connection between

whatever produced
producer-of-j

is

ij

(call it "producer-of-j")

and

this unit.

If

strongly connected to this unit, then the magnitude

of wj will be relatively large.

If

producer-of-j

is

only weakly

connected, then the magnitude of wj will be relatively small.
producer-of-j exerts an inhibitory influence on this unit
ij

makes

it

less likely that this unit will

wj will be negative.
"excitatory",

(i.e.,

a large

produce a large output), then

In general, weights that are positive are called

and weights that are

negative, "inhibitory".

A weight

zero signifies that producer-of-j exerts no influence on the unit;
producer-of-j

as

if

at

all.

There

exists,

points. First,

and

this unit

of

it is

were not connected to one another

within this framework, great variety on several

some PDP systems employ

units

which receive

only a subset of the integers (for example, an input line
the value of 0 or

If

1).

inputs to range over

Some PDP
all

as input

may

take on

systems, on the other hand, allow the

of the real numbers, or perhaps

and

some subset
There

is

also

a wide range of possibilities with respect to the weights. They

may

of the reals (for example, values between 0.0

1.0).

be restricted to the integers or a subset thereof, or they
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may

take on

real values.

and

may

it

The sum

Swjij is called the activation

be likewise restricted in the values

above. The output of the unit
of that unit. Three of the

Figure

is

a function,

f,

it

value of the unit,

can assume, as per

of the activation value

most common choices

for f are

shown

in

5.

fCa.vA

a.v.

function

Figure 5

Alternative

(a)

--

Types of unit output functions

depicts a linear function:

identical to the activation value (in

the output

which case the slope

is

is 1),

either

or

is

a

multiple of the activation value. Alternative (b) shows a typical step
function:

the output

which point
While

I

it

changes to

all

1 at

for that

and

all

reached, at

greater activation values.

an activation value of

0, this is

possible step functions. Another step function

activation values less than 5,

or greater. Alternative
in

1

is

have, for simplicity's sake, shown the step function as

changing from 0 to

many

0 until a certain threshold

is

PDP systems.

It

(c),

and +1

for

all

only one of

may

be

-1 for

activation values of 5

a squashing function,

is

seen quite often

has several advantages over a simple step
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function 17 and over a linear function. 18 (While
functions

(a), (b),

and

(c) as

I

have drawn the

having real-valued domains, and for

an unrestricted real-valued range,

this is

not universally the case.

As already mentioned, often the possible values of the
restrict the

(a),

i's

and w's

corresponding domain (and range) to some subset of the

reals or integers.)

Figure 6 depicts a 3 -layered feed-forward network consisting
of 9 units.

Figure 6

17 A

--

3 -layered

feed-forward network

major advantage of the squashing function within the context of multi-

layered nets capable of learning is that, because it is continuously
differentiable, the most general learning algorithm yet developed for such
nets (back-propagation of the error signal in a direction opposite that of
forward information flow) is applicable to a network consisting of such units.
18 in general, a net consisting of units using linear functions has a more
limited capacity than one consisting of either of the two depicted non-linear
functions.
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The inputs

to the overall

system

(II

— they could be

environment

14)

...

are supplied by the

the outputs from some other

network(s), or they could be some signal coming from the

environment, as normally understood.
units receives each input signal,

described above.

Each of the 4 input-level

and produces an output,

The output from the

as

input-level units forms the

input for the hidden-level units. (They are called "hidden" because

they are not directly connected to the environment, either via their
input or their output.) Similarly, the output-level units receive as
input the output from the hidden-level units. The overall output of
the system

is

the output of the units on this level. There are several

things to note about this particular

PDP system.

It is

a feed-forward

network. That means that information flows only in one direction.

Had

been the case

it

that, for

example, a hidden unit's output

supplied the input to a unit on the input level (thus producing a
loop), the net

would no longer be feed-forward.

Also,

had the net

allowed for an output signal from one level to loop back and form
the input either for that unit
level,

it

are also

or any other unit on the same

would no longer be feed-forward. (Non-feed-forward

known

a recurrent net

as "recurrent nets".)
is

performed by the
sends

itself

its

Whether a feed-forward net or

the appropriate choice depends on the task to be
net.

output to

all

(More on

this later.)

analysis of the network behavior.

why

Note also that each unit

and only the units on the next lower

This condition on feed-forward networks,

reason

nets

There

if satisfied,

is,

level.

simplifies the

however, no principled

a feed-forward net must be thus fully-connected. Most

often, all of the units within a
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network are identical with respect

to

their allowable

domain and range, and the

the activation level to an output.
condition, there

is

function,

f,

which maps

As with the full-connectivity

no principled reason

for this:

such a condition

merely simplifies the mathematical analysis of the network
behavior.

Thus

far,

systems. The

modelled

my

description of PDP networks has been as static

manner

varies.

in

which the temporal aspects of processing

is

For the feed-forward case, one can simply assume

that the inputs to the system

continuously computes
a unit cease changing,

its

its

do not change, and that each unit

output function, so

that,

once the inputs to

output remains constant. Thus, the overall

output of the system eventually achieves a constant value.

For

recurrent nets in general, however, such a constant output condition

cannot be guaranteed: the dynamics of some networks are such that
the overall output never reaches a stable value, even though the

system's inputs remain constant.

It

is

useful here to view the

network, not just as a monolithic structure from inputs to outputs,

but as a system constructed from individual units. This system-asunits level of description will allow us to consider the overall state of

the system as the complex object consisting of the outputs

some

cases, the activation values) of

each

unit.

(An identical

perspective for viewing network behavior of recurrent nets

whereby the output of each unit
output.)

It is

known

is

is

that

a part of the overall system

that, in the general case,
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(or, in

such systems

may

never

settle into a stable configuration.

class of recurrent nets, 19

To

such

stability

However, for a subset of the

is

guaranteed.

dynamics of general recurrent

get a feel for the

nets,

it

be useful to consider some of the properties of the behavior of

may
this

limited class of recurrent nets. Each possible state of the net with
p

units

is

a p-dimensional vector, 20 where each of the p items

corresponds to the output of one of the

units.

(It is

sometimes more

useful to consider, not the output of each unit, but their activation
values, in describing the overall network state.)

understand the behavior of such nets
Imagine a topographical

map

is

A

simple way to

with a 3-D space analogy.

depicting the contours of

some wholly

self-contained group of idealized watersheds: 21 every drop of
precipitation that

falls in

the watershed ends up in a

body

of water

with no outflowing stream. Each body of water in this watershed
a local

minimum

with respect to elevation, and corresponds to the

stable state for each
for this

is

drop of water that

falls

within the watershed

body of water. There may be many such bodies

of water

depicted by the topographical map.

The behavior of an individual water drop

is

analogous to the

behavior through time of a recurrent net with the above-

19 For example, networks with (1) all units using the step function shown in
figure 5b, and (2) networks such that the weight from unit-n to unit-m is
equal to the weight from unit-m to unit-n, for every unit-n and -m) will
always settle into a stable configuration when the system inputs are held

constant.

vector is a mathematical object with p "slots" for numbers, whereby the
2particular ordering of the slots is encoded. So, for example, <1.2, -5.3> is a
vector
-5.3.
This
is
second
whose
and
1.2
dimensional vector whose first item is
is distinct from both <-5.3, 1.2> and <1.2, -5.3, 0>
21 Idealized to the extent that raindrops do not soak into the ground, but rather
friction, as they
roll on the surface under the influence of gravity and
2 °A

minimize their energy

level.
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enumerated properties
elevation

in the following way.

minimum

Each local

each body of water) acts as an attractor for

(i.e.,

drops of water landing in

its

all

in

the

watershed. No matter where they land

within that watershed, they end up at the same local minimum. Just
so,

the space of possible network states can be divided up into

mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive

sets,

each of which

has a "local minimum" or attractor state associated with

As with

it.

the journey of each water drop, the evolution of the network state

may

many

pass through

(non-stable) states on

attractor. Obviously, the analogy fails in

the network configuration

is

many

to its position within the

determines which local
network,

it is

way

to its stable

places. For example,

not transversing 3-D space, but a p-

dimensional space of unit outputs. Also, the

drop with respect

its

minimum

it

initial state of

a water

group of watersheds

will settle into;

whereas, for the

the input vector (and, depending on the update rule

used, perhaps also the initial configuration of the net) which

determine the attractor-state settled
recurrent nets display this stability.

into.

Furthermore, not

all

(In particular, recurrent nets

with non-symmetric weights often do not.) Even with these sources
of disanalogy,

I

think that the group of watersheds picture

useful one to keep in
of

mind when

is

a

trying to understand the dynamics

PDP networks.
Thus

learn.

If

far,

I

have said nothing about how such systems could

a network produces (or settles into) the wrong output (as

judged by an external observer - the researcher, perhaps), how
possible to change the network so that, the next time

with that input,

it

produces the correct output
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it is

is it

presented

(or, at least,

one

"closer" to the correct output than

its

undefined sense)? Hebb

in the

learning could occur by

work

s

learning within PDP:

s

suggested that

of the units' weights

There are two broad paradigms of

supervised learning and unsupervised

In supervised learning,

available to
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means of the changing

according to certain rules.

learning.

previous one, in some as yet

some external

compare the produced output with

entity

must be

the correct or

expected output for that input, and provide the network with
information, so that,
its

if

the produced output

wrong,

is

it

can change

weights so as to increase the chances of producing the correct

output on the next occasion that that input

is

Supervised

given.

how

learning further subdivides into two subtypes corresponding to

much

information

is

provided by the external

with a teacher, the net

is

In learning

entity.

supplied with the correct output.

In

learning with a critic (also called "reinforcement learning") the

supervisor gives the net less information:
as to

it

either informs the net

whether the produced output was correct or

incorrect, or

informs the net as to the degree of wrongness of the produced
output.

(I

shall return to the topic of supervised learning shortly,

and discuss

in general terms

second learning paradigm
learning

is

appropriate

is

how such

learning proceeds.)

unsupervised learning. 22 This

when

the network

items that allow them to be effectively categorized.

made

model of the mind) of most PDP learning
2

style of

to learn, not a fixed

is

input/output relation, but rather the regularities in the

aspect (particularly in light of the use

The

of

rules

is

PDP

set of

input

An important
as providing a

that generalization

Neurobiologists often refer to this form of learning as "Hebbian learning".
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is

automatic.

The network not only improves

its

performance

producing the correct output for a given input
progresses, but also improves in

its

ability to

make

as

in

learning

"reasonable"

generalizations with respect to the correct output corresponding to

an input on which

it

has not yet been trained.

"reasonable" in this context needs
take

up

in Section

3.)

some

Generalization

is

(Obviously,

serious explication, which

I

automatic in the sense that no

additional learning rules need be used above and beyond those
associated with general learning.
I

shall

now

look in more detail at learning in PDP systems.

begin with a consideration of Rosenblatt'

s

I

perception convergence

procedure, which gives the learning rule for a feed-forward unilevel

network of units within the supervised learning paradigm

which a teacher

is

available.

Figure 7

Suppose the

in

initial

--

3 unit

network capable of learning

weights connecting the three inputs to each of the

three units are set to small,

random numbers. The
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training sequence

is

begun

as

an input vector

is

supplied via the input

supervisor then looks at Ol, 02, and 03 to see
that should be

produced for

hence, the weights must

suppose that the input
(1,0,0),

(1,1,1)

adjusted.

To be more

not;

specific,

and that the correct output

and the output given by the net

a zero, as

wrong

is

they are the output

Suppose that they are

this input.

somehow be

if

The

lines.

is

(0,0,1)

-- ie,

is

02 produced

should have; however, 01 and 03 both produced the

it

value.

Described qualitatively, we want to leave the weights

connecting the inputs and the middle unit unchanged, but change
the weights connecting the inputs to the
unit

first

need

produced a zero when

it

first

and third

The

unit.

should have produced a

1,

so

to increase the weights connecting the inputs to this unit.

the third unit, the produced output was
0; therefore,

the weights connecting

it

1

when

it

we
For

should have been

and the inputs should be

decreased. 23 After adjusting the weights as per above, the network
is

presented with a new input (for example,

(1,0,0)),

and once again

the supervisor checks to see whether the output produced

or not.

If

is

correct

the latter, then the weights are adjusted again.

attentive reader has probably already noticed that

the readjustments

made on

this

it is

second training pass

The

possible that

may

interfere

with the learning that occurred as the weights were changed after
the

first

learning pass. Obviously, then,

such a way as to guarantee

that, if

we need

enough

to adjust weights in

training passes are made,

23 The need for an increase or a decrease in a weight is, of course, relative to
value
the function, f, from activation value to output, as well as to the absolute
to
input
the
chose
(1,1,1)
weight.
that
with
associated
and sign of the input
discussion.
above
the
in
relativity
this
mention
avoid having to specifically
However, the reader should keep it in mind. In addition, this fact is reflected
in the perceptron learning procedure, described below.
I
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the network weights will eventually converge to a set that
produces

the correct output for every input.- 4 Otherwise,

we may keep

supplying inputs and adjusting weights, only to have the next weight

adjustment wipe out the previous learning. The perceptron learning

procedure
a unit

tells

us by

how much

must be adjusted,

the weights connecting the inputs to

so as to guarantee eventual convergence.

In particular, the weights should

be adjusted in accordance with the

following equation:

delta-wj = eta x (E

O) x

-

(Eq. 4.1)

j

where "delta-wj" indicates the required change

in the weight

on the input

connecting producer-of-j to

this unit,

from producer-of-j, O

the actual output produced, E

is

expected (or correct) output, and eta

j

is

is

the value

is

that influences the convergence properties of the unit

how fast

it

that, if the

The perceptron convergence theorem

above learning rule

is

converge

to

—

eg,

states

consistently followed on a

sufficiently large set of training examples, then the
will

the

the learning rate (a positive

number

converges). 25

line

network weights

a set that solves the problem.

As the capacity of such uni-layered networks
different functions

is

very limited,

it is

to instantiate

necessary to have a learning

procedure which can be applied to multi-layer

nets.

For this case,

24 This, of course, assumes that the problem is solveable by this network in the
first place. As mentioned above, many problems are not.
2 Strictly speaking, the above learning rule is a generalization of
Rosenblatt's perceptron learning rule, for which the convergence theorem is
valid. However, since we won't be looking at the convergence proof, this

version suffices.
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however, a difficulty not encountered with single layer nets
namely,

how much

should the weight connecting one unit

be changed, given that there

is

more than one

network input from the network output.
network (no hidden

units),

we cannot

arises:

another

to

unit separating the

In the case of a 2-layer

in general

know whether an

incorrect output was given because the weights connecting the

output layer and the input layer were incorrect and/or because the
weights connecting the input layer and the inputs were incorrect.
This

is

called the "credit assignment problem",

until the

the 1980

and

its

recalcitrance

development of the back-propagation learning algorithm
s

meant

that, at least

in

with respect to functional capacity,

PDP remained stagnant during the 60

s

and 70'

s.

As with

description of the perceptron learning procedure above,

I

my

shall begin

with a fairly high-level view of supervised learning with a teacher
in multi-layered networks,

until later.
critic

I

and save the mathematical

then take up the topics of supervised learning with a

and unsupervised learning

in multi-layered networks.

Suppose that the network depicted
initialized to small

by each unit
+ 1, as

particulars

is

shown

random numbers, and

in Figure 6 has weights

that the function

computed

the squashing function with output between -1 and
In order to

in Figure 5c.

accommodate the back-

propagation of an error signal, we must embellish the network with
a communication line (one for each normal forward line) that passes

information in the direction opposite to that of the forward

line.

So,

must

also

be a "learning line connection" from unit-m to unit-n. Note that

this

for each forward connection

from unit-n

to unit-m, there

learning line connection plays a role only in learning, not in the
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processing that ensues between introduction of the system input to
the input level units and production of the system output by the

output units

new

input.

.

26

Training begins as the network

is

presented with a

The supervisor then checks the output

period of time

.

27 If the

output

is

after a certain

incorrect, the weights (those

connecting the hidden level units to the output level units, those
connecting the input level units to the hidden level units, and those

connecting the system inputs to the input level units) need to be
changed. The supervisor
it

tells

each output level unit the output that

should have produced. The weights connecting the hidden

units to the output level units are then adjusted as determind

level

by the

back-prop learning rule, described below. Then, an error signal
passed back from the output level units to the hidden level

and the same weight-adjustment procedure

is

is

units,

repeated on the

weights connecting the input level units to the hidden level units.
(For the general case of a network with multiple hidden levels, this

procedure can be repeated

indefinitely.) Finally,

an error signal

passed back from the hidden level units to the input level

units,

is

and

the weights connecting the system input lines to the input level
units are adjusted.

After this whole procedure

is

completed, the

26 0ne of the major objections against PDF qua neurally plausible framework
of
is its frequent use of a learning technique with a need for this sort
that
claim
neurobiologists
particular,
line.
In
backward flowing information
real
between
exists
signal
error
an
no such means for back-propagating
neurons. This has led some in the PDP research community to reject the backprop technique for learning in favor of a more neurally plausible approach.
More on this below.
2 'Given that this is a feed-forward net, we know that the output will be stable.
However, as the link from input to output involves passing successively
through three units, we must wait long enough for the signal changes to
trickle

down

to the output level.
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process starts again as the next input vector

network. The actual back-prop learning rule used

delta-wjk = eta x delj x

where delta-wjk
eta

(received as input to unit

propagated error
level, delj is

signal.

f,

as follows:

Ok

(Eq. 4.2)

Ok

is

the actual output of unit k

via this connection),

j

and

For the case where unit

delj is the
is

j

back-

on the output

simply the difference between the expected and actual

output for that unit
function,

is

the change of weight from the kth to the jth unit,

is

again the learning rate,

is

supplied to the

is

at unit

Oj) times the derivative of the unit's

(i.e., Ej -

j
'

s

activation value. (Recall that f in such multi-

layered networks using this version of back-prop must be a
continuously differentiable function; hence, the popularity of the
squashing function (Figure

Once the changes

5c).)

output level units are made, the

delj

in weights for the

for the

hidden layer

is

computed using the equation:

delj (non-output-level) = f j(av-of-j) xS(over-l) dellxwlj (Eq. 4.3)

where
all
is

f 'j is

again the derivative of

of the units to which unit

j

sends

then used to compute the del

s

exposition
as a

is

this level of

and

its

1

in the

output.

sum

ranges over

The above equation

for the next left- most layer, until

finally the input level units' weights

Perhaps even

fj,

have been adjusted.

mathematical detail in the preceding

greater than strictly necessary for understanding PDP

model of the mind.

I

have included
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it

because

I

want

to

make

explicit a feature of this

form of learning

that will

in later discussions (particularly in Section

that

4 of

become important

this chapter). Notice

no unit has any information about the global

state of the

network. During the forward pass, each unit (except for the input
level units) receives information of the state of the other units only

from

its

immediate (backward-facing) neighbors

in the

output from those neighbors. Similarly, no unit gives

any other than

its

form of the

its

output to

immediate (forward-facing) neighbors.

Even

considering the backward flow of information that occurs in the

back-prop technique, each unit receives information only on the
state of its (forward-facing) neighbors.

constraint on

PDP systems

will

This so-called locality

turn out to be relevant to a later

discussion of the relationship between mental causal laws and the
contentful states quantified over by them.

An analogy

similar to the group of watersheds analogy for

describing the behavior of recurrent nets as they settle into a stable
state for a particular input

dynamics

to

is

useful here. In this case, however, the

be described involves

changes as learning progresses.

dynamics being mirrored

how

the network's weight-state

(In the previous

in the analogy

example, the

were the network

s

output-

of-each-unit state (or the activation-value-of-each-unit state).) As
before, one can picture the weight-state space of a network as a

group of mutually exclusive and
watersheds.

The

collectively exhaustive, idealized

x-y plane (perpendicular to the axis measuring

elevation) corresponds to the location of the network in weight
space,

and the elevation corresponds

to the "degree of wrongness" of

a particular system output vector for the given input vector.
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The

aim of learning

is

to get to a place of zero elevation,

where there

is

no difference between the correct system output and the produced
system output. Since each input vector has a distinct topographical

map corresponding

to

it,

the overall goal

is

that has zero elevation in each topographical

thumb
from

in situations in

its

which you want

to find a weight state

map. A good

to decrease

rule-of-

your elevation

current (non-zero) value to a value of zero

to

is

head

downhill, taking as your preferred route that with the steepest

Learning in PDP systems does exactly that.

incline.

uses a

It

technique called "gradient descent" that involves calculating the
direction of steepest incline at a location,

and changes the system

variables (in this case, the weights of the network) so as to

system in

this direction of steepest descent.

pass, the weights are

the

After each training

updated and a new input

system error)

move

is

supplied.

If

the

non-zero, the direction of steepest

elevation

(i.e.,

incline

again calculated and the weights are again adjusted to

move

is

is

the system in this direction.

analogy.

In particular, there

gradient, etc.

It is

procedure that

it

is

(Just to reiterate, this

is

only an

no one or no unit calculating the

merely a property of the

(strictly local)

back-prop

performs gradient descent in the weight-state

space.)

Unfortunately, gradient descent has some drawbacks as a
universal learning technique. Foremost

among

these

guarantee convergence of the network weights to a

is

set that

the correct output vector for each input vector, even
is

that

if

in theory capable of instantiating this I/O relation.

it

cannot

produces

the network
(This

is

in

distinction to the perceptron learning procedure, for which
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convergence

guaranteed, so long as the network

is

is

in theory

capable of instantiating the I/O relation.) The problem can be
easily
visualized using the topographical analogy.

(presumed) global
or

minimum

with zero elevation, there

more wholly enclosed watersheds with

than zero. (Alpine lakes, perhaps.)

network puts
lake,

it

the direction of the local

pulls the

is

a local

may

be one

minimum

greater

the initial weight-state of the

If

in the equivalent of the watershed for an Alpine

performing gradient descent

minimum

Along with the

will

minimum.

It is

change

its

weight vector in

possible that the true global

in the opposite direction, so that "learning" actually

system in a direction away from a solution.

For any reader having difficulties visualizing
real-life story that
I

wanted

to hike

up Mt. Toby, but lacked a map. A friend offerred

in this part of Massachusetts, so
to find

something that
while Mt.
little

Toby

I

is

it."

if

Toby

the tallest mountain

is

you consistently walk

only found out after several hours of walking:

indeed the

time and Mt.

mountain

tallest

in the area, there

Bull Hill) in

Toby. Thus, a local

from

my ultimate

find,

not the desired, global maximum, but

between

maximum

goal. Following the friend

s

irrespective of whether

minimum.
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it

is

a

my location

separated

advice allowed

me

me

to

this undesired, local one.

Just so, gradient descent aims for whatever local
vicinity,

uphill,

This friend failed to take into account

mountain (one of the peaks of

at that

have a

I

captures the "problem of local minima" perfectly.

the following bit of advice: "Well, Mt.

you're bound

this,

also

minimum

is

in the

constitutes a global

There are several other shortcomings of gradient descent. For
example,

if

the space being searched

is

describable as steeply sloped,

with very small valleys, gradient descent tends to "overshoot" the

minima. Similarly, using gradient descent

in a space that

is

nearly

flat results in

very slow convergence. One thrust of current research

within PDP

to refine the search technique (as

is

implemented by the

back-prop procedure) to mitigate some of these shortcomings. A
discussion of the particulars of these efforts would take us outside

the scope of this work, however.

I

should at least note in passing

that back-prop learning procedures for recurrent multi-layer

networks are available, although, as with back-prop for feedforward nets, convergence of the weights

to a solution set

is

not

guaranteed.

As promised,

I

shall

now

illustrate

network behavior with a

concrete example, both during the forward flow as the system
outputs are being computed, as well as during the back-propagation
of the error during the weight-update phase of the learning cycle.
In the example,

I

use a 2-layered feed-forward network with

input lines as depicted in Figure
squashing function as

its

f,

also

8.

shown

2

Each of the three units uses a
in Figure 8. 28

28 Squashing functions, even those passing through the origin and
asymptotically approaching -1 in the direction of decreasing activation value
and +1 in the direction of increasing activation value, can be distinguished
based on how quickly they approach their asymptotes. The squashing
function depicted is much less steep at the origin than what one sees in the
typical case. However, for the purpose of illustration, it is preferable.
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f(o)z

O

flo.S\

f (o') - Z

f(o.T»)*0.8

Figure 8

We

--

Learning example in

shall use a learning rate of 0.1.

The

3 -unit

initial

Training begins with the vector (1,2).

(\o.S\-.\

-.O.JS

f'(o.? 5)-.0,S

network

weights are as shown.

The activation values and

outputs for the units are:

av-1 = (0.5)(l)+(0)(2) = 0.5 :: f(0.5) = 0.75
av-2 = (2)(l)+(-l)(2) = 0 :: f(0) = 0
av-3 = (l)(0.75)+(-l)(0) = 0.75 :: f(0.75) = 0.8

The

overall output of the network

is

correct output for this input vector

network weights need

to

thus 0.8.
is

(Eq. 4.4a).

(Eq. 4.4b)
(Eq. 4.4c)

Suppose that the

not 0.8, but

-1.2.

So, the

be changed. Computing the delta-w's for

the 3 units yields:

delta-w3 1 = 0.1(-1.2-0.8)(0.5)(0.75) = -0.075
delta-w3,2 = 0.1(-1.2-0.8)(0.5)(0) = 0
,
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(Eq. 4.5a)
(Eq. 4.5b)

delta-w2,Il = 0.1(2)(-1)(-1)(1) = 0.2
delta-w2,I2 = 0.1(2)(-1)(-1)(2) = 0.4
delta-wl,Il = 0.1( 1)(-1)( 1)( 1) = -0.1
delta-wl,I2 = 0.1( !)(-!)( 1)(2) = -0.2

Therefore, the

new network weights

Figure 9

(If

we were

to

now

(Eq. 4.5e)

(Eq. 4.5f)

shown

in Figure 9.

Network, post-learning

re-try the input vector (1,2)

system output would be
closer.)

--

are as

(Eq. 4.5c)
(Eq. 4.5d)

-1.0;

while

still

on

this

not correct,

network, the
it is

at least

Normally, training on such networks proceeds by presenting

the system with an input, cycling throught the learning phase, then

presenting the network with a

through the training
converge
input.

I

to a
shall,

sets

new

many

input.

Usually, one

must

cycle

times in order for the network to

weight vector that yields the correct output for each

however, end the example here, with the hope that

the reader has gained at least an intuitive feel for processing in PDP

systems using supervised learning with a teacher.

As already mentioned, there

is

another form of supervised

learning in multi-layered nets (so-called "learning with a

which has received attention in PDP research.
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critic")

In this case, the

supervisor checks to see

if

the produced output

is

correct, and,

if

not,

either informs the system of this fact (without, however, supplying

the system with the correct output), or supplies the system with a

measure of the wrongness of the produced output. Learning with a
critic is also

referred to as reinforcement learning to stress both

gross characteristics and

its

its

greater plausibility as the form of

learning most often used by creatures operating in the real world.

(Neither

hazard

I,

nor anyone

to guess

else within the scope of

what percentage

of learning in

my

reading, would

humans

is

described

as learning with a teacher, versus learning with a critic.

both occur. Perhaps then, a complete model of the mind

Clearly,
--

and

its

concomitant model of learning — must include the capability for
supervised learning of both types.) As one might guess, convergence
of such systems

much

is

slower than for learning with a teacher

indeed, the system converges at
to the

network

An

as less information

changing weights

is

available

efficiently.

interesting approach to reinforcement learning

models and
distinct

to aid in

all),

critics

(if,

is

the

approach, in which the PDP system consists of two

sub-networks, one of which forms a model of the

reinforcement signal 29

(I

shall call this the

"model" sub-network),

and the other of which performs learning with a teacher

as

described above, but with the feature that the "correct output"

is

supplied, not by the supervisor, but rather by the model of the

reinforcement signal.
network.) The

first

(I

henceforth

call this

the "being-taught" sub-

learning stage in the models and critics approach

version of learning with a critic, the net receives a measure of the
closeness of its output to the correct one, rather than a mere
"correctV'incorrect" signal.
2

In this
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to

reinforcement learning proceeds as follows.

An

presented to the "being-taught" sub-network and

input vector
to the

"model"

sub-network. The former produces an output. The output

passed both

is

is

then

to the supervisor for

reinforcement information as well

as to the "model" sub-network.

The "model" sub-network then

produces

its

estimate of the reinforcement signal for the given

output and system input, and compares

it

with the actual

reinforcement signal supplied by the supervisor. (Thus, the "input"
to the

"model" sub-network consists of both the input to the system

and the output

the

of

"being-taught"

propagating the error signal

(i.e.,

produced and actual reinforcement
sub-network improves the

sub-network.)

Back-

the difference between the

signal)

back through the "model"

ability of this

network

reinforcement signal corresponding to an I/O

to predict the

The weights

pair.

in

the "being-taught" sub-network can be changed at random, since, in
this first phase,

it is

the "model" sub-network that

not the "being-taught" sub-network.

being trained,

is

Once the "model" sub-

network's estimates of the reinforcement signal are accurate enough,
the second stage of learning begins. Again, an input

is

presented to

The former

both the "being-taught" and "model" sub-networks.
produces an output, which

is

sent as before to the supervisor

and

to

the "model" sub-network, which, in turn, produces an estimate of the

reinforcement signal.
learning occurs.

An

reinforcement-signal)

is

Now, something different from Stage 1
error signal equal to

(0

is

maximum-

back-propagated through the "model" sub-

network, but without the usual updating of weights.

back-prop

-

Rather, this

performed with the purpose of producing a guess
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as to

what the output that the "being-taught" sub-network gave should
have been. This guess is then used to perform learning a la
supervised learning with a teacher on the "being-taught" subnetwork.

Stage2 learning continues as additional inputs are given

successively,

and the whole process

is

repeated.

Unlike the two types of supervised learning described above,
in the

unsupervised learning paradigm, there

is

no

signal

external source indicating whether the produced output
not.

This

mode

of learning

is

used when regularities within a

classes,

to

is

be learned.

Rather,

set of input vectors

identified, so that future input vectors

one of the discovered

correct or

therefore not appropriate in cases

where a particular I/O relationship

to

is

from an

must be

can be classified as belonging

each of which corresponds

In the first type (called "winner-take-all"), the desired result

network

to classify inputs as belonging to

derives from the fact that the

production of a

this

s

type,

1

membership

on the output

and a 0 on

all

line

is

to

one of several

mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive types.

pattern'

to a

This can be implemented in one of two net types.

regularity type.

train a

it is

The name

indicated by the

is

corresponding to the input

other output

lines.

The

applications of

type of learning within cognitive processing are ubiquitous,

particularly in the area of perception, where, for example, a
particular input visual vector needs to be classified as an instance of

a particular object-type (for example, as a

human

face).

The second

type of unsupervised learning involves discovering regularities in
the input data, so that future input vectors can be classified in terms
of their similarity (with respect to the discovered regularities) to the
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inputs presented during training. Within the sphere of
theories of

cognitive level classification, this

is

way

a

in

categorization scheme could be implemented.

subtype of fuzzy categorization

which a fuzzy

One

particular

Wittgenstein

is

"family

s

resemblance" theory, whereby the presence or absence of certain
features

makes the object more or

less

exemplary of a given type.

Various learning rules have been developed for training networks
within the unsupervised paradigm.

have already gone into some

However, given the

fact that

I

detail in describing learning in the

supervised paradigm and the fact that the basic principles remain
the same,

I

paradigm.
teacher or

there

is

shall
(I

omit further discussion of learning rules within

shall,

critic is

this

however, pause to reemphasize that no external

used or needed in unsupervised learning; hence,

no error signal

to back-propagate.

Instead, learning

proceeds by changing weights based only on the state of the unit

and the inputs received from and weights associated with
backward-facing neighbors.

This has led

modelling camp of PDP to adopt

this

many

its

within the brain-

paradigm of learning,

as

it

does

not require the neurobiologically implausible passing of information
against the normal forward flow.)
I

would

like to

end

this section with

an overview of four

important classes of tasks that PDP systems can (be taught
In the first class, called auto-association, the network

is

to)

do

.

30

presented

with a set of input vectors during the learning phase. The task to be

performed involves re-producing

(at the

output) the input vector

30 The following is based on the discussion in Rumelhart and McClelland's
Parallel Distributed Processing, Vol. 1, pages 159-161.
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most closely resembling the given one. The
useful

input

when
is

a network

noisy

ability to

do

this is

very

operating in an environment in which the

is

has occasionally spurious values on an input line

(i.e.,

or lines) or in which the input

sometimes incomplete.

is

possible application areas include content-addressable

Some

memory and

functioning as a front-end to some other network within a noisy

environment.

The second

class of task

is

similar to the auto-associator,

except that, rather than the input vector

itself,

paired with that input during training

is

some other vector

to be re-produced.

Learning consists of repeated presentation of the sets of two
patterns to be associated, so the
learning must equal the

sum

number

of input lines during

of the dimensionality of the vectors to

be associated. After learning, presentation of the

first

of

any of the

now-associated vector pairs should result in the production at the

output of the other. The most obvious domain of applicability

way

in

which a network

to

be done after another. For example, the learning of

is

to guide action, in such a

is

one

that one thing
skilled

is

motor

behavior involves the learning of complex sequences of individual

movements,

all

concatenated together. Such a sequence of vectors

(each corresponding to a single movement) can be associated, such
that the initial

movement

starts a

cascade that produces each of the

others in turn. With appropriate feedback connections, a network

can learn a sequence consisting of

many

individual vectors.

Obviously, the time of production of each item in the sequence

have certain constraints

in order for the sequence as a

achieve a necessary level of fluidity
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(as, for

may

whole

to

example, when a skilled

pianist performs

some
I

tasks,

tried

to

time

an arpeggio with a particular tempo). Indeed,
is

crucial not only to fluidity, but also to success.

produced each item

in the

(more appropriate)

1

sequence

msec

apart,

I

1

characteristics of each unit are

third task

is

gait,

but

I

second apart rather than the

would

likely topple over.

time constraint can be built into the system,

A

If

run by producing each of the individual muscle

contractions and relaxations associated with the running

this

for

if

Even

the delay

known.

that of classification.

Here the network

is

trained to classify a set of input patterns, so that future presentation
of either a wholly novel input vector or one slightly distorted from a

previously encountered input vector results in correct classification.

Within

this

task-type,

predetermined

it

is

classification

assumed that there
scheme, so that the

initial

period consists of supervised learning on the training

A

exists

some

learning

set.

fourth task that PDP systems can learn to perform

regularity detection.

is

This typically occurs in the unsupervised

learning paradigm, and involves the extraction and encoding within

the network of regularities within the training

set,

so that future

novel inputs can be classified by means of the learned regularities.

As an aside,

it is

interesting to note that the

PDP

literature

describing experiments run involving the third and fourth tasktypes often have a

common

feature:

surprise on the part of the

researcher with regard to the regularities in the data seized upon by
the network to accomplish the task.

What

often happens

is

that the

researcher examines the post-training network only to discover that
it

has uncovered syntactic regularities in the training data not
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previously noticed by the researcher.

In particularly

complex

networks,

it is

sometimes even the case that the researcher cannot

figure out

how

the network

level of

is

performing the

although

performance after training demonstrates that

regularities relevant to the overall

crops up again

4.3

task,

PDP

when I examine

problem

to

it

high

its

has isolated

be solved. This issue

generalization in PDP.

as Currently Practiced

The "mind-modelling" contingent among PDP researchers hold
several key assumptions in

One

counterparts.

of these

is

common

with their traditionalist

that mental activity

is

a certain kind of

processing. In this regard, the views of hard-core computationalists
like

Pylyshyn (quoted in Chapter

theorists:

mind

the

is

3) are also applicable to

the instantiation of a particular process,

whereby not only the I/O behavior, but
I/O behavior

brought about,

is

instantiate the mental process.
least,

appear

--

to

PDP

is

also the

important.

means by which

To be a mind

The two camps part company

in a sense, this entire dissertation

is

the

is

to

(or, at

concerned

with figuring out whether they do indeed part company) in their
respective further elaborations of the details of this mental process.

Thus, PDP, like traditionalism,

is

committed

to the explanatory,

rather than the merely simulating, nature of their model.

consequence of
of the

this

mind given

consciousness

accompany an

is

view

to

is

A second

the subordinate status within the theory

mental phenomena such as consciousness.

a by-product of mental processsing, then

it

If

may

instantiated mental process; the property of being
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1

conscious

is,

for being a

however, neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition

mind.

Another key assumption held
traditionalism

section,

common by

both PDP and

the contentfulness of mental states. In the previous

is

confined

I

in

arepresentational.

myself

to

a

description

In depicting net behavior, the

described,

PDP

to

as

vocabulary used

was that of activation values and connection weights

make no reference

PDP

of

--

terms that

anything outside of the network.

Thus

not very interesting for a philosopher of mind.

is

This section, on the other hand, will deal with PDP systems qua
representational systems.
I

begin this task, as usual, with a survey of quotations,

showing that
consented

my

interpretation on this score

to, at least

camp within

the

PDP

is, if

not universally

consistent with the view of an established

literature.

understand their networks

Rumelhart and McClelland clearly

as possessing representations

(i.e.,

states

picked out by virtue of being about something external
themselves).

In

to

one passage, they occupy themselves with

distinguishing their approach to cognitive modelling from that of the
behaviorists. 31

[T]here is a crucial difference between our models
and the radical behaviorism of Skinner and his
followers. In our models, we are explicitly concerned
with the problem of internal representation and
mental processing, whereas the radical behaviorist
explicitly denies the scientific utility and even the
validity of the consideration of these constructs. The
...

3

Perhaps

it is

even debatable whether the term "cognitive model"

applicable to behavioristic theories of intelligent behavior.
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is

training of hidden units is ... the construction of
internal representations. The models ... concern
internal mechanisms for activating and acquiring the

ability
to
activate
appropriate
internal
representations. In this sense, our models must be
seen as ...
strongly committed to the study of
representation and process 32
.

Within the same work the authors devote an entire chapter

to

arguing that distributed representation (the sort that most PDP
researchers use)

is

superior to localized representation (seen within

some PDP networks, but more commonly associated with
traditionalist

approach

to representation).

(I

topic of distributed versus local interpretation
section.)

A second work

influenced

how

the

shall return to the

schema

later in this

within the PDP paradigm that has greatly

(in particular)

assumptions and goals,

is

philosophers understand PDP,

its

Paul Smolensky's "On the Proper

Treatment of Connectionism". He likewise enunciates a construal of

PDP according

to

which research has

as a focus gaining a better

understanding of the concept of representation within cognition.

sample passage

is:

Hidden units support internal representations of
elements of the problem domain, and networks that
hidden units are in effect learning effective
subconceptual representations of the domain. If we
can analyze the representations that such networks
develop, we can perhaps obtain principles of
subconceptual representation for various problem
domains 33
train their

.

32 Parallel Distributed Processing, page 121.
33 Smolensky' s "On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism", page
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8.

A

It is

not enough, however, to state that PDP

representationality of certain network states.

model of the mind,

constitute a genuine

it

is

committed

In order for

must be the case

PDP

If

PDP

is

one

is

I

shall

this later.

above-quoted passages

to take the

to

that the

content of these states plays a role in causal interactions.

have much more to say on

to the

at their

word, that

concerned with representation, then there must be an

explanation consistent with PDP principles that explains not only

how PDP system

states can, in general, be contentful, but also

particular contents are obtained.

"why does

answer the question:
particular meaning?"

story to

tell

(as

nervous system

We

saw

In other words,

have

3 that traditionalists

Fodor would say) about content.
is

how can PDP

this particular state

Chapter

in

how

this

have a

Namely, the

computer that implements a certain

a

computational process. The process

is

defined in terms of a set of

computational states and the rule-governed transitions between
those states. Thus, each physical state that
state type that

is

a

member

is

a token of a physical

of an equivalence class of state types

constituting the computational state acquires

corresponding computational
content inheritance

is

content from

its

This approach to explaining

not open to the PDP theorist, however, for

their system states (or,
states)

state.

its

more

precisely, the distributed system

are not describable as implementing a computational
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3

process. 34 Thus,

I

must

start

back

examination of representation in general

at the
.

beginning with an

33

adopt the terminology of Dretske's theory of
mental

I

representation (as described in his Explaining
Behavior

)

.

He

distinguishes three types of representational systems.

Type

I

representational systems.

Representational systems of type

I

are those in which the entities in

the system both have no intrinsic power to represent and have
their

reference stipulated by the user of the system. Dretske describes a

representation system of type

I:

dime on the table be Oscar Robertson, let this
nickel (heads uppermost) be Kareem Abdul-Jabbar,
and let this nickel (tails uppermost) be the opposing
center. ... With this bit of stage setting I can now, by
Let this

moving coins ... around the table, represent the
positions and movements of these players. I can use
these objects to describe a basketball play
witnessed 36

I

once

.

34 The parenthetical remark must, for the time-being, remain somewhat
cryptic. An explication of it and the philosophical exploration of its
ramifications for representation a la PDP will take up a considerable part of
Section 4 of this chapter. Unfortunately, since writing (and reading) a paper
is a serial process,
must of necessity start somewhere, while making
statements whose meaning will not become clear until later.
I

3

In

what

what follows, am not making assumptions that in any way contradict
have said in Chapter 3. Rather, in Chapter 3 could skip such an
I

I

I

examination because the equation of certain physical states with certain
computational states "bootstrapped" representation -- or, at least,
representation derived in terms of the purposes of an external observer of the
system.
shall remark at the end of this introduction to representation
intentionality-via-computational-states fits into this scheme.
36 Explaining Behavior, page 52-53.
I

161

how

Type

representational systems.

II

In contrast, representational

conventional:

we

systems of type

are only singly

assign a function to an element which has an

intrinsic capability to indicate,

indicator represents.
typical fuel

II

and thereby determine what the

Taking another example from Dretske, a

gauge in a car can indicate many things: the amount of

fuel in the tank, the

We

to the car, etc.

downward

force

on the

bolts attaching the tank

(the users of the system) determine

indicator represents by assigning

it

a function

--

what the

in the fuel gauge

example, we assign the gauge the function of representing the

amount

of fuel in the tank (and not the

bolts),

because

Type

III

it

downward

force on the

our purposes.

suits

representational systems.

Representational systems of type

no agent outside the system

is

III

needed

have no conventional aspect:
to assign the representational

function of elements within the system.

which have their own
derive from the

way

Such systems "are ones

intrinsic indicator functions, functions that

the indicators are developed and used by the

systems of which they are a part." 31 Dretske describes a system

which embodies type

III

representation:

Some marine

bacteria have internal magnets,
magnetosomes, that function like compass needles,
aligning themselves (and, as a result, the bacterium) ...
toward geomagnetic north. Since these organisms are
capable of living only in the absence of oxygen, and
since movements toward geomagnetic north will take
bacteria away from the oxygen-rich and
the ...
therefore toxic surface water and toward the
31 Explaining Behavior, page 62.
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comparatively oxygen-free sediment at the bottom, it
is not unreasonable to speculate ... that the function
of this primitive sensory system is to indicate the
whereabouts of benign (i.e., anaerobic)
environments 38
.

Representational systems of type

upon conventional assignments
the grounding for

all

III,

because they do not rely

of representational content, serve as

intentionality.

The elements

representational systems refer because

we

by virtue of possessing the capability

for type

of type

human

(i.e.,

III

II

Type
there

is

representation,

I

and

itself in

What does

II

it

III

systems, for which the function

the

way

mean

in

which an indicator

bacteria

is

is

not the

assigned by the

developed and used.

is

for an indicator to be so assigned? Dretske

to play a role in the causal sequence of

the

I

representation are easily explained, because

hypothesizes that the assignment takes place

In

type

(by supposition) an agent outside the system to assign a

case with type

comes

all

representation with our underived intentionality.

function to a representational element in the system; this

system

II

cognizers),

can stop the regress of derived intentionality: we ground

and type

and

I

example,

the

direction

when

the indicator

an agent

s

behavior.

pointed to by the

magnetosomes represents "benign environment

this

way" because

the indicator has been harnessed (via evolution) by the bacteria for
its

advantageous results of allowing the bacteria

to reproduce).
its

To make

this relationship

to live

(and hence,

between the indicator and

representational function clearer, consider a slightly altered

38 Explaining Behavior, page 63.
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example. Suppose that biologists discover that oxygen
for the bacteria in question.

is

not

toxic

turns out that the selectional

It

advantage to the bacteria of possessing a magnetosome playing a
certain causal role in the bacteria

s

behavior

is

that

it

draws the

bacteria toward the iron-rich sediment at the bottom, and

from the iron-poor surface water.

feeding ground this way”. In

fact,

magnetosome represents "good

the

magnetosome has represented

even though we mistakenly conjectured that the

this all along,

selectional advantage offered

do with the

suppose that the bacteria

(Let us

feeds on iron.) In this scenario, the

by the magnetosome had something

relative toxicity of the water for the bacteria.

illustrates that the representational function of
III

system

is

intrinsic:

it

represents what

environment irrespective of the intentional
than

away

an element
it

to

This

in a type

represents in

its

states of systems other

itself.

(Thus, looking back to
capacity a la traditionalism,
artificial

device have type

II

we

my

depiction of representational

see that computational states of an

representationality.

To move from

this

derived intentionality to the original intentionality possessed by

computational states implemented in natural objects
systems

--

there must be a causal story to

gained by a creature at having

some external
traditionalist

state-of-affairs.

this state

As

I

tell

--

eg,

nervous

about the advantage

which

is

correlated with

said in Chapter 3:

"a

leaning towards the evolutionary approach to

naturalization [of content] will answer that, in the history of a
species,

it

has offered selectional advantage to have a body

164

(or,

more

narrowly, a nervous system) whose physical states follow
upon one

another in the manner of Figure

A

2.")

further distinction divides general type

into two classes:

representation

III

those resulting immediately from evolution and

those gained as a result of learning during the lifetime of the
representational system. Dretske allows only the latter to hold

title

to

genuine intentional mental statehood. He explains

in

terms of whether the behavior of an individual depends upon

what the internal

state

means or upon

a particular genetic

which was selected for what the internal
of instinctive behavior).

swims

in the direction pointed to

what the
it

The bacteria
by

its

is

state

means

(as in the case

an instance of the

latter; it

magnetosome, not because

has a genetic make-up which predisposes

According to Dretske, there

is

it

of

to act in that way.

a qualitative difference between

learned versus inherited behavioral dispositions.
is

make-up

magnetosome means for it, but rather because

state of the

distinction

this distinction

Briefly, this

based upon the manner in which the representational

element comes
the behavior.

to play its role in the causal

sequence leading up

to

In the case of inherited dispositions, this occurs

because the ancestors of the organism (system) gained selectional

advantage by virtue of having a causal sequence where the
representational element played this role. This

learned dispositions:
explanation for

why

one can give more than a selectional

"What explains why, during

internal registration of a type of object
into, a

not the case for

a representational element means what

According to Dretske:

made

is

cause of

M

[a particular
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A presence]

behavior]

is

it

does.

learning, R [an

was recruited

as,

the fact that R was

a sign of

O

[the object type]

coordinate behavior

presence of O.

--

and the organism had a need

in this case evasive

movements

Hence, the internal sign of

...

O (namely

M — with
R)

to

the

was made

into a cause of M."39

Given the recent controversy surrounding the question
of
whether Dretske really has explained meaning, 4 9 I feel obliged
to

my

defend

circular.
fails

adopted account of meaning against the charge that

First,

because

(

1)

(2)

X
A

'

s

though, a summarization of the charge:

committed

it is

this

it is

account

to the following three theses:

explanatory role is X s causal role.
C has an explanatory role in virtue of having
'

state

meaning.
(3)

A

The second
explain

state

C has meaning

thesis

how

it

is

is

in virtue of having a causal role. 41

the goal of Dretske

that

meaning

is

'

s

(and my) whole project:

The third

relevant.

encapsulates the means by which this goal

is

to

admit that Dretske'

s

thesis,

want

to distinguish "causal role" as

from "causal

its

causal role.

account of the explanatoriness of meaning

depicted by theses 1-3) appears circular; however,
Dretske,

thesis

be achieved —

namely, to ground the meaning of a state in terms of
I

role" as

it

it

to

I,

(as

along with

appears in the third

appears in the second thesis (under

the substitution of "explanatory role" with "causal role"). As Dretske
argues:

Explaining Behavior, page 19.

Baker's "Dretske on the Explanatory Role of Belief and
"How
Beliefs
Explain: Reply to Baker".
Dretske' s reply
41 L. Baker, "Dretske on the Explanatory Role of Belief page 100.
4() See,

for example,

1

L.

1

,
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...

[CJurrent behavior, the causal process that the

meaning of C is called upon to explain (as structuring
cause) need not (and typically will not) be the same
sort of causal process as that which was responsible
(during learning) for C s acquiring that meaning. C got
the function of indicating F (hence, this meaning) by
being recruited to cause M, but what its having this
meaning is (typically) called on to explain is its causing
N, quite a different movement. And even if it is called
on to explain the production of
(the same type of
movement that it was recruited during learning to
cause), it wasn t its causing
that conferred an
indicator function on C. It was its causing something,
some movement or other (whatever movements were
rewarded in the conditions C indicates). So the causal
process (behavior) being explained by meaning is
never the causal process underlying the meaning that

M
M

explains

How does

it . 42

Dretske'

s

account of the explanatoriness of meaning

apply to the issue of intentionality in PDP systems? This question
highly relevant, for,

if

PDP wants

model of the mind, then
explanation of

how

its

it

to

be a serious contender for a

must be able

systems

'

is

states

to provide a principled

can be contentful.

I

would

here like to deflect a possible objection that a PDP system, at least as
currently embodied in the artificial computer science laboratory,

cannot possess intentional states because the inputs

come not immediately from

to the

system

the environment of representable

objects, but rather mediately via the researcher.

goes, this mediate-interaction version of

PDP

is

So, the objection

not a possible model

of the mind, as such systems lack the capacity for representation 43
.

42 "How Beliefs Explain: Reply to Baker", page 115.
43 0ne also hears this objection raised against traditionalism.

My argument

that the objection does not ultimately bear fruit applies equally well to PDP
and traditionalism as potential models of the mind.
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My

response to such an opponent of PDP qua mental model

an unqualified "yes and no".

mediateness of the stimuli
environments

First,

to

the "yes".

I

is

agree that the

the system in such artificial

relevant to the obtaining of intentional mental

is

states (in Dretske's sense of the phrase).

The relationship

of the

input supplied to the system with the real environment (of the
researcher) depends

there

is

upon

(i.e., is

mediated by) the researcher.

If

a counterfactual-supporting correspondence between a

particular input vector's being supplied to the system and a
particular state-of-affairs, the counterfactual support relies on
certain of the mental states of the researcher.

with the thesis that representational content

The objection begins
is

determined by the

causal chain which results in the production of the representation.

When

the causal "distance" separating the object purportedly

represented and the purported representation becomes too great,
the latter loses

its

representational content.

When aimed

at the

relationship between input to a system and objects or states-oraffairs said to

be represented therein in such an

causal distance
this

artificial set-up, the

too great to support representation. Proponents of

is

view measure causal distance not in purely quantitative terms
to B

-

but in qualitative terms. In the case at hand, the causal distance

is

--

eg,

how many

causal laws need be invoked to get from

A

too great because the causal chain passes through the mental states
of the researcher.

A

little

reflection convinces

one that

this

cannot

be an objection against representational status, for the causal chain
separating a person sitting for a portrait and the painted portrait
likewise passes through the mental states of the painter.
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We

would

not, however, say that the painting therefore fails
to represent the

paintee. Perhaps, then, this objection

is

not so

much

directed at the

ability of the input to represent, but at the ability of
the input to

support original intentionality in states of the system entered
subsequent to receipt of the input. With
objection,

it is

this interpretation of the

not so clear that the painting case can serve as a

counterexample, for

not obvious (at

it is

least,

my

intuitions

register a decisive response) that original intentionality

is

do not

had by a

creature exposed only to paintings. In order to thwart the objection,

one can consider only the PDP systems which receive input
(relatively) directly

from the environment (mediated only by the

necessary converters

--

for example, a television

camera that

converts the light energy impinging on the lens to a "brightness at a
point" matrix of numbers) as candidate models of the mind. (Thus,
the camera functions as an artificial eye.)

With the above proviso, we can pose the question: how do the

PDP system come

states of a

do they come
question,

to

have content? More precisely, how

to be intentional

mental states? To answer

we must re-examine learning within PDP

this

systems,

concentrating this time on the representational aspects of the
process. In
critic.

I

do

what

follows,

I

shall focus

this for several reasons.

the researcher (and

learning loop:

all

makes

it

possible to get

the reinforcement signal, like the input, can be

system has only type
is

First, it

other supervisory cognitive agents) out of the

supplied by the environment

of the states

on supervised learning with a

II

itself.

Thus, the objection that the

representation, because the actual content

supplied by the supervisor (in her judging of the
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appropriateness of the produced response and supplying of
the
correct one)

a critic

is

creatures

is

thwarted.

that

it is

-- it is

A second

reason for favoring learning with

the predominant

mode

of learning in natural

the exceptional case in which an external source

is

available to supply information detailing the correct response to
a

particular situation.

As

primarily with explaining

I

am

few pages concerned

in the next

how PDP

states

limiting myself to learning with a critic

can be representational,

is justified.

However, as

mentioned previously, an adequate model of the mind must

I

also

allow for exceptional cases (such as supervised learning with a

mechanisms supporting both forms of learning must

teacher); hence,

be present.

To simplify the

while content

is

exposition,

I

can merely assume

determined in both types of learning

content during learning with a teacher cycles
content acquired during the more

common

cycles, the

parasitic

is

that,

on the

learning with a critic

cycles.

So,

the

general framework has

the

environment

(via

converters) supplying input vectors, and the environment (via the

reinforcement signal) supplying the feedback on the adequacy of the

The front-end

produced output.
straightforward:

it is

of

this

set-up

is

fairly

easy to construct (or imagine) audio and video

equipment pointing out

at the world, converting the inflowing

information into a segmented signal capable of being used as input
to a

PDP network.

It is

perhaps

the reinforcement signal)
in

is

less

obvious

how

the other

constructed. Consider

which reinforcement information

is

the

(i.e.,

manner

supplied in natural creatures.

The creature performs a particular action
170

first

end

in the presence of a

stimulus.

If

the action

immediately followed by a relatively

is

pleasurable experience (for example, a cessation of an
unpleasant
thirst

with a neutral feeling of equanimity), this serves as a

reinforcement signal, which tends to produce changes in the creature

such

that, in the future,

it is

more

likely to

perform that action in the

presence of that (and similar) stimuli. Contrarily, when the creature

performs an action in the presence of a stimulus that

is

followed by

a relatively unpleasurable experience, the causal pathways linking
stimulus and response will change so as to
likely in the

make

that response less

presence of that stimulus 44 This explanation works for
.

natural creatures, because they

come equipped with

rudimentary') pleasurableness detector

--

(at least a

warm, fuzzy sensations

are pleasurable, whereas sharp, obtrusive sensations are not.

Evolution has supplied these detectors to aid in the survival and

reproduction of their possessors.

This

is

because the sorts of

behaviors resulting in warm, fuzzy sensations

(e.g.,

eating) tend to

be those that also aid ultimately in reproduction; whereas the sorts
of activities resulting in sharp, obtrusive sensations

oneself)

(e.g.,

burning

tend to be those that have a deleterious effect on

reproduction.

Does

it

come equipped with

make

sense to say that PDP systems likewise

a detector which, like the above-described

pleasurableness detector, can supply a reinforcement signal given

environmental conditions (including the conditions of the system's
44

am

using this vocabulary, not to emphasize a connection with
in general or instrumental conditioning in particular, but
rather as semantically-neutral descriptors of the signal received, input and
output of the system -- whether that system be natural or artificial. Given that
have yet to argue that this process can result in intentional states on the
part of the learning creature, it seems premature to refer to an input as
"perception of the presence of x".
I

behaviorism

I
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physical parts)? While they would not be the product
of the
evolution of the system

s

forebears, a system could certainly be

equipped with such detectors. Does
status of

PDP

as a mental

model? 4 ^

make a

this

I

think not.

the purpose of the reinforcement signal

type

III

I

system need only be able

- whether

PDP systems
creatures

is

If

to participate in

such content-adverting
is

determined within

detail,

(In other words, the

not pertinent to PDP

can explain

how

'

s

means

is

merely an

status as a

model of

these artificial detectors can be used

supply a reinforcement signal for training the net, and,

to

process, give content to certain of the system states, that

Strangely,

among

all

of the recent works

by PDP researchers and by philosophers),
detailed explanation of how, exactly,

lacuna

is

4 ^It

a PDP

from the means employed within natural

irrelevant.

I

necessary for

is

Qua mental model,

means by which content

differs

implementation
the mind.)

the

laws.

say this because

ultimately to establish

is

representational content, which in turn

subsumption under mental causal

laws

difference to the

I

PDP

on PDP

have yet

is

in the

enough.

(written both

to

encounter a

states represent 46 This

particularly striking, given that the

.

word "representation"

may seem as though am getting rather far afield, but it is a common
assumption (among German neurobiologists, at least) that the biological
nature of a mind-possessing creature is important. (One can also see such a
concern among some American philosophers -- eg, Searle -- although his
argument for the importance of biology takes a slightly different tack.) For
those espousing this view, merely building in a "reinforcement module" won't
do. Hence, my argument.
46 here and henceforth shall mean type III representation by
I

I

"representation". No difficulties in explaining type II representational
content in PDF states arise, as the content is assigned by the researcher in the
act of labelling a unit (for localized representation) or a pattern of activation
(for distributed representation). Clearly, though, the act of labelling does not
make a difference to the network -- it goes on processing quite oblivious to
what is assigned to its states: the labels play no role in the ensuing procession
of states.
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as describing such states

why

this topic

is

so freely used.

(My personal theory

has not been addressed relates back to

as to

my conviction

that the writing in this field occurs independently of a developed

theory of causation

--

and, without such a theory,

it is

not possible to

give a detailed account of representation.) So, let's start at the

beginning (again).

number

We

have a network with a fixed architecture

of units, available

communication

lines), a

(e.g.,

hard-wired

learning rule, and weights initialized to small,

random numbers.

Figure 10 gives an overview of the system and

its

relation to the

environment.

Figure 10 -- PDP network in system capable
of supporting representational states
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As the system

initialized

is

(i.e.,

prior to training), the network states

do not have representational content. The audio-visual front-end
receives information

from the environment, and transforms

it

into a

format suitable for use as input to the network. The introduction of
this

input vector produces changes in the activation values of the

input level units, then subsequently the rest of the units in the
system. All current PDP systems presuppose temporal quantization:
the input signal does not change continuously, but rather changes at

We

discrete time steps.

can stipulate that the audio and video

devices likewise sample the information available from the

environment

at discrete points in time; to simplify the description of

network behavior, we can assume that the time interval between
input vectors

large

is

enough

to allow use of the learning algorithm

described in Section 2 of this chapter. The network output

is

used

to

drive effectors that (for example) manipulate objects in the

environment.

A

typical effector

is

a robot arm.

Other types of

effectors are also possible, for example, a transportation sub-system

capable of changing the location of the system relative to the

environment.
which, in turn,

The

effectors force changes in the environment,

may

cause an increment or a decrement in the

pleasurableness value returned

by one or several of the

pleasurableness detectors.

As with the effectors, there are
pleasurableness detectors.
ability to

What they

many

all

possible types of

have in

produce a signal measuring some factor

common

is

the

relating to the

hospitableness of the environmental conditions for the continued

functioning of the system

(i.e.,
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the network plus front-end plus

effectors).

One type

robots

a simple volt-meter measuring the energy reserve

is

of pleasurableness detector often seen in mobile

available in the robot's storage battery.

The higher the energy

reserve, the greater the pleasure signal. This

is

loosely equivalent to

a hunger detector (which takes into account food in the digestive

system and energy reserve
fat) in

natural creatures.

in the

form of blood sugar and stored

One can imagine other types

of detectors

based loosely on the sorts of detectors selected for by natural
evolution

--

temperature detectors, strain gauges,

output of the pleasurableness detector box
signal)

is

(i.e.,

etc.

The

overall

the reinforcement

the difference between the overall pleasurableness at the

current time step minus that at the previous time step, where the
overall pleasurableness at a time step

some function

is

of the

outputs from each of the individual pleasurableness detector
apparati. With this access to a reinforcement signal, the network can

use the learning procedure described in Section 2 to force a change
of weights in a

manner

so as to decrease the probability of doing the

"wrong" thing relative to the output of the pleasurableness detector
box.

If,

as supposed, the output of this detector

box

is

correlated

with the continued-functioning-of-the-system expectancy,

means

that learning will result in a system

the effectors, behavior)

is

whose output (and,

this

via

decreasingly likely to be deleterious to the

continued functioning of the system.

While

this

sounds well and good,

the possession by

PDP systems

of type

it is

III

argue as follows: although the researcher

open

to the

opponent of

representational states to
is

in

one sense out of the

learning loop, in that she need not even be present during the actual
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learning phase;

still,

various of her choices in the design of the

overall system have as a consequence that the system achieves
only

type

II

Such an opponent may point

representation.

several design choices as critical in this regard

-

to

any of

these include: (1)

front-end, (2) network architecture, (3) learning rule, (4) effectors,

and/or

pleasurableness detectors.

(5)

choices were

made by

a cognitive agent

by evolution make a difference

had by the network

'

s

Does the

(i.e.,

fact that these

the researcher) and not

to the type of representational status

representational states? In answering

this, it is

important to keep in mind that the representational states

in

question are not the states of the various devices forming the
interface between the network

and the environment, but rather the

The network achieves type

III

individual states achieve type

III

states internal to the network.

representation
representation.
causal role

if

A

(i.e., its

some

of

its

particular representational state

is

type

III if its

place in the chain of states during processing in

the network in regard to the other states within the chain) derives

from the history of the system
changes in
expectancy

its

(as

--

in particular,

from the way that

causal role aided in the increase of survival

measured by the pleasurableness detectors) during

the learning phase.

parameters was explicitly made by a cognitive agent
irrelevant to the type
states.

A

conclusion.

but lacking

person

is

to design

That the choice with respect

III

is

therefore

status of the network's representational

simple thought experiment also produces the same

Imagine a person born with a perfectly normal brain,
all

of the five sense organs.

supplied with an

artificial

176

eye

Imagine further that

much

like the

this

TV camera

forming part of the front-end of the overall PDP system. The mere
facts that the eye

is

artificial

and that a physician chose which

particular artificial eye to use do not prevent the person from

becoming a type

III

representational system after learning.

I

think

that similar thought experiments questioning the relevance of an

external cognitive decision-maker to type

III

representational status

can likewise be given for each of the other four design choices,
although, particularly for the case of the architectural design, the
scenario to be imagined would be very far-fetched. Just
that various design decisions in the construction of the

so,

the fact

PDP system

were made by the researcher does not prevent the system from

becoming a type
satisfied

mental

III

representational system.

one of Dretske'

s

Thus, we have

conditions for the presence of intentional

states.

Here,

I

would

like to distinguish

two types of

describe the "current state" of a PDP network:

weight state

(i.e.,

used

states

to

(1) the current

the matrix of weight values connecting the units to

one another) and

(2) the

current activation value vector

(i.e.,

the

vector whose elements are the activation values for each of the
units), or, alternatively, the current

output vector

whose elements are the output values

(i.e.,

the vector

for each of the units).

three are candidates for contentful states. In what follows,

I

All

use the

terms "weight state" and "activation value state" in such a way as

to

avoid committing myself one way or another on the question of

whether such

states are

atomic or complex with respect to content.

As with the discussion in Chapter

3 dealing

with the supposed

representational complexity of the monolithic computational states,
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I

want

to

remain non-committal

(at

discussion) with regard to whether
state (or

network activation value

least,
is

it

at

this

stage of the

only the network weight

state) as a

whole that can carry

content, or whether sub-states of the network weight state
(or

network activation value

state)

can also be contentful. In general,

PDP researchers indicate a

the writings of most

willingness to allow

sub-states of network states to be contentful.

Now

time to look inside the network as learning

is

it

progresses, in order to isolate exactly where the changes are being

made and how

those changes bring about representationality.

As

already stated, prior to training, none of the network's states are

representational 47 In what follows,

I

.

how

a network could

network

is

come

to possess a representational state.

The

presented with an input vector. Let us suppose that the

scene encoded by the input vector
description

present a scenario showing

is

is

of a

that of an outside observer

possess a representational vocabulary at
of distinguishing a fire

fire.
--

(Clearly, this level of

the system does not yet

all,

much

less

one capable

from other potential objects

in

the

environment.) As the network's weights at the beginning of the
learning phase are randomly assigned, the network's output, and,

hence, the system

'

s

behavior, will likewise be random. Suppose that

the behavior produced just so happens to

away from the

fire

(perhaps by a

move

command

the system further

to the transportation

sub-system to move in a particular direction which

happens

to

47 Obviously,

be away from the

fire).

am

So

we have an

in this case

input/ output pair

here speaking only of type III representation. It is possible
that the researcher, by a clever choice of weights, has produced a network
with type II representational states.
I
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(i.e.,

input vector encoding of the

command), and a change
The change
the

fire.

to the
air

in

in the

environment

fire

scene and "move away"

environment

results

from the

relative to the robot.

relative

movement

of

Suppose that one of the pleasurableness detectors supplied

system

is

a thermometer measuring the temperature of the

near the system surface, calibrated so as to return the values

shown below:

Value

Temperature Range
60-75 F
40-59 F, 76-80 F
20-39 F, 81-95 F
5-19 F, 96-110 F

3
2
1

0

Figure 11 -- Hypothetical pleasurableness values
returned as a function of temperature

Suppose further that the only pleasurableness detector that changes
value in the time step after execution of the behavior

is

thermometer, which measures a temperature drop from 62 F
F. 48

So, the

this

to

reinforcement signal received for the I/O pair

58
is

48 Obviously, the example am presenting, with its many suppositions and
happy coincidences, is not very realistic as an actual sequence of events. This
fact does not, however, detract from its usefulness as a summarization of the
(for present purposes) relevant changes leading to a representation of a fire.
A more likely sequence of events -- for example, one in which no change of
pleasurableness level is evoked from any of the detectors over many time
steps — would lead to the same representational state. Describing the process
would, however, necessarily include many irrelevant details.
I
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negative thus forcing a change in weights to make

this

likely in the

The next input

,

vector

is

presence of this and similar inputs.

again directed at the

changed from the
front-end.

first

fire scene;

vector in that the

Now suppose

although

fire is

output

it

less

have

will

further from the

the output produced for this input

such

is

as to direct the transportation sub-system to drive the system as a

whole closer

to the fire.

The 60

F temperature threshold separating

the "ideal" and "suboptimaT ranges

becomes

signal

positive,

signal,

will

crossed,

which tends

continuing to approach the

75 F threshold

is

fire.

This

and the reinforcement

to increase the likelihood of

is

repeated. At

some

point, the

be crossed, resulting in a negative reinforcement

and a corresponding refinement

of the "approach-fire"

behavior.

During

this

group of learning

changing, although, by supposition,
at the fire scene.

The

"retreat" behavior)

had the

first

cycles, the input vector has
it

has at each stage been directed

change (resulting from the

initial

up a smaller area

of the

fire taking

and a decrease

in the

The negative reinforcement

signal

visual field, with decreased overall brightness,
decibel-level of "fire-type" noise.

brought about a change

which

in turn

been

in behavior

produced changes

from

in the

"retreat" to "approach",

environment

relative to the

system. In particular, the portion of the visual field occupied by the
fire increased, as

49

did the brightness level and "fire-type" noise. 49

that the "crackliness" property of the sound of a fire is
isolatable in the frequency profile of an audio reproduction of a lire, and that
the rapidly fluctuating brightness and color characteristics of a fire are
likewise isolatable in the visual reproduction of a fire. In order to capture
I

would assume

these aspects of the continuously- changing environment, it may make most
sense to have each input vector be not an encoding of the input-at-a-moment
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The

approach

temperature

behavior led eventually

to

a

value

greater

an increase of the

to

than

maximum

the

ideal

temperature, thus producing a negative reinforcement signal
and a

change from "approach"

to "retreat" behavior.

further changes in the input vector

(i.e.,

This in turn led to

decreased

fire area,

decreased brightness, decreased level of "fire-type" noise).
Obviously, other changes in the input vector not directly related to

the

fire

were simultaneously occurring.

background visual

signal

the background noise.
place.

was changing

For example, the

as the system

moved,

as

Other additional changes were also taking

Perhaps other mobile creatures entered and/or exited the

perceived environment during this time period. Hence, viewing

sample sequence of events in
that

was

it is

isolation,

it is

this

not immediately obvious

the aspects of the input directly related to the fire that are

important in the changes in reinforcement

signal.

However, suppose

that the system has repeated encounters with fires.

The

non-fire-

related particulars will change with each encounter, while the

fire-

related effects on the pleasurableness detector (and, in turn, on the
overall reinforcement signal) will remain constant. Thus, the change
in weights forced

make

by these repeated fire-encounters

will

tend to

the approach-retreat behavior depend only on the visual and

auditory properties of the

fire,

and not on the

non-fire-related

circumstances.

Looking back to Dretske
representational content,

we

'

s

explanation of the determination of

see that

all

of the conditions for the

alone, but rather an encoding of the input-at-a-moment and an encoding of
the variability between time steps of the signal received by the front-end.
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acquisition of intentional mental statehood are satisfied in the

above-described depiction of learning in a PDP system. The internal
registration of the fire's presence, R, 5() has been (via the learning
rule)

made

into a cause of the approach-retreat behavior, M. This

explained by the fact that the system had a need to coordinate

behavior with the presence of

fire

--

fire

system behaviors, highly deleterious
deleteriousness detection
detectors,

is

its

can be, given certain

to

the

system.

This

mediated by the pleasurableness

is

which were chosen because of

their ability to correlate the

presence of potentially harmful conditions (brought about by the
presence of potentially harmful objects) with a reinforcement

R represents
fire"

role

fire

because R's causal role

lies

signal.

between "presence of

and "fire-approaching-and-retreating behavior". This causal
is

the result of changes

made

in the weights of the network.

After learning, an input vector encoding a fire scene produces R,

which

in turn

which tend

produces a certain

set of

behaviors relative to the

fire,

to increase the probability of the continued functioning

of the system.

Let's look at the

theory of causation.

because

it

nothing at

all).

my

possible worlds

else,

or because

it

fire (either

represented

Thus, the production of R would not be correlated
fire.

between "presence of

50j

in light of

Suppose that R did not represent

represented something

with the presence of

behavior".

same process

In this case, R'

fire"

s

causal role would not

lie

and "fire-approaching-and-retreating

(Assume that the general architecture of the system

have not yet discussed what

this internal registration

presently.
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is.

That

will

come

remains unchanged in
represent

fire,

this counterfactual world.) If

R did not

then R would not govern the particular approach and

retreat behaviors that

it

in fact governs, for the learning of these

behaviors was mediated by the heat-producing characteristics of the
fire.

Without a

there would be no heat production; hence, no

fire,

changes detected in temperature; hence, no positive and negative
reinforcement signal

(or, at least,

not this particular pattern of

reinforcement); hence, not this particular change in weights; hence,

no learned approaching and retreating behavior.

If

R were

instantiated in the network, the output of the network (and ensuing

behavior of the system) would be different. R

s

dependent upon

is

its

meaning, as

mental causal law.

As

it

argued

I

must be

in

if

Chapter

R

causal role

is

thus

to participate in a

2, it is illegitimate to

construe the antecedent to the counterfactual conditional testing for
causal relevance

(i.e., "if

the system were not in that mental state")

as "stipulate that the system

implementing that mental

is

in the

same physical

state in the actual world,

the instantiation of that mental state

state as the

one

but assume that

means something

else,

and

leave everything else in the world (including the past) unchanged."

Thus, not only
adverts to

its

is

R meaningful, but

content.

participation in causal laws

its

Recall Dretske '

s

soprano example, in which

the meaning of the words sung by the soprano are causally
irrelevant to the shattering of the glass.

because the meaning of R

something
I

else,

then

its

is

causally relevant, for,

effects

would have been

mentioned previously that

whether Dretske

'

s

This case

it is

if

different,

R had meant

different.

currently a debated topic

account of the relevance of meaning
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is

is

circular or

.

With the general

not.

Dretske
Let

s

s

account,

look in

more

I

case, as well as with this particular use of

don't think the charge of

detail at

how

"causal role"

circularity

is

to

is

correct.

be understood in

the context of the two sentences:

(51)

R represents

(52)

R

because R' s causal role lies
between "presence of fire" and "fire-approachingand-retreating behavior"
s

fire

causal role

Prior to learning,

is

dependent on

R was an indicator of

became instantiated whenever a
early stage,

have

its

its

R does not mean

fire

fire).

meaning

fire:

fire.

a token of type R

was observed (although,
S2

is

at this

how R came

describing

to

causal role after learning. During learning, the repeated co-

occurrence of the

triple:

tokening of R,
(2) particular behavior,
(3) particular reinforcement signal
(

1

)

R came

led to changes in the network such that tokenings of

control over certain behaviors.
it

were

to

Had R been such

that

its

have one) came to be something other than

have had a different causal role than
because the changes

made

it

in fact

came

to

have

meaning

fire, it

(if

would

to have. This

is

in the system relevant to the tokening of

the R-behavior sequence during learning were guided by the

reinforcement signal received during learning.

But the particular

reinforcement history would have been different had R
indicated, not

fire,

but (for example)

the counterfactual claim that
fire

(and, hence,

human

face. Thus, S2

is

(truly)

making

had R indicated something other than

had the history

of reinforcement vis-a-vis fire been

different), then the causal role that
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R eventually took on would be

Thus, S2

different.

is

true by virtue of the past (actually occurring)

tokenings of R in the presence of

why

explaining

this

and

SI,

fire.

on the other hand,

future tokenings (assuming learning had

all

ceased) of R represent fire as opposed to something
represent

because they

fire

between "presence of

lie

approaching-and-retreating behavior".
this causal role for

there

and

"fire-

wholly silent on

example was chosen for

no

principled

is

reason

how

PDP networks

to

its

relative

preventing

PDP networks from gaining

manner. A point that deserves

in a similar

is

fire"

fire

representational states in

learning in

SI

they

else:

R has been arranged.

While the above
simplicity,

is

all

their content

be emphasized

is

that

(and, correspondingly, content acquisition)

occurs piecemeal and achieves relative stability only after a long
training period.
cycles

needed

One would assume

that the

number

of learning

for the formation of a representation of (for example)

another cognitive agent would be very large and that a description
of

its

acquisition in terms of environmental feedback

Very large and very complex do

complex.

impossible.
criterion

(i.e.,

is

amount

to

it)

this

of exposure to an object needed to acquire a

does not automatically exclude

the rare exception.

acquisition in

needed

not, however, imply

Judging PDP as a model of the mind based on

representation of
learning

would be very

When

humans, one must

it,

for one-pass

considering representation

also include the learning cycles

produce the base of representations from which complex

representations are formed

--

a process lasting

encompassing very, very many learning

cycles.

I

many

years and

can only think of

one case of genuinely one-pass learning among humans: namely, the
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learning of an aversion to a food type after only one exposure
to

when

that exposure

not at

is

followed by severe nausea.

However,

ready to grant that the causal law governing

all

behavior

is

mental

(i.e.,

that

I

it,

am

this aversive

adverts to contentful states of the

it

agent).

One advantage

of the explanation of the acquisition of

intentional states within the
traditionalist

framework

PDP framework over

is

that

that within the

one can see

in

PDP how

representational states emerge from an initially unstructured

The

network.

regularities in the

environment resulting from the

and persistence throughout time

existence

of objects guide not only

the learning of behavioral responses appropriate to the objects, but
also the learning of the representations of the objects. Thus,

see the

Humean

one can

bent of PDP, which presents a contrast to the more

Cartesian bent of traditionalism. In the

latter,

concepts are innate to

the extent that traditionalism provides no explanation for the
acquisition of their

manner

of representation.

networks must also learn how

answer for
complex?

If

itself

In contrast,

to represent a concept:

the following questions.

Is

it

PDP
must

a concept atomic or

the latter, are there any necessary and/or sufficient

conditions associated with

it? If so,

what are they? Learning within

PDP explains how these questions can be answered given merely

the

system set-up and information from the environment, whereas the
process of concept formation within traditionalism either remains

unexplained or presupposes the innateness of concepts.

Humean

flavor of

PDP has

arguments against PDP

as

led

some

traditionalists to direct the

This

same

were aimed against associationism (and,
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in

These come in two

particular, behaviorism).

that the emerging

sorts:

complaints

(1)

model cannot be of the mind because

it

does not

take into account the representational properties of causally
efficacious states,

and

poverty of the stimulus arguments.

(2)

already given reasons for rejecting the
PDP:
its

it is

have

type of attack against

clearly concerned with representation, both in explaining

acquisition

and

its

causal relevance.

complaint against PDP because
that

first

I

PDP can

it

I

addressed

explicitly

strikes at the root of

constitute a coherent

model

this

my contention

of the mind.

Poverty of

the stimulus arguments, on the other hand, are directed at the
empirical adequacy of PDP as a model of the mind, and, as

I

am

not

here concerned with arguing either for or against PDP or
traditionalism as providing the best model,

I

shall not

pursue

this

topic further.

have yet

I

to specify

what

sorts of states within

are the bearers of causally-efficacious content.

PDP systems

The reasons

for

my

reticence on this point are two-fold: a lack of consistency within the

PDP

literature

and the necessity

hope that the above arguments

PDP networks are capable

Now

all

that

is left is

are representational,
their content.

where,

many

if

As to the

the analysis

is

I

I

suffice to convince the reader that

among

out which

the candidate states

participate in causal laws as a function of
first

reason,

to continue,

of the stated views

only one issue at a time.

of possessing representational states.

to pick

and

to tackle

on

I

this topic

I

have now reached a point

must disregard

made by PDP

as inconsistent

researchers.

have already mentioned the two candidates most often

mentioned

in the

PDP

literature for intentional mental statehood:
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the weight-state (or parts thereof) and the activation value
state (or

parts thereof). 51

One condition

intentional mental state type

mental causal laws
causal law

is

set

that

is

down

its

in

Chapter

an

tokens must participate in

must potentially do

(or, at least,

2 for

one relating an intentional mental

another mental state or to some external behavior.

so).

A mental

state either to

How can one

understand the causally interacting representational objects

in a

PDP

network? The only regularities of transition that are isolatable in a

PDP network are the

unit-level rules governing unit output as a

function of activation value, and activation value as a function of the

connectivity pattern of the network (encoded in the weights) and
the state of the local units to which this unit

is

connected.

Is

the

unit-level the appropriate level to consider in looking for mental

Perhaps the activation value of a unit represents the

states?

presence

(or, for real -valued units, the

object.

On

schema

for a

first glance, this is

degree of presence) of an

the most intuitive interpretation

PDP network. The weights would then correspond

to

the degree of association of the objects represented by the various
units.

(This "degree of association"

conditional support

—

thus,

if

may even

unit-n

is

constitute a degree of

connected to unit-m via a

line with a large positive weight, then a large

output on unit-n lends

a high degree of support that the object represented by unit-m
also present.) This

approach

is

to interpretation (hereafter called the

often used interchangeably with the output of each unit state.
In networks with a one-to-one function relating activation value and output
of a unit, the two state-types collapse into one. As the network exemplar that
have in mind throughout this chapter is one using back-prop as it is
currently construed (ie, in conjunction with a squashing function a la Figure
confine myself to consideration of only activation value state and
5c),
51

The

latter

is

1

I

weight

state,

but not output of each unit
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state.

local interpretation schema"), while easy to understand,
presents

some

difficulties.

Experiments on PDP networks capable of learning often show
that, after training, there is

objects to units:

no consistent assignment of individual

the activation value of the units

is

not correlated

with the presence or absence of any particular object in the domain
of

commonsense representable

the local interpretation

Perhaps, even in this case,

objects.

schema can be salvaged,

units represent, not the objects picked out

perhaps, the

for,

by words

in

our natural

language, but objects that are picked out by a very large disjunction.
Is

there a reason to reject such "objects" as genuine, at least to the

extent that representations of

them

participate in mental causal

laws?

For those philosophers

(e.g.,

Grice)

who want

to

use

contentfulness of mental states to ground contentfulness of words

and expressions

between

in

mental

representational

our public language, such a large mismatch

representational
units

units

and

would be unacceptable.

philosophers, mental representation

is

linguistic

For

such

and language has

basic,

evolved as a means to encapsulate the possible mentally
represented items and allow

its

transmission

among minds.

But

then, our public language should have been capable of easily

capturing these mental representational units. This
case.

(In general,

researchers

can

it is

is

clearly not the

only with considerable awkwardness that PDP

encapsulate

the

content

of

a

unit-level

representational state into natural language.) The most obvious

response to the argument against viewing the unit activation values
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as the bearers of causally efficacious mental content of

keen on defending

means

to

this

view

to point out that there are alternative

is

grounding the meaningfulness of words and expressions

our public language.

One such

with Wittgenstein)

to

is

ground meaning

in social practice.

words and expressions takes the punch out of
order to

shore

it

to

representation must argue that the Gricean approach

contender for grounding
imagine

meaning.

linguistic

how such an argument would

Another

I,

The

meaning of

this sort of

such an opponent

up,

in

alternative (most often associated

possibility of such alternative avenues for grounding

In

someone

argument.
unit-level

is

the only

for one, cannot

go.

line of attack against the unit-level representations as

quantified over in mental causal laws view of PDP focusses on the

mismatch between mental processing described
level

in terms of unit-

meaning units and mental processing described

in "stream of

consciousness" reports during (for example) problem solving.

assumption of

this

argument

is

An

that stream of consciousness reports

provide an accurate picture of the causal goings-on in the mind of
the reporter. There are two possible counters to this argument. The
first

involves

questioning

the

assumption that stream of

consciousness reports bear any relation to the actual mental
processing involved in problem solving

One

sees even within the traditionalist

(or,

mentation in general).

framework

(e.g.,

in the

of Freud) a questioning of the reliability of subjective reports.

merely one more step down

this familiar

road

work
It is

to question not only

the reliability of the reports, but also the reliability of the

vocabulary in which the reports are couched.
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A

second approach

to

countering this argument against unit-level representation
harks

back to the equation within PDP (and, within traditionalism
of the

mind with

general

is left as,

PDP needn'

t

a certain type of processing.

as well)

Consciousness in

by-product of mental processing. Thus,

at best, a

take conscious reports as conclusive in this regard.

perhaps strange that there

is

vocabularies, but not decisive.
as reconstructed

by

me

It is

such a mismatch between the two
(As

I

am

not taking the view of PDP

be that unit-level representations are

to

those quantified over in mental laws, both the Gricean complaint and

the disparity with stream of consciousness reports complaint

mounting evidence

constitute

in

favor

of

the

alternative

interpretation schema.)

Neither of the above arguments succeed in knocking out unitlevel representation as a

items.

They

at best

aspects in which

its

contender for mentally causally efficacious

tend to disconfirm this thesis by pointing out

implications are counterintuitive. As the history

of other scientific disciplines (particularly in the 20th century)

makes abundantly

clear,

mere counterintuitiveness

reason to reject a theory.
level representation later.

is

not by

itself

shall return to a consideration of unit-

I

Now, however,

I

would

like to

consider

another set of candidates for the bearers of causally efficacious
representation within PDP:

namely, the pattern-level

Under the rubric of multi-unit
mentioned

possibilities for bearers of

activation values

question

patterns, there are two

in the network.

commonly

meaning: patterns over units'

and patterns over weights.

may encompass one

activities.

The patterns

in

unit, multiple units, or all of the units

Recall in Chapter 3 that, strictly speaking, a
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computational state

the monolithic system state.

is

It is

only under

the assumption that parts of this monolithic state are
causally
isolatable that

it

is

legitimate to speak of the representations of

these parts as being causally efficacious.

A

similar issue crops

up

with respect to the isolatability of parts of the monolithic network
state

(whether of weights or of activation values) within PDP

systems.

Under what assumptions

is

it

legitimate to speak of a

pattern of activation or pattern of weights as a causally efficacious
representational item,

proper subset of
isolatability"

mean

all

when

that pattern

only constituted by a

of the network's units?

in this context?

subset of the network's units
representational content
(2) all

is

is

is

A

What does

"causal

pattern consisting of a proper

causally isolatable

when

(1) its

adverted to in a mental causal law, and

other representational states adverted to in that mental

causal law interact with that subset of states such that the set of
units not a

member

of the subset are irrelevant to the proper

instantiation of the law:

relative to all the

mental causal laws

which that subset partakes, the non-subset members are

Whether there are such causally

isolatable subsets

question which will not be pursued here.
"pattern",

I

mean

When

any such subsets.

to include

If

then "pattern" refers only to monolithic network

note on terminology.

meanings

The attempt

to patterns over

value of a single unit)

many
is

is

I

in

irrelevant.

an empirical
use the word

there are none,

states.

A

further

to assign causally relevant

units (as

opposed

to the activation

referred to in the literature as the

"distributed interpretation schema", in that the contents borne by

PDP networks are distributed over multiple
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units.

Let's

first

examine patterns of weights as potential bearers of

Can a coherent picture of mental causation emerge from

content.

such an assignment? Clearly not, for mental causal laws
mental

states with

relate

one another. The format of mental causal laws

is:

mental-state- 1 causes mental-state-2.52 But patterns of weights do

not cause one another.

In particular,

instantiation of one pattern of weights

another.

So, patterns of weights alone

it is

not the case that the

immediately followed by

is

cannot be the sought-after

bearers of causally relevant content.

Perhaps, then, sense can be

made

of patterns of activation

values as causally efficacious representations.

Here, at least, the

overall format of mental causal laws can be applied to transitions in

patterns of activation during processing:
follow

upon one another from one time

patterns of activation

step to the next. Patterns of

activation as mental states also satisfy the format of the mental

causal laws relating mental states and behavior, for a particular

network output (driving system behavior)

by a pattern of

activation.

So, at least

is

immediately preceded

on

this superficial point,

patterns of activation are contenders for mental statehood. Closer
analysis shows, however, that patterns of activation

mental

states, for the transitions

alone cannot be

between patterns of activation are

law-like only relative to the weight state of the network at the time

of the transition.

On

this point, the traditionalist mindset, with its

notion of mental causal laws encoded in a

static

algorithm governing

52 Mental causal laws can also relate mental states and behavior. do not
bother considering these, as the patterns of weights can already be excluded
as potential causally relevant mental states, because they cannot lit into the
framework of mental causal laws relating one mental state with another.
1
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the

manner

jettisoned.

of manipulation of stored representations, must be

In a

PDP network, there are no

encoded

explicitly

governing manipulation of a distinct group of mental
it

is

the total pattern of the network

(i.e.,

rules

states; rather,

activation values plus

weights) that forces transition to the next pattern. So, the bearers of
causally efficacious content within
activation values

and weights.

implications of this view for

PDP

I

PDP networks
shall look in

as a

are patterns over

more

detail at the

model of the mind

in the next

section.

Before leaving the present section, however,

sum up

the most central points of

A

currently practiced.

my

I

would

like to

examination of PDP as

it is

useful springboard for such a summarization

a consideration of what the separate words within the

name

"parallel distributed processing" entail, especially in light of

PDP's

is

use as a model of the mind. The word "processing" distinguishes PDP
as a particular

way

manner

that (1) has

involves

somehow

of arranging state transitions

many

--

namely, in a

sub-processes going on in parallel, and (2)

the amalgation of each of the individual sub-

processes into a larger unit. In relation to PDP as mental model, the
thesis

is

that the

characteristics.

The

mind

likewise a process with just these

is

"parallelism" refers to the fact that

many

simple

units are operating simultaneously, such that each of these simple

units

has access only to locally available information

information on the state of those units to which
"distributed" nature of

PDP networks describes

it is

connected). The

the usual

manner

interpretation of representational atoms within the network.
distribution of representation

is
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not so

much

(i.e.,

spatial as

it is

of

This

involving

the contribution of
distinction

is

many

important, because, in one sense, representations in

traditionalist systems

distributed

relatively-independent simple units. This

--

representation

implemented on a physical computer are

in space.
is

For example, the

medium

in

which a

stored may, and usually does, involve multiple

individual locations (whether they be multiple physical locations
on

a chip, or, in the extreme case, multiple storage devices).

What

distinguishes the spatial sense of distribution from the one meant

within the context of the
representation

4.4

PDP

as a

is

manipulated as a

PDP

is

I

when PDP

the particular topics

unit, despite its spread-outness.

examine some of the implications of PDP

is

I

s

construed as a model of the mind. Some of

include on this score are: the ramifications of

the mental state as patterns over weights
(still

that, in the former, the

Model of the Mind

In this section,

properties,

title

and

activation values; the

unresolved) issue of local versus distributed interpretation

schemas; and generalization (semantically described) within PDP
networks.

I

end the section and chapter with a description

of

PDP

as

an explanatory model of the mind. What ontological commitments
does

it

make? What

level of reality

efficacious intentional states?
I

is

represented by

What form

its

causally

will its causal laws take?

begin by taking a closer look at the ramification of PDP as a

model of the mind, under the assumption

that the bearers of

causally efficacious content are patterns over weights and activation
values.

Perhaps the simplest way to broach
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this subject

is

by a

quick contrast of this view of mental activity with
that implied by
traditionalism.

Rumelhart and McClelland provide

just

such a

contrast:

In

most

traditionalist] models,

knowledge [ie, a
representation] is stored as a static copy of a pattern.
Retrieval amounts to finding the pattern in long-term
memory and copying it into a buffer or working
memory. There is no real difference between the
stored representation in long-term memory and the
active representation in working memory. In PDP
[ie,

models, though, this is not the case. In these models,
the patterns themselves are not stored. Rather, what
is stored is the connection strengths between units
that allow these patterns to be re-created 53
.

While

the

above-depicted

traditionalism

only one

is

the current set of
scientist),

the two

it

among many (one

programming languages

characterization

of

heavily influenced by

available to the computer

points out by overstatement a basic difference between

modes

distinction

"database”

of processing:

in traditionalism, there

is

a clear

between the rules governing manipulation

of

representations (whether those rules are explicitly or implicitly
stored)

and the representations thus manipulated.

In PDP,

on the

other hand, the two are not clearly distinguishable: one pattern of
activation follows

upon another

as a function of the weights,

encode the potentiality of the production of patterns of

which

activation.

Thus, the particular succession of patterns of activation

determined by the network

itself.

53 Parallel Distributed Processing, Vol

196

I,

One cannot

page 31.

is

therefore view the

network merely as a storage medium for representations,
which,
passive storage

A

useful

medium,

way

is

operated upon by some external process.

of viewing the relative contribution of the

patterns of activation and the patterns of weights

is

in terms of

explicit versus implicit representations; although, as

Section

3, this

way

as

of viewing

it is

argued

in

only approximately correct, as

neither patterns of activation nor patterns of weights are in isolation
constitutive of representations.

In describing the contents of the

mind, we often distinguish between those items that are

explicitly

represented (usually understood as being available to introspection)

versus those that are implicitly represented (only potentially or
latently available to introspection).

PDP

as a

model of the mind tends

As

I

have already mentioned,

to discount the

importance of

(conscious) introspection, yet the implicit/explicit distinction in

representation has survived within PDP in a slightly altered form.
Let

s

look again at what happens during network processing. The

network has a particular pattern of activation instantiated
activation values of

weights.

its

units.

It

in the

also has a particular pattern of

The weights determine the

line of succession (relative to a

sequence of input vectors) of one pattern of activation upon another,

and the pattern of activation instantiated picks out where
line of succession the

pattern of activation

network
is

is

in that

currently located. Thus, the current

explicitly realized in the network,

and the

pattern of weights encodes the information needed to produce the
future patterns of activation:

the future patterns of activation are

implicit in the weights.

only a short step to using the word

It is

197

implicit' to describe the representational status of the
weights.

sees this usage quite often in the

almost

all

knowledge

PDP

One

literature, as in:

representation] is implicit
in the structure of the device [ie, in the connections]
that carries out the task, rather than explicit in the
states of units themselves. Knowledge is not directly
...

accessible to
processor, but

[ie,

interpretation

by some separate
and

built into the processor itself

it is

directly determines the course of processing. It is
acquired through tuning of connections as these are
used in processing, rather than formulated and stored
as declarative facts 54
.

This reworking of the implicit/explicit distinction offers the
possibility for a

smooth union

"directions" of processing with
(i.e.,

in the interpretation of the two

PDP networks: forward processing

the succession of one pattern of activation

backward processing

(i.e.,

learning).

tuning of the weights so as to

upon another) and

Backward processing

is

the

the line of succession of patterns of

fix

activation relative to a sequence of input vectors

to bring

--

about

the succession of the explicit states that instantiate mental causal
laws.

Forward processing

sequence.

This

way

is

then the unfolding of the causal

of putting

it

is still

too simple, because the

processing involved in learning likewise involves mental causal laws.

The picture of mentation

that emerges

description, very different

from that of

PDP, there

is less

is,

at least at this level of

traditionalism. According to

differentiation of the elements of the mental realm

into the static, discrete representations

and the mental algorithm

54 Rumelhart and McClelland, Parallel Distributed Processing Vol.
,

198

I,

pp. 75-76.

that operates
to

upon them. Because

accommodate the learning

element of discreteness

between

static

of the time quantization

rules in current use, there

PDP representations, but

to

needed

and

representations

active

is

an

the distinction

algorithm

has

disappeared. 55

One question

that

I

left

hanging in Section

3

concerned which

of the two interpretation schemas was the correct one

-

is

the local

interpretation schema, which isolates the content at the unit level,
the correct one for identifying the representational states mentioned
in

mental causal laws, or

correct?

I

is

the distributed interpretation schema

should note here that

I

am

using the phrase "local

interpretation schema" in a slightly different

encountered in the

literature.

(I

do

this,

way than

is

not for the mere sake of

perversity, but because "local" versus "distributed" are,

intended as opposites
literature.

so

I

to pair these

must

— whether used by me

I

think,

or within the

However, the standard meaning that has evolved for

"local" in this context

want

usually

jettison

is

not precisely the opposite of "distributed".

two interpretation schemas

off as exact opposites,

one of the two standard usages.

retain "distributed" in

its

I

I

have chosen

to

standard sense and to change that of

"local".)

it certainly lies outside the scope of this work to address the issue of
the possibility of learning within continuously processing PDP networks, it is
interesting to consider its potential ramifications for PDP. In that case,
representational states would not follow upon one another in discrete time
steps (as, for example, the integers follow upon one another when counting),
but rather would flow continuously -- so that no particular representation
could be truly said to follow upon another. In light of PDP s modelling of the
mind, this would translate over into the thesis that for (human) minds,

5 5 While

representations are not discrete, isolatable entities.
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The most often encountered usage
interpretation

schema assumes

that there

of the epithet "local
is

some non-disjunctive

unit level semantic content. Thus, the class of "acceptable"
networks

are those for which the unit level content

restricted

is

to

representations of objects, properties of objects, or microfeatures.

The

first

two types of content are self-explanatory. "Microfeatures",

on the other hand,
level lower

is

used

to describe

an object or property

at a

than that at which commonsense objects or properties

are described.

Thus,

microfeatures

has-a-handle,

M/crofeaturehood

is

is-a-cup

if

is

a property,

it

may have

is-made-of-porcelain,

thus relative to which level

surface or ground level of description.

The

is

etc.

identified as the

restricted class of

PDP

networks for which a local interpretation schema can be given
encompasses the correct mental model, on
As already mentioned in Section
representational content

is

3,

this view.

most PDP networks whose

determined by training

being selected and hand-coded by the researcher)
class.

The unit

Non-disjunctive

(as

fall

opposed

to

outside of this

level represents a disjunctive object or property.

objects

or

properties

only emerge in the

representational states implemented by multiple units.

It is still

possible, however, to identify the unit-level representations as those

implementing mental causal laws. In

this case, the

form

causal laws would be radically different from what

assumed.

I

normally

use the phrase "local interpretation schema" to

encompass both of the above
interpretation

is

of mental

schema

is

correct

if

possibilities.

Thus, the local

the content adverted to in mental

causal laws can be borne only by single units, irrespective of

200

whether that content

is

disjunctive or not.

Section 3 that, under the rubric "pattern",

also

I

wanted

"patterns” encompassing only a single unit.

whether such "patterns" are truly causally
matter. Allowing the

word

fairly

isolatable

to include

an empirical

is

possible non-

all

not) of the units in a network

standard in the literature, and the singletons are

subsets as are those with

in

remarked that

I

"pattern" to range over

empty subsets (both proper and

mentioned

I

more members. The

just as

issue boils

is

much

down

to

whether multiple unit patterns are even potentially the bearers of
content adverted to in mental causal laws: proponents of the local
interpretation schema say "no", whereas proponents of the
distributed interpretation

One point
intuitiveness:

many

over

schema say

"yes".

in favor of the local interpretation

units are easily identifiable

units,

and

schema

labellable.

on the other hand, are harder

is its

Patterns

to isolate for the

purpose of discovering their representational content.

Is

there

anything arguing in favor of the distributed interpretation schema?
Before tackling this question,

more

precise. 56

The word

"spatially extended".
stuff

forming

its

must make the notion of

I

is

ambiguous.

Thus, a content

is

One

of

distributed

if

"distributed"
its

senses

is

the physical

representation occupies more than a point in space.

not very useful, for

physical stuff occupies

Clearly this sense

is

more than a point

in space: all stuff has extension. Using this sense,

all

physically realized representations a la traditionalism are likewise
56 My starting place for this discussion is van Gelder's paper "On Distributed
Representation" in Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. While he makes
many good points on the way to distinguishing "local" and "distributed",
think his final choice of criteria for distributedness relative to FDP networks
misses the mark.
1
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A second

distributed.

van Gelder

sense of "distributed" (the one preferred by

as the sense that best

understood within PDP)

is

how

fits

the term

is

and should be

applicable to a representation

resources (in this case, units) used to realize

it

if

the

likewise participate in

the realization of distinct representations. Thus, a network supports
distributed representation

each of which

is

if

each unit participates in

patterns,

a representation. Alternatively expressed, there

no mutually exclusive partitioning of the
overall set into subsets, each of which

a content, such that
subset.

many

set of units separating the

responsible for representing

representable contents have their

all

Van Gelder

is

calls

this

is

sense of "distributed"

own
"the

superposition of representations".

While the distinction superposable/non-superposable
in that superposability of representations
in

PDP networks,

I

light of the use of

don't think

PDP

as a

it

is

multi-unit patterns.

gets at the heart of the issue, in

model of the mind. Rather,

to contents

Thus,

useful,

a feature often realized

distinguish distributed from non-distributed based

mental causal laws advert

is

the

borne

I

want

to

upon whether

(at least potentially)

by

important sense in which

representations are distributed in PDP networks

is

that the network

models a mental process whose causally interacting items
correspond in the network
of representation
crucial

to multi-unit patterns.

may be an

The superposition

additional feature, but

it is

one in distinguishing the interpretation schema

not the

as local or

distributed.

So now, we can return to the question:
reject the local interpretation
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schema

is

there any reason to

in favor of the distributed

one? In Section

3,

I

mentioned two points of counterintuitiveness

associated with the local interpretation schema.

There

is,

addition, slightly less anecdotal evidence that the (human)

implements
evidence

This

not of a sort to yield an out-and-out disconfirmation of

is

local representation; rather,

it

points to four mental

which follow naturally, without the need
special procedures,

of evidence

the ease with which

is

is

first

piece

generalize. 57 Stated

the application of principles learned from

that a system can generalize
to

for the introduction of

humans

experienced examples to novel examples.

)

phenomena

from distributed representation. The

broadly, generalization

principle^

mind

representations in a distributed fashion.

its

in

is

imply that the choice of

to

be applied makes sense

Usually, though, to say

--

that the system takes into

account the similarities and differences between the previous
examples and

many

novel one, and either chooses the correct

among

principles, or adapts a learned principle in light of these

similarities

many

this

and

units in a

available to

differences.

When

a representation

PDP network, there

is

is

spread over

a natural similarity metric

compare two representations — namely, the distance

between the two vectors forming the representation.
"similarity check" occurs automatically

—

there

outside agent to assign a similarity metric.

is

no need

This
for an

To take a particular

example, suppose that a network has been trained so that on input

speaking, it is not distribution per se, but superposition of
representations that explains ease of generalization. In rejecting van Gelder's
equation of "distributed" and "superposed", was not rejecting the thesis that
superposition is a property had by most mental representations, but rather
the thesis that superposition is the defining feature of distributed
5 "Strictly

I

representation in general.
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II it

produces output Ol, and on input

input

13,

03, and on

Now

04.

14,

presented with a novel input,
outside observer,
similar to 13

and

is

15,

12

it

produces output 02, on

imagine that the network

is

which, from the perspective of an

similar to II

and

14 in other respects,

12

some

in

respects,

but dissimilar to

other inputs on which the network was trained.

all

and

of the

Again, from the

point of view of the external observer, the "reasonable"

way

handling this novel input

similar

in

some repects

similar)

and

extent that

to

is

produce an output, 05, that

to

Ol and 02

similar in

(to the extent that

some respects

03 and 04 are

similar).

"reasonable generalization"

is

just

to

is

of

Ol and 02 are

03 and 04

(again, to the

This high-level description of a

what a PDP network does. The

perceived similarity between two input vectors must somehow be

encoded
similar?).

in the actual vectors (else,

This similarity

is

why would

automatically taken advantage of as the

processing proceeds and the network output
localized interpretation schema, there

Any

generalization that

may

is

If

we

take

computed. With a

is

no automatic

generalization.

take place must be guided by a hand-

coded procedure and/or a hand-coded
representations.

they be called

similarity metric relating

PDP seriously

as a

model of the mind,

generalization within a local interpretation schema requires a

homunculus who can look

at

and appraise the

inputs (and between internal representations).

such a homunculus

assumption

that,

is

not incoherent,

I

am

similarity

between

While the idea of

working under the

other things being equal, an interpretation schema

that does not require the existence of a
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homunculus

to explain a fact

human mentation

about

(namely, that we can generalize)

is

preferable to one that does.

A second

feature of a distributed interpretation schema that

provides evidence that

distributed

fashion

human mental

is

states are

a modified version

implemented
of

the

degradation" property of distributed networks.

network's performance degrades gracefully
individual piece of the network

is

produces a marked decrease

in the

network as a whole.

A

is

so crucial that

in a

"graceful

To say that a
to

its

say that no

loss or

performance

damage

level of the

further aspect of graceful degradation

is

the

gradual decline in performance with the loss or damage of parts of
the system. Clearly, a local interpretation schema does not display
graceful degradation: there

key to the

may

be a unit representing a key object

or property

(i.e.,

that

produces a drastic decline in performance. What about

its

loss

level of

performance of the system) such

the case for a distributed interpretation schema? Here

it

is

important to be clear on what graceful degradation means when
applied to PDP qua mental model.
particular that

PDP

literature

degradation.)
(as

it

does not mean.

is rife
It

pause

make

to note

one thing

this explicit,

in

because the

with this mistaken understanding of graceful

does not

we know from

(I

I

mean

that units are like neurons, in that

empirical investigation) neurons die off every day

without a noticeable decline in intellectual capacity of the individual.
This mixes two distinct understandings of what the PDP project

is

about — namely, modelling the mind versus modelling the brain.

What

I

think the feature of graceful degradation within distributed

representations has as important implication
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is

that representational

content can change in a piecemeal fashion.

thought experiment involving the

am reminded

I

woman who,

of Stich

'

s

over the course of

time, gradually lost the ability to represent President McKinley 58
.

Under

a local interpretation schema, this

representations are atomic and either

inbetween

all

not a possibility:

is

there or

all

absent, with

no

states.

There are two further features of distributed interpretation
that provide evidence in favor of

(human) minds.

The

content-addressable
Content-addressable

of these

first

memory
memory

is

recall a female acquaintance's
(i.e.,

"is this

hypothesized name, which

am

who has

acquainted

question

is

I

that

example, when

So, for

name by

common

am

I

taking advantage of
in this case

use to recall each person with

name, in order

in a distributed network, but

A

try to

female names and ask

The "content"

with great effort in a local schema.

I

the "generate-and-test"

to see

if

the

is

is

the

whom

woman

among them. Content-addressable memory

implemented

in

the ease of implementing

her name?"),

content-addressable memory.

schema present

one in which items can be recalled

think up a bunch of

myself for each one:

is

as the

within a distributed framework.

based upon some part of the item.

procedure

it

is

I

in

easily

implementable only

fourth piece of evidence

pointing to a distributed interpretation schema as that used by

human minds

is

the ease with which both

humans and

networks can create new representations on the
less

emphasis

to

these

latter

fly.

I

distributed

have given

two features of distributed

representation because they present less conclusive evidence in
58 See

From

Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science, pp. 54-56.
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favor of a distributed interpretation schema as the correct one.
think, though,

interpretation

the mind.

in

all

all,

schema

Hence,

that the evidence points against a local

as the correct

I

I

shall

one

in constructing a

model of

from here on assume a distributed

interpretation schema.

One
that

potential objection to a distributed interpretation

would

I

like to

counter goes as follows: doesn

afoul of the locality constraint within

doesn't

it

'

t

this

PDP networks?

implicitly posit an additional entity

who

schema

schema

fall

In particular,

"looking over"

is

the network to gather together the non-local information regarding

which patterns are present? A simple reductio shows the hollowness
of this objection.

Suppose that instantiation of a mental causal law

does require such an external observer to note that a particular
contentful state has been tokened.
state

(Assume that

this contentful

forms the nomologically sufficient condition for some

There

is

in this regard

effect.)

no relevant difference between mental causal

laws and causal laws simpliciter, so there must likewise be an
external observer to note
satisfied, in

the antecedent to a causal law

order for that causal process to ensue. But

Therefore, no external observer

false.

the

when

non-local

representation.

information

is

is

this is clearly

required to gather together

constituting

the

distributed

Therefore, distributed representation per se does

not violate the locality constraint on PDP.
I

end

this section

will surface again in

traditionalism.

The

with an examination of several issues which

Chapter

as points of

question asks:

first

commitments are inherent

5

in
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PDP

as a

comparison with

what ontological

model of the mind? PDP

presupposes a physicalist metaphysics, while also maintaining the
existence of causally efficacious mental states, identified in terms of
their semantic content.

Mental causal laws advert to the content of

these states.

Looking closer at the form that these mental causal laws

we

take,

will

see that the set of possible mental causal laws

constrained by the nature of PDP processing.

If

we

take

is

PDP

seriously as offering a mental model, this translates into the

statement that the manner in which one representational state in a

PDP network can follow upon another
one mental
at all

state

reflects the

can cause another. (Recall that

manner

my

in

analysis

which
is

concerned with what particular mental causal laws there

but rather with what form

is

assumed

by,

and what

not
are,

restrictions are

placed upon mental causal laws in accordance with the framework

provided by either traditionalism or PDP.)

more

detail in

Chapter

5,

where

I

I

will take

up

this topic in

attempt a point-by-point

comparison of the constraints on mental causal laws offered by the
two paradigms.
Finally,

what

level of reality

is

represented by the causally

efficacious mental states according to PDP? As already argued,

I

think that the most promising interpretation schema for use within

PDP

is

the distributed interpretation schema, according to which the

causally efficacious states have non-disjunctive content. While there
is

no argument within PDP

that plays the

implying exactly what level of reality
causally efficacious states as
traditionalism,

we

is

see in the

some general comments on
208

same

role with respect to

represented by these

LOT argument within

this topic are possible.

A

review of the literature quickly confirms the view that PDP does not
differ

much from

traditionalism on this score.

After training,

researchers analyze the network by trying to identify regularities in

among

the succession

internal patterns,

between inputs and internal patterns.

and

in the relationship

The

labels attached to

causally efficacious patterns correspond in most instances to

concepts easily expressed in natural language.
properties.) There are, however,

that have yet to

succumb

many renegade

(Either objects or

trained networks

to this analysis 59 For
.

such networks,

researchers can identify no consistent mapping between causally
efficacious patterns

and such

easily expressible concepts

--

yet, the

networks succeed in achieving a high level of performance
task at hand.

I

am

One can assume
complex,

it

not quite sure what to

that such a

mapping

have mental

states

of such networks.

exists, but,

has not yet been discovered.

this as a sign that a full-blown

make

because

is

it is

likewise not

easily expressible in natural

language.

59 The most famous example

is

the mine identifier system of

Sejnowski.
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so

Contrarily, one can take

model of the mind may

whose content

at the

Gorman and

CHAPTER

5

ARE THE TRADITIONALIST AND PDP MODELS
QUALITATIVELY DISTINCT?

In this concluding chapter,
tasks.

First,

I

I

have

before myself several

develop a general framework for comparing two

models of a domain. This framework
specifies criteria to

addressed in the

is

general in the sense that

it

be used in judging qualitative distinctness,

irrespective of the particular

One

set

domain being modelled. This

topic

is

first section.

often hears

PDP referred

to as a

"new paradigm"

for

understanding mental phenomena, and the transition within
cognitive science (at least, with respect to emphasis in professional

meetings and journals) from the traditional to the PDP model of the

mind

as a

"paradigm switch" or "revolution" within the

allusions to

Kuhn's theory

consider the questions: Can
as

field.

of scientific change have led

we understand

traditionalism

The

me

to

and PDP

forming the kernel of disparate paradigms, and are they

incommensurable?

doing

so,

I

I

examine

highlight

this issue in the

the

between

differences

"incommensurability" (a concept which

is,

second section.

I

In

Kuhn's

think, never fully

developed in his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions) and

my

"qualitative distinctness".

One famous exchange
literature

(see

in

the traditionalism versus

PDP

Smolensky's "On the Proper Treatment of

Connectionism" and Fodor and Pylyshyn's "Connectionism and
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Cognitive Architecture:

bears attention.

I

A

Critical Analysis") that addresses this topic

therefore devote Section 3 to a summarization of

the views of these two opposing camps. While they are suggestive,

I

believe that the arguments put forward by both sets of authors

(indeed, by

all

of the authors

short of the mark.

As

I

who have

written on this topic)

fall

have already repeatedly mentioned, the

construal of one object (or object-type) as an explanatory model of

another

When

possible only in the context of a theory of causation.

is

such an articulated theory

assumed or because

tacitly

is

it

is

absent (whether because

it is

wholly lacking), the analysis of

something's modelhood as well as the comparison of models

becomes highly problematic.
fail to

In

each of the above cases, the authors

provide the necessary causal theoretic background.
In Section

discussion

is

4

consider issues relating to computability. This

I

included to thwart the superficially plausible argument

that traditionalism

and PDP

as

models of the mind must be

distinct,

because the two corresponding abstract machines (namely, the

computer and PDP networks)
Finally, in Section 5

traditionalist
Briefly,

my

I

differ in their

give

my

answer

computational power.
to the question:

and PDP models of the mind

Are the

qualitatively distinct?

argument takes the following form. While both models

describe the mental level, and both

commitments, there

is

make

similar ontological

no possible isomorphism between the web of

causal laws permitted within the constraints of the respective

models. Hence, the two are qualitatively
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distinct.

5.1

What

is

Qualitative Distinctness?

As remarked above, one often meets in the literature
surrounding the traditionalism versus PDP debate the assertion that
the two

camps are proposing

distinct theories of the mind.

Unfortunately, these assertions are usually
generality, because they are

made

worked-out explication of what
distinct.

As we

it

left at

outside the context of any

means

shall see in Section 2,

the level of vague

for two theories to be

even Kuhn

fails to give

more

than the briefest of sketches in describing what criteria distinguish
genuinely incommensurable theories from those that merely differ
with respect to adopted vocabulary.

own

set of criteria for use in

In this section,

I

propose

my

determining whether two theories are

qualitatively distinct.

Before beginning that task,

I

pause to give reasons for

my

choice of the descriptor "qualitatively distinct". Scientific theories

can be distinct in
if

many

ways. For example, two theories are distinct

they make differing predictions about future events given the

same

initial conditions.

reflect

This divergence in and of

itself

need not

an underlying qualitative distinctness between the two

theories, for such divergence can result
differ in respect of

some value

if

the two theories merely

of a parameter.

the divergence in prediction that results

To be more

specific,

when two otherwise

identical theories of relativistic mechanics differ with respect to
their values for the speed of light (say, 2.9x10*17*

m/s versus

3.0x10*17* m/s) does not constitute a qualitative difference

between the two theories.
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Similarly,

two theories that make

identical predictions (about both observable
states of the system), given the

qualitatively distinct, even

and

may

In the

qualitative

1
.

states quantified over

by

above two respects,

my

its

causal laws

application of

much from Kuhn's

does not differ

distinctness

incommensurability.

conditions are not

initial

though the vocabulary that each employs

to identify the objects

differ radically

same

and non-observable

For him, two formulations do not constitute

incommensurable paradigms either when one

is

a mere quantitative

refinement of the other, or when the two formulations support a

ready translation between themselves.

I

do

"incommensurability" for several reasons.
clearly defined in his work.

however,

my work

could view

I

specification of his own.

"incommensurability"

is

this

If

First,

were

adopt his

the notion

my

unjustified

--

"shall be".

I

some
I

of

(unlike

(rationally defensible) reasons

one paradigm over another. Note here

rather weak "can be" over the

and

reason for rejecting his

the baggage that comes along with that term. In particular,

for preferring

never

only objection,

desire to distance myself from

Kuhn) do believe that there can be

is

as a natural extension

A more important

my

not, however,

much

stronger

—

my use

of the

and,

think,

I

think that for Kuhn, even the "can be"

is

too strong. While he explicitly rejected the accusation that his view

into trouble with anyone who rejects the
possibility of a theory-neutral language of description. However, as will
become clear later in this section, I mean here to exclude from the extension
of the set of obviously qualitatively distinct pairs of theories only those pairs
permitting the most superficial mappings between their respective

Whis statement

will get

me

terminologies.
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of science turns
still,

it

and

into a "subjective"

a consequence of his view

is

that

"irrational"?

any attempt

at

enterprise^

arguing for one

against another of two incommensurable paradigms will be
necessarily circular

.

4

I

have much more

shall

to say

on Kuhn's

"incommensurability" in the next section.

On my
aspects:

use of the term, qualitative distinctness takes in two

respective ontological

commitment and

respective

decomposition of phenomena into causal sequences. In posing the
question "what ontological commitments are
theory?",

I

am

made by

presupposing that that theory takes a

towards the objects and states quantified over in
this

question

transformed

is

assumption that

this

its

a particular

realist stance

causal laws. So,

"what things must

exist

on the

theory correctly subdivides the world

(or, at

into:

least a level of causal interaction within the
later) into its causally efficacious parts?"

world

Answering

--

more on

this

question

in general a very difficult task, for several different reasons.

most obvious

is

commitments on

that theories do not
their shirt-sleeves:

this
is

The

wear their ontological

rarely does a researcher or

theoretician give explicit declarations regarding what assumptions

are

and are not being made within a

Smith remarks,
is

not a

this

tendency toward silence on the part of

examining
commitment, it

1

As Newtonscientists

new phenomenon:
In

2

scientific theory.

theories for ontological
will not usually be such a trivial matter.
scientific

think he meant "arational".

^See especially his Postscript to the second edition
Scientific Revolutions, pp. 191-198.
4 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, page 94.
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of

/Tie

Structure of

For instance, it remains as controversial today as it was
at the time for Leibniz and Newton whether theories of
time carry a commitment to the existence of moments of
time over and above collections of events 5
.

In performing

an analysis of the ontological commitments made by a

must do some

particular theory, therefore, one

A second
commitments

interpolation.

source of difficulty in teasing out ontological

when

(particularly relevant

an inter-theory comparison)

is

the aim of this analysis

that objects

and/or their

is

states that

are hypothesized within one theory to be causally efficacious entities

qua singletons may appear
unit.

in the other theory only as

In the latter case, only the unit

efficacious.

committed
denying

In this case,

that singleton entity plus

(i.e.,

the other singleton entities with which

one part of a

it is

conjoined)

is

causally

would one say that both theories are

to the existence of that entity?

this is that the latter

I

think not.

My reason

for

theory does not recognize the singleton

alone causally efficacious, even though the terminology

as

standardly used by practitioners of that theory have a word that
(This

picks out that singleton.

is

particularly prevalent

when

the

theory that has the singleton being causally efficacious in isolation of
other facts about the world temporally precedes the theory that has
the singleton being one part of the true causally efficacious entity

7

The
of

classic

example of the

whether Newtonian

difficulty

(classical)

mechanics are both committed

5 Newton-Smith,

to

is

provided by a consideration

and Einsteinian

mass

(relativistic)

as a causally efficacious

The Rationality of Science, page 38.

215

.)

A problem

property.^

arises because the

most

intuitive construal of

"mass" as used by Newtonians equates to "rest mass" in the
terminology of Einsteinians, but rest mass

is

not alone the causally

efficacious property within that latter theory.

Rather,

it

the

is

conjunction of the rest mass of an object and a measure of the
velocity of that object relative to the speed of light that
efficacious.
"rest

Setting aside for the

moment

is

causally

the fact that the phrase

mass" was never used within Newtonian mechanics, would we

still

want

to say that

rest

mass

as a causally efficacious property? As noted above,

answer

is

rest mass,

A

"no":

both theories are committed to the reality of

Newtonian mechanics

but Einsteinian mechanics

is

is

committed

my

to the reality of

not.

third source of difficulty in comparing the ontological

commitments of two theories
employed within both theories

is

that, while the

to pick out

same word

an object,

many

is

of the

causal interactions in which the object can participate according to

one theory are not recognized by the other, and vice
in point

is

committed

determining the import of the sentence:
to the existence of light"

versa.
"this

when made with

corpuscular versus a wave theory of

light.

Clearly,

A

case

theory

is

reference to a

many

of the

properties possessible by light in the one theory are not recognized

by the

other.

committed

Does

this

mean

that the two theories are ontologically

to different things

--

namely, light-qua-particle for the

corpuscular theory and light-qua-wave for the wave theory?
so, for

I

think

the causal efficacy of the two "types" of light differ. For the

terms of the causal efficacy of objects and states, this is the same as
asking whether both theories recognize "having-mass-x" as a causally
relevant state of an object.

6 Put in
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wave theory (but not

for the corpuscular theory), light

something having a particular wavelength:
wavelength-x

is

beam

a state of a

must

exist as

the state of having-

of light that

must

exist if the

wave

theory correctly describes the world. In a sense, the above example

shows the

difficulty of teasing apart the ontological

commitment

aspect of a theory from the set of causal laws propounded by a

wave theory

theory: the

committed

is

to light-qua-wave

causal laws mention possible states of light

presuppose that

it is

(e.g., its

because

its

wavelength) that

a wave.

Choosing an example closer

to the

theme of

this

whether the ontological commitments made by Freud

'

work, consider
s

psychological

theory and by folk psychology prior to Freud are the same. What

must

exist

if

the former

is

a true depiction of the world? Clearly,

mental agents with various attitudes
representations must

exist.

The causally

efficacious items are the

conjunction of representational content plus attitude.
belief that

I

will receive a raise

the desire that

I

towards

(beliefs, desires, etc.)

(Thus, the

has a distinct causal efficacy from

will receive a raise,

causal efficacy from the desire that

I

which

in turn has a distinct

eat French fries.) This

uncontroversially shared with folk psychology.

A

much

is

possible point of

divergence crops up in considering whether the fact that some of
these causally efficacious states are unconscious for the Freudian
theorist adds something

new

to the

ontology of Freudian theory not

found in folk psychology. (Note: Although

on Freudian theory,

I

am assuming

I

am

certainly

that the unconscious itself

metaphorically causally efficacious within that theory:
causally efficacious are beliefs, desires,
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no expert

etc.,

some

is

only

what are

of which are

unconscious. For a fuller discussion, see the section "Freud and the
Unconscious", in The Construction of Reality by Arbib and Hesse, pp.
114-117.) This boils

down

to the question:

does Freudian theory

recognize unconscious-beliefs, unconscious-desires,
entities

(vis-a-vis

causal

conscious-desires, etc.?

I

relevance)

etc., as distinct

from conscious-beliefs,

don't think a definitive answer can be

given, because Freudian theory

is

not a monolithic theory, but rather

a group of schools of thought.

The version of Freudian theory

presented by the school most

at

home

with cognitive psychologists

does not give unconscious mental states a distinct

status.

The case

is

perhaps otherwise for other schools within the broad Freudian
tradition

-- I

just

of ontological

don'

know. The question concerning distinctness

t

commitment

rival theories are folk

makes no place

is

much more

clear-cut

when

psychology and behaviorism.

the two

The

latter

for the causal relevance of beliefs, desires, or

other representational

states;

hence, the two theories

make

any

differing

ontological commitments.

A second

aspect of qualitative distinctness involves sameness

of causal interaction across the two theories.

This aspect

is

in a

sense secondary to that of ontological commitment, for

presupposes sameness of ontological commitment.

Where two

theories have well worked-out sets of causal laws, this comparison

(conceptually, at least) straightforward.

and

states referred to in

and

states in the other.

First,

it

is

pair off the objects

one theory with the corresponding objects
(Again,

I

reemphasize that

this step is

predicated on the existence of a correlation between the causally
efficacious objects

and

states posited
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by the two

theories.)

One can

think of causation as a relation over sets of
states. So, for example,
the causal law that says

and

a, 5,

a&b&c causes d&e relates

c to the set containing

d and

Now, the two theories are

e.

distinct with respect to causal interaction

defined by the one

the set containing

listing of causal laws

when

is

the relation thus

not isomorphic to the

other listing under the mapping equating the causally
efficacious
objects

and

and

states in the

one theory with the corresponding objects

states in the other.

This version of distinctness
are looking for, as

example,

it

it is

is,

however, not exactly what we

too quick to label two theories as distinct. For

labels as distinct two versions of relativistic mechanics

that differ only in their respective approximations of the speed of
light.

A

This,

I

think, slices the world of scientific theories too finely.

coarser slicing (one more befitting the epithet "qualitative")

requires

some additional

In particular,

distinctions within each respective theory.

each theory would group

its

causally efficacious states

into relatively quantitatively similar sets.

The two

theories are

qualitatively distinct with respect to causal interaction
relation defined

by the

listing of causal

laws

is

when

the

not isomorphic to the

other listing under the mapping using the coarser grained sets of
quantitatively similar objects and states.

There are two points

note on this refined version of distinctness.

First,

it

fails

to

to

distinguish between two theories that differ only in non-qualitative

ways.

This

is

more than an empty

truism, for the ultimate

determiner of what differences are quantitative and what
differences are qualitative

is

relative to the two theories being

compared. By specifying the quantitatively similar groupings, each
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theory implicitly says:
parameters

will

"any theory that keeps within these

me

be viewed by

as the qualitatively

same

theory."

Secondly, this understanding of qualitative distinctness
can
distinguish theories that differ in quantitative ways,
where those

quantitative differences constitute qualitative differences.

example, a

relativistic

theory of mechanics that allows particles

(whether massive or not)
speed of

light

may

For

to travel

above

its

approximation of the

be judged as qualitatively distinct with respect

to

causal interaction from one that disallows such fast moving particles
relative to

its

approximation of the speed of

quantitative" difference of

1

m/ s, when

Thus, the "mere

light.

that difference occurs at the

cusp separating sub-light from supra-light speeds,

may

constitute a

qualitative difference.

my method

The above characterization of

for determining

qualitative distinctness with respect to causal interaction requires a

general remark.

For those theories wherein the cardinality of the

set of causally efficacious objects
set of real

My

states

numbers, the problem of the

the causal laws crops up:
laws,

and

how can you

response

is

to

if

you can

'

t

is

equal to that of the

inability to

enumerate

enumerate

all

all

of

of the causal

possibly compare the one listing with the other?

shrug

my

shoulders and note that

my

method,

while conceptually straightforward, presents some difficulties in
implementation.

Considering

my method

in light of the task at

hand (namely,

comparing the theories presented by traditionalism and PDP,

to be

discussed in Section 5) points to another potential problem:

both

theories are too

young

to

have a well worked-out
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set of causal laws.

In particular, the

model driving the theory

in each case

such as to place constraints on the possible causal laws,
dictate particular causal laws.

have

to

Thus, in applying

my

it

merely

is

does not

method,

I

will

examine, not whether the two causal relations permit an

isomorphism, but whether the constraints placed on the possible
causal relations leave

the

open the

possibility of

two theories are qualitatively

an isomorphism.

distinct.

This

If

lack

not,

of

conclusiveness (in that the failure to discover the impossibility of a
possible isomorphism does not entail that the two theories are not
qualitatively distinct

not-p

)

is

—

tolerable, for

my

spurred

failure to prove that

my

interest in

accusation that PDP

is

over-arching goal

just the

with some updated vocabulary
to

be performed in Section

subject

this

5

and

of

my method

to characterize the

-

is

involves whether the
(i.e.,

traditionalism)

At a minimum, the analysis

true.

should

settle that question.
I

pause to give a high-level

for determining qualitative distinctness,

two (grossly described) "flavors" in which

The

qualitative distinctness comes.

first

stage of testing for

qualitative distinctness involves asking the question:

theories

make

the same ontological commitments?"

"no", then the matter
distinct.

If,

is

that

the question that has

same old thing

Before leaving this section,

summary

-

p does not imply

settled:

however, the answer

If

"do the two
the answer

is

the two theories are qualitatively
is

"yes", then

one must continue

the analysis to include a consideration of the causal interactions

posited by the respective theories.
distinct

When

the two are qualitatively

with respect to causal interaction,
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then they are

qualitatively distinct, simpliciter.

Otherwise, they are qualitatively

indistinct.

Described

comes

in

two

at a

high level of abstraction, qualitative distinctness

"flavors":

The

(2) different levels.

the latter flavor

is

(1)

same

level but

no or

little

overlap,

and

qualitative distinctness of two theories in

perhaps easiest

to see, for the level of reality

(viewing the world as a quasi-hierarchy of causally interacting
objects

and

states)

encompassed by each

quantum mechanics
current

two

(or,

more

Consider current

differs.

precisely, consider

quantum mechanics) and modern

one version of

cellular biology.

scientific theories are clearly qualitatively distinct,

commitments are

ontological

respective theories.
cells,

membranes, and

committed
there

Modern

is

because the

so radically different in the two

cellular biological laws quantify over

their states. Thus,

modem

to the existence of these objects

no mention whatsoever

modern quantum mechanics.
disciplines

These

cellular biology

and

of these objects

states.

and

is

However,

states within

In general, disparate scientific

have qualitatively distinct theories;

this distinctness is

reflective of differences with respect to ontological

commitment

within the two theories.

What, though, of the case in which

it is

two theories are describing different levels of

not obvious that the

reality, either

because

the two do indeed describe the same level, or because there

is

disagreement among the proponents of one or both theories with
respect to the level of reality being described? (This latter
possibility

is

particularly relevant to the issue at

lack of consensus within

PDP regarding what
222

hand

their

in light of the

model

is

a model

of.)

Returning to the previous example of the corpuscular versus

wave theory

we

of light,

which the two theories do

see a case in

describe the same level of reality (namely, the behavior of

they share

little

common

in

commitments or causal

in

yet

terms of either ontological

The

interactions.

overthrow of one theory by another within a
this

light),

classic

example of the

scientific discipline fits

mold. Those proponents of PDP who are fond of describing their

model of the mind

as a

new paradigm

usually have such an

understanding of the relationship between traditionalism and PDP.

5.2

Kuhn's Theory and the Relationship between
Traditionalism and PDP

Such references

to the

terminology in Thomas Kuhn's The

Structure of Scientific Revolutions leads
questions.

Is

revolution

the usage appropriate:
pitting

traditionalism

is

me

naturally to ask several

psychology in the midst of a

against

PDP? Also,

"qualitative distinctness" just his "incommensurability"?

If

is

not,

my
what

are the points of divergence between the two?

Kuhn

lays

out the typical development of a scientific

revolution as seen in historical case studies of transitions that, in
retrospect, are clear instances of

particular discipline

is

paradigm changes.

First,

a

united around a single paradigm in the

process of doing normal science.

Practitioners in the field are

occupied with fleshing out some aspects of the paradigm not yet
results not predicted

by the

fully concrete

and solving puzzles

paradigm

currently stands) within the context of the paradigm.

If

as

it

a sufficient

number

(i.e.,

of puzzles prove to be recalcitrant with
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respect to being explained with the (perhaps slightly modified
version of the) paradigm, a

crisis situation

thus explainable are called "anomalies

among some

of the

members

younger ones, who have

".)

develops.

There

is

(Puzzles not

growing discontent

of that discipline, particularly the

less stake in the

maintenance of the old

paradigm, leading eventually to the feeling among some members
that the "existing

paradigm has ceased

to function

adequately in the

exploration of an aspect of nature to which that paradigm

previously led the

around a

rival

way ." 7 Eventually

itself

had

the discontented group congeal

paradigm, and the battle for allegiance within the

previously unified group commences. The allegiance centers around

three sorts of commitments that a scientist derives from her

paradigm:

and temporary, though

not unchanging
characteristics of science, are the higher level, quasimetaphysical commitments [which follow from the
acceptance of a paradigm] that historical study so
regularly displays. ... That nest of commitments
proved to be both metaphysical and methodological.
As metaphysical, it told scientists what sorts of
entities the universe did and did not contain. ... As
methodological, it told them what ultimate laws and
fundamental explanations must be like. ... More
Less local

paradigm] told scientists what
of their research problems should be 8

importantly

many

The two

rival

still

[a

.

paradigms are not only incompatible (they must

on some of their predictions,
forward in response
7
8

still

The Structure of
The Structure of

to

and

in that the

as supplying

page 92.
Scientific Revolutions, page 41.
Scientific Revolutions,
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new paradigm

differ
is

put

an explanation of the

results that

but

may

were anomalous within the context of the old paradigm),
also

be

incommensurability into

incommensurable.
its

Kuhn

breaks

three aspects:

"[T]he proponents of competing paradigms will
often disagree about the list of problems that any
candidate for paradigm must resolve.
Their
standards or their definitions of science are not the
(i)

same ." 9
"Since new paradigms are bom from old ones,
they ordinarily incorporate much of the vocabulary
and apparatus, both conceptual and manipulative,
that the traditional paradigm had previously
employed. But they seldom employ these borrowed
elements in quite the traditional way. Within the
new paradigm, old terms, concepts, and experiments
fall into new relationships one with the other. The
inevitable result is what we must call ...
a
(ii)

misunderstanding between the two competing
schools ." 10
(iii)
"[Most fundamental:] the proponents of
competing paradigms practice their trades in

different worlds ." 11

This incommensurability between paradigms makes rational
discourse concerning the relative merits of the two paradigms
impossible.

Members

"talking past"

of the opposing

camps often find themselves

one another, because the meanings of the terms that

they use are paradigm-relative, and because "they cannot
to a neutral

...

resort

language which both use in the same way." 1 - Arguments

for or against a particular

paradigm must be persuasive (rather than

9

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, page 148.
10 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, page 149.
11 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, page 150.
12 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, page 201.
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As enough of the members of the

rational) in nature.

field

come

to

adopt the challenger paradigm (either because people are actually
persuaded, or because the scientists
older paradigm die

off),

who remain committed

the challenger attains the role of accepted

paradigm and normal science commences within that
albeit

to the

field again,

around a new paradigm.

Kuhn

describes the process by which an individual scientist

becomes committed

to the

new paradigm

as akin to the gestalt

switch that occurs in the oft-cited duck/rabbit picture:

quantum experience not

further decomposable into substages.

it

is

a

Kuhn

describes the transition from a field in crisis to the field again
unified around a

new paradigm

as:

a reconstruction of the field from new fundamentals,
a reconstruction that changes some of the field s most
elementary theoretical generalizations as well as
many of its paradigm methods and applications. ...
When the transition is complete, the profession will
have changed its view of the field, its methods, and
its goals. One perceptive historian, viewing a classic
case of a science s reorientation by paradigm change,
recently described it as "picking up the other end of
the stick," a process that involves "handling the same
bundle of data as before, but placing them in a new
system of relations with one another by giving them
'

'

a different frame ." 13

With

this

description of the Kuhnian view of scientific

revolution in hand,
state

13

we can consider

the question:

is

the current

within cognitive science one of crisis/revolution, with

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, page 84-85. Quote from
The Origins of Modern Science, 1300-1800, pp. 1-/.

Butterfield's
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H.

traditionalism as the old paradigm and

approach

PDP

My

as the challenger?

in the next several pages will be to give
a depiction of the

emergence and development of PDP within cognitive science
as sympathetic as possible to the view that takes

paradigm within that

PDP

that

as a

is

new

(As already hinted at previously, this

field.

view predominates among PDP researchers themselves, whereas
the
prevailing view

science

is

among adherers

not in a

to traditionalism is that cognitive

crisis situation,

and the puzzles

that are not yet

explainable within the framework of traditionalism

will,

with

further research, eventually succumb.)

Traditionalism came to dominate psychology after the

overthrow of behaviorism.

normal

scientific

its

it,

presuppositions

(in

last

can be seen in researchers' acceptance

as

commitments,

ontological

(1)

was the accepted paradigm, and the

phase of research within psychology during the

30 years or so assumed
of

It

(2)

methodological

form that causal laws and causal

the

explanations within psychology would take) and (3) depiction of the
sorts of

phenomena

to explain.

that a theory within psychology should be able

Thus, the work of psychologists during this time period

consisted in fleshing out the particulars within the traditionalist

framework

(e.g.,

performing experiments

to

determine what the

individual mental causal laws are) and making minor adjustments

within

the

framework

order to

in

solve

the

outstanding

psychological puzzles.

Many

puzzles did indeed prove to be explainable within

traditionalism; however,
recalcitrant.

Some

many remained

of the

(and continue to remain)

anomalous mental phenomena have
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already been described in Chapter

One such example

4.

inability of traditionalism to explain

memory

is

how

content-addressable

achieved in the mind, given empirical data on access time

required to recover a particular item.

psychology (particularly the newer ones
just

the

is

Some researchers within
to the field,

who

either

completed their professional training or had

just

gained an

interest in psychology after

work

in

some other

field

- most

had

often,

neuroscience or computer science) began placing more emphasis on
the failures of traditionalism

The "youth

successes.

apparent, and
the older

is

(i.e.,

factor"

the anomalies) than on

among converts

to

PDP

is

its

quite

explained by the fact that part of the reluctance of

members

of the psychological

community

traditionalism relates to their professional

paradigm. They continue to see only puzzles

commitment
to

up on

to give

to that

be solved within the

framework of traditionalism, whereas the younger generation

much more

willing to

phenomena

as "anomalies"

brand the

and

"as yet not explained"

is

mental

to reject traditionalism as itself

inadequate. These discontents have by and large congealed around

PDP

as a rival for the allegiance of psychologists.

At a minimum,

they contend, PDP can explain what has heretofore remained
unexplained within traditionalism:

[PDP holds] out the hope of offering computationally
sufficient and psychologically accurate mechanistic
accounts of the phenomena of human cognition which
have eluded successful explication in conventional
computational formalisms [ie, traditionalism]. 14

14 Rumelhart

and McClelland,

Parallel Distributed Processing,
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page 11.

One can

see in

some

of the debates that have occurred

between adherents of traditionalism and adherents of PDP the

tell-

tale signs of

The

clearest

incommensurability between the two theories.

example of

PDP systems are

this is the denial that the sorts of

particularly

good

at solving are

problems that

even within the

purview of psychology. Thus, we see Fodor and Pylyshyn (the truest
of believers in traditionalism) unintentionally illustrating this very

aspect of the

crisis situation

within psychology today in their denial

PDP qua model

of the successes of

of the mind:

We

have, in short, no objection at all to [PDP]
networks as potential implementation models, nor do
we suppose that any of the arguments we've given
are incompatible with this proposal. The trouble is,
however, that if connectionists do want their models
to be construed this way, then they will have to
radically alter their practice. For, it seems utterly
clear that most of the connectionist models that have
been proposed must be construed as theories of
cognition, not as theories of implementation. This
follows from the fact that it is intrinsic to these
theories to ascribe representational content to the
units (and/or aggregates) that they postulate. And,
as we remarked at the beginning, a theory of the
relations among representational states is ipso facto a
theory at the level of cognition, not at the level of

has been the burden of our
argument that when construed as a cognitive theory,
rather than as an implementation theory,
connectionism appears to have fatal limitations. The
problem with connectionist models is that all the
reasons for thinking that they might be true are
reasons for thinking that they couldn t be
psychology 15

implementation.

It

.

15 "Connectionism
italics

and Cognitive Archtitecture: A

added.
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Critical Analysis",

page 66,

Similarly,

some

terminology often seen within

of the

traditionalism has been retained within PDP, but with a different

meaning.
likely

A

case in point

noted

this in

is

the

Chapter

word

4.

"representation".

While the broad definition of

"representation" as "one thing that stands in for another"

many

is

retained,

of the particular defining features of representations change

from traditionalism
in the

The reader

to PDP.

This, in turn, produces radical changes

very notion of what processing representations means. For

example, RumelharT and McClelland note that for traditionalism:

[t]here is no real difference between the stored
representation in long-term memory and the active
representation in working memory. In PDP models,
though, this is not the case. In these models, the
patterns themselves are not stored. Rather, what is
stored is the connection strengths between units that
allow these patterns to be re-created. 16

The implication of
processing

is

this

view of representation for cognitive

that:

no longer a matter
of finding the relevant information in memory and
bringing it to bear; it is part and parcel of the
[u]sing

knowledge

processing

in processing

itself. 17

16 Parallel Distributed Processing, page 31.
17 Parallel Distributed Processing, page 32.
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is

Also, the relevance of

some previous experiments within psychology

has been reevaluated within PDP. Again, Rumelhart and
McClelland

make

this point explicitly.

[TJhese same mechanisms [associated with PDP]
exhibit emergent properties which lead to novel
interpretations of phenomena which have
traditionally been interp retted in other ways 18
.

One way

of describing the advent of

new way

of picking out

parts) the

and

slicing

PDP

up

is

(into

as provider of a
its

causally efficacious

mental world, such that the very notion of "mental" has

been transformed.

Two

quotes, again from Rumelhart and

McClelland, bear proof of this transformation.

[PDP has] radically altered the way we think about
the time-course of processing, the nature of
representation,

and the mechanisms of learning

19
.

And
This

whole

is

a profound difference between our approach

and other more conventional approaches,
means that almost all knowledge is implicit

for it
in the
structure of the device that carries out the task
rather than explicit in the states of units themselves.

Knowledge is not directly accessible to interpretation
by some separate processor, but it is built into the
processor itself and directly determines the course of
acquired through tuning of
processing.
It is

18 Parallel Distributed Processing, page 13.
19 Parallel Distributed Processing, page 13.
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s

connections as these are used in processing, rather
than formulated and stored as declarative facts 20
.

One
is

interesting aspect of the traditionalism versus

that, while

some participants

proponents of PDP)
scientific revolution

in the

PDP debate

debate (most noteably,

relish seeing their theory as a challenger in a

sweeping over psychology, and often use Kuhn'

terminology in describing their theory as a new paradigm they just
,

as often fail to take note of

some

of

Kuhn

'

s

other remarks concerning

the evolution of science. In particular, they

fail to

notice several key

aspects of his view of scientific revolution with respect to the nature
of discourse between the proponents of the two clashing theories.

Thus, one often finds in the PDP literature an attempt at arguing that

PDP

is

(objectively considered) the better of the two theories at

explaining psychological phenomena. This

flies

in the face of

Kuhn

s

assertion that rational discourse on the relative merits of two

incommensurable paradigms

is

impossible:

argumentation for or against a paradigm

is

to the extent that

possible,

it

will

be

persuasive (rather than rational) in nature. Thus, the adoption of a

Kuhnian construal of

their situation undercuts a second important

working premise of the most vocal PDP enthusiasts: namely, that
their theory

is

the best.

This sketch of the history of the rise of PDP-as-challenger-

paradigm leaves us
Certainly

it is

still

premature

in the midst of a crisis within psychology.
to say either that

PDP has become the new

paradigm around which future normal science within psychology

20 Parallel Distributed Processing, pp. 75-76.

232

will

work or

eased

by

that a crisis-like mentality within psychology has been

the

solution

of

some

potentially

counterexamples to traditionalism. Thus,

whether the

members

final stage of the revolution

of the psychological

it is still

(i.e.,

anomalous

too early to say

the congregation of the

community around PDP,

as a result of

either persuasion or a dying-off of the traditionalist generation) will

be reached. Clearly,

it is

paradigm change

eventually occur

will

the movement), as

is

the view of

illustrated

some PDP adherents

that this

(or, at least, that it is

a goal of

by the following:

We

wish to replace the "computer metaphor" as a
model of the mind with the "brain metaphor" as

model of mind

With respect

21
.

to the "gestalt switch"

predicted by Kuhn, not
aspect of

Kuhn

'

s

all

theory.

between paradigms

first-hand accounts lend support to this

For example, Rumelhart and McClelland

describe their piecemeal acceptance of PDP as a model of the mind.

seem more and more attractive to
us as the contrast between our convictions about
basic characteristics of human perception, memory,
language, and thought and the accepted formal tools
for capturing mental processes became more

The idea began

apparent

.

to

22

Interestingly, the gestalt switch aspect of a
level of the individual researcher

is

21 Parallel Distributed Processing, page 75.

22 Parallel Distributed Processing, page
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ix.

paradigm change

at the

highly contested within the

literature that has

Revolutions.

grown out of The Structure of

Some authors maintain

Scientific

that, as historical fact,

it is

mistaken. For example:

The

world view associated with paradigm
changes are likened to the sort of gestalt switch one
may have when, having first seen the notorious
duck-rabbit as a duck, one suddenly sees it as a
rabbit. By and large this analogy is absurdly farfetched.
For few of us had anything like this
dramatic shift of attitude when, having learned
Newtonian mechanics in school, we came slowly and
perhaps painfully to appreciate the greater virtues of
Einsteinian mechanics 23
shift in

.

Newton-Smith continues on

phenomenon,

if

true,

Even Kuhn, in some of
gestalt type

to

argue that such a gestalt switch

would undercut some of Kuhn's own
his

examples

phenomenon on

,

24 contradicts his prediction of a

the part of scientists. Thus, the lack of

concurrence within the PDP literature on

Hopefully,

the

theses.

above

this point is

not surprising.

description

of

Kuhn's

"incommensurability", both in general and as potentially applicable
to the situation relating traditionalism

and PDP

as

competing

theories, has given the reader a better understanding of

Kuhnian may

a

try to interpret the import of "qualitative distinctness",

particularly as applied to traditionalism

contrast

how

that

with

distinctness", both as

my own
an aid

and PDP.

interpretation

I

would

of

to seeing the differences

"qualitative

between

23 W. H. Newton-Smith, The Rationality of Science, page 118.
24 See especially his description of the Priestley/Lavoisier debate. /Tie
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pages 54-56.
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like to

my

view and Kuhn's, and, more importantly, as an aid
better understanding of

begin by noting that

my

"qualitative distinctness", simpliciter.

Kuhn never

when two

hints) for deciding

to gaining a

gives

any hard

criteria (or

have been

ones in which, in retrospect,

major

clear that a

it is

has occurred.

matter at the level of generality

It is

at

at

hand

I

need concrete

competing theories. Lacking such

my

part

to

historical

shift

within a

not sufficient to leave the

which he speaks.

characterization of incommensurability

purpose

even

theories are incommensurable. All of

his case studies describing incommensurability

scientific discipline

I

is

certainly fruitful, for the

criteria for

criteria,

While his

it is

comparison of two

not even an option on

compare traditionalism and PDP

for

possible

incommensurability.
It

may even

be argued that

my

setting

up of

criteria for cross-

theoretic comparison refutes the claim that they are indeed

incommensurable
2:>

.

25

However

this

may

be,

it is

clear that

my

views

do not want

to turn this section into a commentary on The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions, but a few words on one of the more contentious aspects
of that work are in order. The most straightforward reading of the first
edition would have Kuhn disallowing the very possibility of cross-theoretic
I

comparisons, when those two theories are incommensurable. (1 henceforth
call this the "strong incommensurability thesis".) According to this view,
there can never be any such comparison, because there is no neutral
language within which to perform the comparison. Thus, my posing of the
question: "does traditionalism make the same ontological commitments as
PDP?" in the process of deciding qualitative distinctness is illegitimate, for it
assumes the existence of something (namely, a neutral language) which does
not exist. In his Postscript (added to the second edition as a response to many
criticisms of the first edition), however, he seems to take back this strong
incommensurability thesis and replace it with something else. What that
something else is is not quite clear, but his statements regarding the
possibility of inter-theoretic translation (see page 202.) show that it cannot be
think the most generous reading is
the strong incommensurability thesis.
that incommensurability a la the second edition is merely the claim that
arguments in favor of one theory against another will inevitably be merely
persuasive in nature, as they will use as premises comparison measures based
on aesthetic considerations (eg, simplicity).
I
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(both those stated in this chapter and in the
remainder of this work)
are at odds with those of Kuhn.

and strength

criteria as not

In particular,

I

interpret simplicity

merely aesthetic", but as providing the

basis for the truth or falsity of causal laws.

My

combination of a

Lewisian version of lawhood with a realist construal of
causation

(admittedly unorthodox, but not,

with

Kuhn

s

relativism,

possibility of rational
I

I

think, inconsistent)

is

odds

at

which explains our differing views on the

arguments for one theory against another. As

have already often mentioned,

I

am

not in the least here concerned

with a comparison of the relative merits of traditionalism and PDP,
so

I

5.3

shall not

develop

this point of

divergence further.

Some Answers Given by Others

Most

often, the subject

versus PDP debate

is

under discussion

in the traditionalism

not whether the two are qualitatively distinct,

but rather which of the two provides the best explanation for mental

phenomena. Such arguments obviously presuppose some
distinctness between the two theories; else,

than the other?

Whether the

qualitative distinctness

examine what

is

is

how

could one be better

distinctness presupposed

another matter.

perhaps the most famous

sort of

In this section,

is

my

I

shall

(or, at least, the

most

often cited) exchange in the debate between Fodor and Pylyshyn
(representing traditionalism) and Smolensky (representing PDP) as
to the relative merits of the

much

two theories.

My

focus will not be so

empirical evidence cited for or against either theory, but

rather the assumptions

(both implicit and explicit)
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in

the

argumentation of each

set of

authors with respect to the qualitative

distinctness of traditionalism

and PDP.

I

shall also

mention some of

the other positions vis-a-vis qualitative distinctness found in the
literature.
I

begin with Smolensky's treatment of the relationship

between traditionalism and PDP. Smolensky
start that the

A

two theories are

set of

hypotheses

states right

from the

distinct:

formulated for a connectionist
These hypotheses
are shown to be incompatible with the hypotheses
underlying traditional cognitive models. 26

approach

is

to cognitive modeling.

And:

of cognitive analysis adopted by the
subsymbolic paradigm [ie, PDP] for formulating
connectionist models is lower than the level
traditionally adopted by the symbolic paradigm. 27
...the level

What remains

to be

done

to

is

understand the specific points of

departure between the two theories, and to examine whether his

notion of distinctness

is

the same as or entails qualitative

distinctness.

The remark
levels

in the

is telling, for,

second quote concerning a difference in

as noted in Section

1,

a difference in levels

is

evidence for a difference in ontological commitment with respect to
the causally relevant entities.

The

issue

is

not so clear, however, for

26 "On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism", page
27 "On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism”, page
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1.

3.

Smolensky
of the

is

not always so consistent in identifying the PDP model

mind with

analysis of

the unit-level (as opposed to the pattern-level) of

PDP systems.

identifications, his

I

If

we

take the second quotation as

and consider PDP systems

representative,

on either of the two

view results in a qualitative distinctness between

traditionalism and PDP.

analysis as the

think, though, that

model of the mind

to

at the unit-level of

be associated with the PDP

paradigm, then the two paradigms are qualitatively
postulate distinct causally efficacious entities.

distinct, for

they

This follows from

three premises that he makes, either explicitly of implicitly:

PDP systems, the only exceptionless laws are
be found at the level of changes of states in

(1) In

to

individual units.
(2) The representational content of individual units
not that of concepts.

committed

is

the causal
efficaciousness of entities that bear content at the
conceptual level.
(3)

Traditionalism

He sums up the conclusion

is

to

of this line of reasoning:

Does the complete formal account of cognition lie at
the conceptual level? The position taken by the
No -- it lies at the
subsymbolic paradigm is:
subconceptual

There

are,

level. 28

however, passages in which he implies that

the level of analysis of patterns of activation within
that the official

PDP model

of the

mind

is

to

on

PDP networks

be found. This "tension"

28"On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism", page
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it is

7.

is

his thinking has a clear source;

of analysis of

PDP networks

is

namely, the fear that the unit-level

not a model of the

mind

,

for the laws

governing transitions among unit states do not advert to meaning.

He

states this himself:

subsymbols [the units of representation of individual
units]
are not operated upon by symbol
manipulation: they participate in numerical - not
symbolic — computation 29
.

If

one takes

this

quotation in

its

unit level laws are only syntactic
as adverting to the

Thus, he

is

strongest interpretation

- they do not admit

meaning of unit

on occasion driven

states)

then

(i.e.,

that

of a construal

this fear

is

justified.

to considering the level of analysis of

patterns of activation (which he allows represent concepts) as the

model of the mind supplied by PDP. Even on
is

qualitatively distinct

make

the

this interpretation,

PDP

from traditionalism. Even though the two

same ontological commitments

causally efficacious objects

and

vis-a-vis

what the mentally

states are (namely,

symbols with

conceptual level content), the laws describing state transitions

will

be different. According to traditionalism, the mental causal laws are
precisely formalizable and computable; whereas, according to

Smolensky:

[Typically, interactions at the level of patterns of
activity, which, under this intrepretation, would be

the mental causally relevant entities,] can be
computed only approximately. In other words, there
will generally be no precisely valid, complete,

29 "On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism", page
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3.

computable formal principles at the conceptual level;
such principles exist only at the level of individual
units -- the subconceptual level. 30

There
considers.

is

a third construal of

PDP

that

Smolensky never

He never examines whether sense can be made

of the

unit-level interaction as adverting to content; rather, as stated

above, he assumes that unit-level laws governing transitions

between activation values are only syntactic
semantic counterpart).
the pattern level

is

I

(i.e.,

they admit of no

think, though, that his limiting of content to

unnecessarily restrictive, and shows a

common

misunderstanding in the role played by meaning in structuring
causal laws.

Smolensky, along with
that, if causal laws adverting

are available to explain

all

many

others,

makes the assumption

only to syntactic features of a system

syntactic transitions within the system,

then semantic considerations (for example, the semantic properties

possessed by that same system) must be causally
according to this

way

inert.

Thus,

of thinking, because a complete description of

unit-level activity can be given in syntactic terms alone,

laws at the unit-level exist.

My view,

that his assumption results

as

made

no semantic

clear in Chapter 2,

is

from an incorrect construal of the

counterfactual testing for causal relevance of semantic properties.

Smolensky (and others) who

right

from the

start

deny causal

relevance to semantic properties at the unit-level, misinterpret the

antecedent to the counterfactual;

30 "On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism", page
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6.

If

the system were not in a state with this
particular
meaning, then this other state would not

(unit-level)

follow.

as:

Hold everything else constant

(e.g., the system
architecture, the items presented to the system
during the learning phase, and the weights learned
during the previous cycles of the system), but
stipulate that the unit state has a different meaning

rather than

(my preferred

interpretation of

it):

Hold the system architecture constant, but allow the
past to vary so that the system is not in a state with
this (unit-level) meaning ...

The weights acquired during the learning

cycle govern transitions

between activation values, but the learning cycle

(in particular, the

inputs received from the environment and the changes in weights
that result

from application of the learning

rules as a function of the

reinforcement signal), and, hence, the weights, would have been
different

had the environment been

different.

I

am

taking seriously

the theory of representation presented in Chapter 4, whereby the

(Type

III)

representational content of a state

causal role that

it

is

determined by the

acquires in mediating the causal sequence

between the presence of an object and the production of behavior
appropriate to that object. Had the object during the learning phase
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been something other than

was, the causal sequence connecting

it

registration of the presence of that object

and object-appropriate

behavior would have been different; hence, the system that resulted

would be syntactically
different).

different (because the weights

we would not expect

So,

counterfactual world to remain as

Smolensky

'

s

analysis of

PDP

behavior in this

the

was in the actual world.

it

quick dismissal of a unit-level construal of PDP as

provider of a model of the mind

Chapter

are, as stated in

would be

as a

4,

thus seen to be premature. There

is

other reasons for rejecting the unit-level

model of the mind; although, these reasons are

based more on empirical considerations than on an analysis of what
content-adverting causation could possible mean.

The

schema view

local interpretation

qualitatively distinct

from traditionalism,

relevant entity on this view of the

that

is

recognized

not

traditionalism.

as

mind

alone

of

clearly

is

presumed causally

as the

is

PDP

a singleton (subconcept)

causally

within

relevant

Rather, traditionalism recognizes only conceptual-

level states as efficacious.

The most consistent position

(although he nowhere does so explicitly)

mind presupposes
ontological

is

PDP

that

PDP are the same

of

However,

PDP

implementation of traditionalism

by Fodor and Pylyshyn),

for

it is

is

not

model of the

as

schema -

a distributed interpretation

commitments

traditionalism.

Smolensky could take

that

in

(a charge that

as

general

we

thus, the

those of
a

shall see

the rare case in which

mere

made

PDP systems

admit of exceptionless transitions between patterns of activation
(and,

on

a

semantic

level,

242

between

traditionalism-like

representational states). The second half of this position reinforces
the relevance of the unit-level analysis to

mind, in

PDP

as a

model of the

qua explanatory model, the actual causal laws

that,

governing mental state transitions must be not merely simulated but

implemented, along with their concommitant
This genuine implementation

the unit-level

-

not as

is

itself

ceteris paribus clauses.

possible only

if

the model includes

providing the mentally causally

relevant representations (a la the local interpretation schema), but
as

implementing the true mental causal laws

The second of the two works

31

that have set the tone in the

PDP debate

traditionalism versus

.

is

Fodor and Pylyshyn's

"Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture:

A

Critical Analysis".

As

already mentioned, these authors are also of the opinion that
traditionalism

and PDP are

distinct, as is

demonstrated by the

following quote from the introductory section of that paper.

When

taken as a way of modeling cognitive
architecture, Connectionism really does represent an
quite different from that of the
Classical cognitive science [traditionalism] that it
seeks to replace 32

approach that

is

.

The major burden
to

show

that,

if

that Fodor

PDP

is

other than the mind.
passage.

and Pylyshyn assume

a (true) model of anything,

One can

in this
it is

paper

is

something

see this in a previously-quoted

Their reasons for arguing in favor of

this

PDP-as-

31 For a more thorough discussion of this topic, see my unpublished draft On
the Necessity of Including the Implementation Level in a Model of the Mind".
32 "Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis", page 4.
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implementation view are that mental activity displays certain
regularities

Fodor

s

(summarized

in that paper, but

fully

developed in

The Language of Thought) which PDP, when interpreted

model of the mind, cannot
shall look at parts of the

whether

more

it

is

laying

explain.

In Section

LOT argument

down

in

some

4 of this chapter,

detail, in

I

considering

principles of mental processing

necessary conditions), or merely citing empirical evidence
instances of mental processing that

as a

(i.e.,

(i.e.,

the

we have heretofore encountered

possess these properties, but there might be, in theory, a being
lacking one or several of these properties

who

nevertheless has a

mind). 33

The LOT argument describes
causal sequences.

certain conditions

had by mental

So, for example, the systematicity of

thought

condition stipulates that the possession of certain mental states
implies the ability to possess certain other mental states. The causal

structure of the

mind ensures

this systematicity.

components of certain mentally causally

In particular, the

efficacious representations

are themselves causally efficacious, and the causal role of the

complex representations are somehow a function of the causal
of the constituents.

The

certain representations

is

effect of this combinatorial structure of

the above-mentioned systematicity. Fodor

and Pylyshyn then ask the question: "are the causally
states postulated

by PDP

efficacious

similarly structured, so as to ensure

systematicity (and the other conditions of the
33

role

LOT argument)?" They

readers of this work are already
can omit a
sufficiently familiar with the oft-reproduced LOT' argument that
full summarization of it here. In the process of arguing that it is citing
empirical evidence relevant to, but not laying down necessary conditions for,
mental processing in Section 4, shall be summarizing parts of it.
I

think

it is

safe to

assume

that

all

1

I
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answer:

"no":

occasions

when they do

result of

an underlying combinatorially-structured syntax and

such regularities within PDP systems, on those

semantics. Does this
this

obtain,

mean

would be merely

accidental, not the

that traditionalism (which does possess

combinatorial structure) and PDP are qualitatively distinct? The

answer

is,

I

think, not so clear.

Fodor and Pylyshyn

s

preferred

view would answer "yes", for the two models imply divergent
mental causal laws (and, hence, divergent causal sequences ). 34

There

is

also a

way

of interpreting the

yields a less unequivocal answer.

phenomena

that the

LOT

If it

really

is

LOT argument

that

a principle of mental

conditions hold, then perhaps a PDP system

34 Fodor and Pylyshyn give a somewhat confused account on this
matter, for
they want to distinguish the merely causal relations among representations

from their structural

relations, as in:

"Connectionist theories acknowledge only causal connectedness as a primitive
among nodes; when you know how activation and inhibition flow
among them, you know every thing there is to know' about how the nodes in a
network are related. By contrast, Classical theories acknowledge not only
causal relations among the semantically evaluable objects that they posit, but
also a range of structural relations, of which constituency is paradigmatic."
("Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis", page 12.)

relation

How'ever, it is not clear how such structural relations can make a difference if
they are not in some way realized in the causal relations among
representations. The whole point of the LOT argument is that certain
observable mental phenomena are explained by these structural relations;
but, in order to be observ able mental phenomena, these relations must make a
difference in the causal relations among the representations. It is not clear,
therefore, what the structural relations are above and beyond restrictions on
the mental causal laws. Indeed, in many of their examples illustrating the
difference between traditionalist and connectionist models, they describe the
ramifications of combinatorial structure solely in terms of restrictions on the
set of

mental causal laws, as

in:

Classical machine. This machine has a tape on which it writes
the expressions that can appear on this tape are: "A", "B",
"A&C&D" ... etc. The machine' s causal constitution is as
"C&D",
"D",
"C",
"A&B",
of the form P&Q. appears on the tape, the machine
token
whenever
a
follows:
form
P. An inference from A&B to A thus corresponds to
writes a token of the

"Now consider a

expressions.

Among

a tokening of type "A&B" on the tape causing a tokening of type "A"."
("Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis", pp. 15-16.)
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will

be forced

to

develop a structure consistent with these conditions

during the learning process. Fodor and Pylyshyn have no argument
(indeed,

none

PDP systems

possible) that

is

are disbarred from

evolving during learning into systems displaying
conditions. Furthermore,

if

all

of the

LOT

these conditions constitute a part of the

set of conditions operative in the

development of a Type

(learned) representational system, then the fact that the

displays these regularities would not be

and Pylyshyn never consider

III

PDP system

mere coincidence. Fodor
they assume that such

this possibility:

conditions, in order to be non-contingent, must be "built-into” the

structure of the model, rather than resulting from the learning
process.

And, they argue, any PDP system with such a

combinatorial

structure

is

above and beyond an

nothing

implementation of a traditionalist model.
in Section 4,

more

when

I

shall return to this topic

I

examine the nature of the LOT conditions

in

detail.

A second burden
that

"built-in"

PDP

is

of Fodor

and Pylyshyn

s

paper

is

to

argue

best understood as a (non-mental) model of the

implementation of the mind:
successful in explaining certain

to the extent that

phenomena,

granted on the assumption that

it is

its

PDP has been

success can only be

not a model of the mind, but

rather a model of the subprocesses (none of which involve mental
causal laws) that implement the mind. As

when two models
traditionalist

have argued previously,

explain distinct levels of reality (in this case, the

model explains the mental

implementing

I

level,

qualitatively distinct.

level

and the PDP model the

according to Fodor and Pylyshyn), they are

The

ontological
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commitments of traditionalism

5

include states picked out by their representational content, whereas

(on this view) the ontological commitments of PDP include no such
things.

There

is

a third alternative position on the relationship

between traditionalism and PDP.

It

states that the

mind cannot be

wholly explained by either of the two models; rather, PDP explains

one subset of mental phenomena, traditionalism explains a
subset,

and there

is

no reduction between the two

Smolensky and Fodor and Pylyshyn suggest
in

distinct

subsets.

Both

this as a possibility, but,

each case, the subset of mental phenomena that "the other" model

explains

is

vanishingly small. For example, Fodor and Pylyshyn say:

be that [PDP] networks sustain some
cognitive processes. A good bet might be that they
sustain such processes as can be analyzed as the
drawing of statistical inferences. ... Since we doubt
that much of cognitive processing does consist of
analyzing statistical relations, this would be quite a
modest estimate of the prospects for network theory
compared to what the Connectionists themselves
have been offering 35
It

could

still

.

Smolensky

perhaps a

is

traditionalist

bit

more generous

in allowing that the

model explains mental phenomena dealing with novice

problem solving
explicit rules).

(i.e.,

that characterized as the conscious following of

However, neither

set of

authors wants to grant much.

More ecumenically-minded authors are Robert van Gulick 3() and

"Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis page G8.
3 ^See, for example, his commentary on Smolensky s article "On the Proper
Treatment of Connectionism", pp. 57-58.
3

,
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Woodfield and MortorD 7 who suggest the possibility that
,

fairly large

expanses of mental phenomena are explained by traditionalism
and

PDP,

respectively.

(Smolensky refers

to

version

this

of

ecumenicalism as "cohabitation".)

The question then
distinct

on

this

theories that

follows, are the two

view? Note that this

we have already met

is

models qualitatively

similar to a comparison of

in this chapter:

between the corpuscular and wave theories of
time earlier in this century

when

light .* 8

s

There was a

physicists interpretted the two

theories not as competing, but as cohabitating.

theory

namely, that

purview included optical phenomena

in

The corpuscular
which the energy

packet nature of light and the states mentioned in quantifying

this

nature were causally efficacious, whereas the wave theory's

purview included those phenomena
were causally

in

which the wave properties

Thus, while both theories attempted to

efficacious.

explain the same level of reality, they were not competing to explain
the

same phenomena. This

different domain) held

traditionalism versus

is

just the

view

(albeit,

with respect to a

by the cohabitation proponents

PDP debate.

in the

As already argued, the

corpuscular and wave theories are qualitatively distinct.

An

analogous argument can be given for the qualitative distinctness of

* 7 Also part of

commentary on Smolensky's

article,

page 58.

^Usually, when one speaks of the corpuscular versus wave theories, one
means the two competing paradigms in optics in the early 19th century: the
Newtonian theory and the (newer) wave theory (not clearly identifiable with
mean the cohabitating
a single name). In the above passage, however,
theories within optics just before the development of the photon-as-quantummechanical-entity theory of light. During this period, it was common to
consider neither corpuscular nor wave theory as alone encompassing all
optical phenomena; rather, some phenomena were explainable by means of
the corpuscular theory, and other phenomena by the wave theory.
3

I

248

traditionalism

and PDP on the cohabitation view:

by the very

supposition that the two theories cover distinct ranges of

phenomena, there must be some causally relevant property
properties that split the overall set of cognitive
subsets, such that those

phenomena

phenomena

or

into two

explainable by traditionalism

have that property or properties and those explainable by PDP do
not,

and

vice versa.

Thus, the ontological commitments of the two

The end

theories differ.

effect of the differences are clearly

when considering whether

identifiable

isomorphism between causal
theory range

must

is

be), there

maintained

laws. 39

(as, in

If

there

is

effects

a consistent cohabitation view,

can be no isomorphism;

mentioned

in the other.

To

cite

in the

for,

phenomena

traditionalism.

make use
in

of

by the very supposition

a concrete example,

is

possible.

to

put

it

is

common among

memory

storage and

within the range of PDP, and outside the range of

Thus, while traditionalist mental causal laws

remembered

mind

the

is

it

one theory would never be mentioned

proponents of the cohabitation view
access

possible

the strict exclusivity of

of distinct ranges, no isomorphism of causal sequences

The

a

may

items, the actual retrieval of those items

not within

traditionalism's

purview.

So,

traditionalism would postulate no causal law, the "effect-side" of

which

is

the recalling-of-x.

"effect side" of a

PDP causal

This could, however, appear on the
law.

Where a

correlate of an effect

39 As noted, sameness of ontological commitment is conceptually prior to
isomorphism of causal laws; however, as the ontological commitment of a
theory becomes clear only on an analysis of the objects and states quantified
over in its causal laws, the two characteristics are not independent.
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postulated by one theory

is

wholly absent from the other, there can

be no isomorphism.
This concludes this discussion of the views concerning
the
qualitative distinctness

We

literature.

exemplified.

between traditionalism and PDP found

in the

have seen the two flavors of qualitative distinctness
Both Smolensky and Fodor and Pylyshyn admit

readings in which they are describing different levels of reality (for

Smolensky,

this is the less preferred interpretation of his view,

whereas for Fodor and Pylyshyn,

the

it is

more

preferred).

The

other readings of Smolensky, Fodor and Pylyshyn, as well as the

cohabitationists
distinctness, for

have

little

and give

represent

the

other

my answer to

5,

I

will

Before tackling this issue, though,

of

I

qualitative

been

put

my neck

level,

but

on the

line

this question.

5.4 Issues Concerning Computability
(Plus, the LOT Argument)

which

of

which the two theories describe the same

or no overlap. In Section

topic that has

flavor

and Computation

I

feel obliged to discuss a

oft discussed in the literature, the

treatment of

believe shows a widespread misunderstanding of the nature

computation — and,

in

particular,

what distinguishes

computational processes from non-computational processes.

form

in

which one most often meets

versus PDP debate

this topic in the traditionalism

is:

My

preferred model [proponents on both sides of
this debate make use of the argument form] is
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The

superior as a model of the mind, because it can
compute function-x; whereas, your model cannot. 40

Thus, a traditionalist might mention some Turing-computable
function and hint that no PDP network could realize

from what

I

said in Chapter 4, Section

guaranteed to be unsound, for

PDP network can

that a

it

has been

(in theory)

Turing-computable function.

that

compute. This error
functions

is

is

As follows

such an argument

known

is

since the 1940s

be constructed to instantiate any

One

PDP

also sees the reverse:

proponents saying that their model

compute functions

1,

it.

is

superior because

it

can

no traditionalist-type machine could

particularly glaring, as the set of computable

determined by the

set of

Turing-computable functions.

(This assumes a construal of Church's Thesis as a quasi-analytic

statement

--

reader

free to disagree with this construal.

is

to

be computable

is

to

be Turing-computable.

however, ameliorate the errorfulness of referring

The

This does not,
to the processes

within PDP systems as computational.)

Both

these

of

lines

of

argument

show

the

same

misunderstanding, in that both presuppose that what PDP systems

do

is

to

compute. This

instantiate functions.

is,

however, not the case; rather, PDP systems

The misunderstanding

the current state of technology,
digital

computers;

so,

it

is

PDP systems must be simulated on

perhaps natural

systems compute their functions.

40 Obviouslv, this

is

arises because, given

to

assume that PDP

(Interestingly, though,

premised on function-x'

s

no one

being a cognitively relevant

a function realized in cognitive agents. Arguments for this
suppressed premise are, however, usually lacking.

function

--

ie,
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would make the analogous mistake of saying

that a real spring/mass

system whose state transitions are being simulated on a

computer therefore computes
Chapter

its

state transitions.)

digital

Looking back

and the definition of a computational process

3

computational process

is

one

in

which

to

a

(i.e.,

(1) the representational states

being manipulated are explicitly stored, and (2) the program that
refers to

and transforms these

corresponds to formal rules

states

governing the manner of manipulation), one sees that the second
condition

is

not satisfied.

In

PDP systems, there

is

no

distinct

program governing the manipulation of representational
rather, the representational states

states;

activation values + weights)

(i.e.,

"include" the "program".

One very

interesting thesis

mentioned by proponents of PDP

is

that their systems can instantiate functions that are not computable.

Whether any particular one
significance to

PDP

as a

model of the mind

The only attempt I've seen
clearly cognitive

of these non-computable functions
is still

is

of

an open question.

in the literature to isolate a particular,

phenomenon 41

41 The emphasis

that does not correspond to a

is meant to make clear that
wish to exclude Rumelhart and
"On Learning the Past Tenses of English Verbs", which is
sometimes cited as a provider of an argument that there is a cognitive
function that is not computable. But, as the authors themselves state: " ... we
suggest that the mechanisms that process language and make judgments of
grammaticality are constructed in such a way that their performance is
characterizable by rules, but that the rules themselves are not written in
also
explicit form anywhere in the mechanism." (Page 217, italics added.)
Dreyfus,
for
they
writings
of
Dreyfus
and
wish to exclude the various
nowhere cite particular psychological evidence that some cognitive
phenomenon does not correspond to a computable function. In any event,
they are not proponents of PDP as have laid it out in Chapter 4, for they
explicitly deny causal relevance to meaning. Also excluded are the recent
apparently do not
admit,
writings of Roger Penrose, whose arguments,
understand. And, like Dreyfus and Dreyfus, he is in any case no supporter of
PDP as a model of the mind.

McClelland

I

s

I

I

I
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1

computable function
their

is

due

to

Cummins and Schwarz

.

42

example of such a cognitive phenomenon (behavior

However,
relating to

clothing) remains purely anecdotal.

Perhaps, even under the assumption that no individual non-

Turing computable function

PDP does not engage

that

in

is

cognitively necessary, the

computation

the two theories qualitatively distinct.

is

sufficient to

This

is,

ambitious interpretation of Fodor and Pylyshyn
charge against PDP, that
right because

it

it is

not getting

it (i.e.,

I

mere

pronounce

think, the
s

fact

most

intent in their

modelling the mind)

does not presuppose that mental processes are

computational in nature. Their LOT argument can be summarized as
follows:

Human mental phenomena

properties

(i.e.,

display certain pervasive

productivity, systematicity of representation,

compositionality of representation, and systematicity of inference).

These properties are explainable only on the assumption that mental

processing

consists

of

rule-governed

manipulation

on

representations in a combinatorially structured language of thought
-- ie,

this

that mental processing consists of computation.

argument

in several different forms.

One version

They couch

is:

But we are not claiming that you can't reconcile a
Connectionist architecture with an adequate theory
of mental representation (specifically with a
combinatorial syntax and semantics for mental
representations). On the contrary, of course you can:
All that's required is that you use your network to
implement a Turing machine, and specify a
combinatorial structure for its computational
What it appears that you can't do,
language.
42 See "Connectionism, Computation, and Cognition", in Connectionism and the
Philosophy of Mind, edited by Horgan and Tienson.
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however,

have

is

representational

both a combinatorial
system and a Connectionist

architecture at the cognitive level 43
.

Thus, they attempt a transcendental proof (in the Kantian sense) of
the computational nature of the mind.

If

their proof goes through,

then the non-computationality of PDP processes would make
qualitatively distinct

from traditionalism.

it

In this case,

it

would be a

condition on any explanatory model of the mind that

it

instantiate

all

mental functions computationally:

mental causal laws would

quantify necessarily only over computational

states.

While the thought of proving such a strong result might bring
glee to

LOT
all

Fodor and Pylyshyn, their actual supporting argument for the

falls

very far short of establishing any such thing. As

that they have

done

is

to

have

positing

a

One way

certain

type

traditionalism). Thus, the

as

of

mental

as:

They tend

is

by

(namely,

architecture

whole LOT argument argument

There are passages, such

it,

even they would admit, not

of explaining these properties

"inference to the best explanation".
point.

read

listed several properties possessed

by mental phenomena (although,
universally so).

I

is

to waffle

a sort of

on

this

"The traditional argument has

been that these features of cognition [systematicity,

etc.] are,

on the

one hand, pervasive and, on the other hand, explicable only on the
assumption that mental representations have internal structure ," 44
as well as passages suggesting a

more modest

43 "Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture:
44 "Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture:
italics added.
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A
A

proposal, such as: "But

Critical Analysis

,

Critical Analysis

,

page 28.
page 33,

if

this

explanation [linking systematicity with the existence
of

combinatorial structure]
others

on

offer),

and there

is

right (and there

a language of thought."^

is

don't seem

to

be any

then mental representations have internal structure

interpretation of the

mental states

is

LOT argument,

On

this

more reasonable

the computational nature of

not causally relevant, so no qualitative distinctness

based on differences in ontological commitment can be traced back
to the

non-computational nature of the causally efficacious

states in

PDP systems.
Perhaps, though, one could argue that there could be no
possible isomorphism between the causal laws in the two theories

because, whereas the traditionalist laws would satisfy those
properties (systematicity,

PDP laws would

not.

etc.)

identified in the

LOT argument,

the

This seems to be, however, a bit premature

without an accompanying argument that the PDP laws as resulting

from the learning process would not possess
Fodor and Pylyshyn consider

PDP

just these properties 46

this possibility as a

to traditionalism, but then reject

.

way

of reconciling

it:

possible to imagine a Connectionist being
prepared to admit that while systematicity doesn t
follow from — and hence is not explained by Connectionist architecture, it is nonetheless
compatible with that architecture. It is, after all,
perfectly possible to follow a policy of building
It

s

4 5"Connectionism

and Cognitive Architecture: A

Critical Analysis",

pages 39-

40. Note in particular the weakness of claim implicit in this passage.
46 Yet another topic for future research is the ability of multi-layered PDP
networks to develop a connectivity pattern (perhaps generalizing from
presented examples in which both P&Q. and P are true, to the universally
quantified x&y->x) that produces a system meeting the conditions identified
the LOT argument.
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in

networks that have aR b nodes only if they have bRa
nodes ... etc. There is therefore nothing to stop a
Connectionist from stipulating — as an independent
postulate of his theory of mind -- that all biologically
instantiated networks, are, de facto, systematic. ...
[However], it s not enough for a Connectionist to
agree that all minds are systematic; he must also
explain how nature contrives to produce only
systematic minds. Presumably there would have to
be some sort of mechanism, over and above the ones
that Connectionism per se posits, the functioning of
which insures the systematicity of biologically
instantiated networks. ... There are, however, no
proposals for such a mechanism. Or, rather, there is
just one:

This
that

is

Classical architecture 47

...

.

the closest that Fodor and Pylyshyn ever

PDP

produce a

will certainly

to those of traditionalism

because

the above-mentioned conditions.
at

come

set of causal laws
its

to arguing

non-isomorphic

laws will not necessarily reflect

However,

recall that, for the case

hand, one cannot speak of the specific mental laws associated with

either traditionalism or

Hence, the

test for

test for possible

PDP because they have yet

to

be formulated.

isomorphism, simpliciter, must be weakened to a

isomorphism:

are the two sets of laws possibly

isomorphic? Lacking a proof that the mental causal laws that
result in

will

PDP systems necessarily display non-systematicity, Fodor

and Pylyshyn
traditionalism

s

LOT argument does not supply evidence

and PDP are

that

qualitatively distinct.

47 "Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture:
Italics as in original.
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A

Critical Analysis",

page 50.

5.5 Are Traditionalism

I

and PDP Qualitatively

Distinct?

have repeatedly stated and reiterate here (more for

—

benefit than for that of the reader

my

myself of

I

must constantly remind

wander too

goal so as not to

my own

far afield) that

am

I

performing a conceptual analysis and comparison, not a comparison
of the empirical

adequacy of either traditionalism or PDP

of the mind.

My

distinctness

settled; the relative merits of the

is

job

topic for another day.

my answer to
My
of

done

model

soon as the issue of qualitative

as

So, finally,

we reach

two theories

the point where

I

is

a

give

this question.

starting

assumption

mind.

the

is

as a

While

is

that

many

PDP

is

put forward as a model

researchers

(predominantly

neurobiologists) use PDP-type networks to model neural processes,
to

assume

leaving

this

little

view decides the issue of qualitative distinctness

room

for a philosophically-interesting discussion. Even

on the other view, though, there are several ways of interpreting the
relationship between the processes modelled by traditionalism and

those modelled by PDP. The outline of this section

is

as follows.

I

describe each of these (three) alternatives, and consider the
question:

are the two models qualitatively distinct under this

interpretation? As the first alternative has already been discussed in

Section

3,

the first

and the second

and third

treatment to these.

alternative

alternative,
I

I

is,

in a sense, a special case of

shall give a rather abbreviated

concentrate on the third alternative, which

think, the alternative that correctly depicts the relationship
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is, I

between

traditionalism

and PDP.

I

argue

two models are qualitatively

We have

that,

under

this interpretation, the

distinct.

already met

the

first

relationship between traditionalism and

interpretation

PDP

PDP

is

an implementation of traditionalism

or at least supervenient relation

is

assumed

According
(so,

to this

some reductive

to hold), yet both are

models of the mind, because both posit mental causal laws
causal laws that pick out states based

(i.e.,

their representational

This corresponds to the reading of Smolensky that

content).

identifies the
first,

upon

the

in Section 3 of this

chapter on the possible readings of Smolensky.
view,

of

mental causal laws with unit

level state transitions. At

the very idea of two models explaining the same causal realm

(namely, that realm whose laws advert to content), one of which

an implementation of the other, may seem ludicrous

--

after

is

all,

there can be at most one level describing mental phenomena. Hence,

two models assumed

to describe distinct levels

The summary dismissal of

models of the mind.
however, premature
incoherent).

(at least,

it is

premature

Perhaps the mental realm

is

is

it

view

is,

as being

causally "fat", in that
distinct levels.

If

having difficulty making sense of this as a genuine

possibility, consider

an analogous relationship

Newtonian mechanics and quantum mechanics

domain

this

to dismiss

mental causal phenomena are distributed over two
the reader

cannot both be

of (relatively)

--

that between

restricted to the

slow-moving, large objects.

It

is

not

incoherent to maintain that both describe physical causal

phenomena, yet

that

quantum mechanics implements Newtonian

mechanics. By restricting consideration to large objects — for which
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quantum

effects are not discernible

hence, of non-reducibility,

realm

is

by two

like the

domain

is

—

domain

the

excluded.

of mismatch, and,

Perhaps, then, the mental

of classical physical objects

-

explainable

one of which implements the other. (This

distinct theories,

obviously skirts the issue of whether both theories do in fact
correctly describe this domain.) In any event, this demonstrates that
this possible relationship

between traditionalism and PDP

is

not

incoherent.

As already argued, the two models would be qualitatively
distinct

on

this view.

this alternative to

Also as mentioned previously,

offered by

A second

do not find

be the one that best depicts the relationship

between traditionalism and PDP, for

mind

I

PDP

it

identifies the

as the unit level of description of

model

of the

PDP systems.

possible relationship allows only partial reduction or

supervenience between the two models.

domain within the

overall

traditionalism;

for

but,

Thus, for a restricted

mental realm, PDP implements

another domain, no reduction or

supervenience of mental states posited by traditionalism to states
posited by PDP

is

possible.

For this alternative, the qualitative

distinctness of the two models with respect to the

domain

of

reducibility or supervenience decides the issue of qualitative

they are qualitatively distinct.

distinctness simpliciter:
reject

this

possibility

outright,

but

I

note

that

I

the

do not

most

philosophically interesting question relates to the qualitative
distinctness of the two models

which traditionalism

is

when

restricted to the

not implemented by PDP.
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This

domain
is

for

an issue

that

I

consider with the third alternative interpretation of the

relationship between traditionalism

According to

and PDP.

third alternative, there

this

is

no possible

reduction or supervenience relations linking traditionalism and PDP:
there

is

no sense

in

which the mental realm

two models explain distinct
Looking back to Chapter

2

levels of

and

is

causally

phenomena

my

and the

fat,

within that realm.

preferred view of causation

presented there, the mental facts are predicted by the traditionalist

mental causal laws plus

initial

conditions,

and the mental

predicted by the PDP mental causal laws plus

facts are

initial conditions,

and

there are no bridge statements (either universally quantified or
particular) linking the states quantified over within the two models.

Thus, traditionalism and PDP are models competing to explain the

same

As mentioned in Section

level.

models are

distinct,

question

settle that

1

of this chapter, competing

but not necessarily qualitatively distinct.

we must examine

To

the two aspects of qualitative

distinctness as applied to this interpretation of their relationship.

The

first

question to ask

is:

do they make the same ontological

and

commitments?

In the final sections of Chapters 3

the ontological

commitments associated with traditionalism and PDP,

4,

I

laid out

respectively. First, the very broad considerations. Both theories are

based on a physicalist metaphysics, and both assume that there are
causally efficacious mental states picked out by their content. These

mental states are explicitly instantiated
presumably

in

physical

states,

in the physical states of the brain.

Since mental causal laws advert to content, one aspect of the
ontological

commitment

of a theory of the
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mind

is

the level of reality

represented by these causally efficacious mental

states.

I

think that

good case can be made that the LOT argument imposes on

a

traditionalism constraints that imply that the level of
realitv

represented by mental states corresponds to word-concepts and
propositions easily expressible by words and sentences in our public

language.

Similarly,

the general considerations favoring a

distributed interpretation schema impose on

PDP constraints

that

likewise imply this level of reality as that represented by the

causally

efficacious

mental

commitments of the two

Thus,

states.

the

ontological

theories are the same.

The question of ontological commitment

is,

however, only one

of two questions to be addressed in deciding the issue of qualitative
distinctness.

The more complex

of the two questions

Are the two

is:

causal relations on the set of efficacious states associated with
traditionalism

and PDP respectively possibly isomorphic? Here

important to recall what

it

means when a proponent

other of the two models pronounces: "this

is

it is

of one or the

an explanatory model

of the mind." Mental state transitions are regulated by the mental

causal laws.

In particular, the transitions of the states of a

traditionalist (or PDP)

system identified as the mentally causally

efficacious states are regulated
state transitions (picked out

by the mental causal

by content

laws.

These

in a semantic description of

system behavior) are also describable in syntactic terms

.

48 Indeed,

it

48 feel obliged to reiterate a point made repeatedly in this work, and justified
in Chapter 2 -- my account of mental causation does not leave content causally
impotent, even though the behavior of a system (whether artificial or
biological in origin) that admits of a semantic description also admits of a
I

syntactic description.
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is

the syntactic description of state transitions that defines
the

corresponding abstract machine.

According

to traditionalism,

it is

the computational states that

are the causally efficacious mental states.

reworking
states.

there

of)

PDP,

So, traditionalism
is

(my

to

the activation value plus weight vector

is

it

According

and PDP are

qualitatively distinct only

no possible mapping between computational

states

if

and

activation value plus weight vector states, such that the state
transitions within the respective systems are the same.

possibly such a mapping? Given what
4,

there cannot be such a mapping.

I

have said in Chapters

must be

either that

there
3

and

Consider the evolution of the

representational states within a PDP system.
it

Is

When

a state changes,

one (or more) unit activation values changed,

or that one (or more) weights changed, or that one (or more) of each

changed.

When

Let's consider the first of the three cases separately.

only a unit activation value (or multiple unit activation

values) has changed, there

activation values

—

all

is

no change

that has

in the line of succession of

happened

is

that the next overall

activation value has replaced the current one.

A

line of succession

(determined by a fixed pattern of weights) defines a system

dynamics not necessarily dissimilar from the succession of
computational states within a traditionalist system. (Keep in mind
that

my

task

is

to identify a dissimilarity

transitions of traditionalist

between the

and PDP representation

state

states that

is

guaranteed to occur.)

The

situation

PDP system

is

owing

is

otherwise

to a

change
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when

the change of state within a

in weight (or weights). In this case,

the line of succession of future states

is

altered. Recall

4 the role that weights play within PDP systems:

encode the sequence of patterns of activation that

on a particular input. Whereas a change

from Chapter

they implicitly
will

be produced

in activation value

merely

changes the position of the system within a sequence of activation
values, a

change

in weight

changes the whole sequence. There

comparable feature within a

is

no

traditionalist system.

Weight change within PDP systems using the back-prop
technique
learning.

is

the result of back-propagation of an error signal during

Perhaps, an opponent of the qualitative distinctness of

traditionalism and

PDP may argue, a

similar effect can be found

during the execution of a learning cycle within a traditionalist
system. Certainly traditionalist systems can learn (an active area of

research within traditionalist-based AI

is

the development of

learning algorithms); however, the computational assumption at the

heart of traditionalism limits learning within traditionalism to

changes in the manipulated data structures.

Changes

in the

algorithm (or program) take one outside the scope of computational
processing.

Again, this imagined opponent

may

wish to divorce

traditionalism from computationalism. This move, however, would

prove the undoing of traditionalism as a model of the mind, for the
representational content of traditionalist states depends crucially on

those states being computational states.

Expressed compactly: No

computationalist assumption, no representational content.

No

representational content, no subsumption under mental causal laws.

No subsumption under mental
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causal laws, no model of the mind.

Traditionalism without the computational assumption
possible contender for a

model of the mind.

Again, this imagined opponent
the

mode

when

PDP

of learning within

being a model of the

not a

is

mind

--

is

may

try another tack. Perhaps,

a detail not relevant to PDP's

we should consider PDP

sans learning

asking the question: are traditionalism and PDP qualitatively

distinct? This tack

is,

like the

PDP sans learning

is

not a possible candidate for a model of the

previous one,

mind. In accordance with Chapter

PDP

states

is

4,

doomed

the representational content of

determined by the causal role of those

causal role for Type

III

states; but, the

representational systems (with "genuine

intentional mental states")

PDP has no

traditionalism,

to failure, for

is

determined via learning.

alternative

means

statehood) for fixing meaning, so learning

is

(i.e.,

Unlike

computational

an integral part of

its

being a possible model of the mind.

Looking at the foregoing argument in overview, we see that
there

is

no possible isomorphism

associating the transitions between

mentally causally efficacious states within traditionalism and PDP.
Various attempts at modifying the features of either theory so as to
allow a possible isomorphism result in a product that
possible

model

seriously

as

of the mind.
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not a

Therefore, taking the two theories

models of the mind implies

distinctness.

is

their

qualitative

,
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